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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over centuries, economists have been engaging in the question how fiscal policy affects
the economy. Fiscal policy in this context is defined as using government expenditures
and taxation to influence the level of aggregate demand in the economy.
The Keynesian theory advocates active fiscal policy to stabilize output over the busi-
ness cycle. The main ideas of the Keynesian theory were developed during the Great
Depression and were first presented by John Maynard Keynes in “The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money” in 1936 [72]. Two types of policy are usually
distinguished: expansionary and contractionary fiscal stimuli. A fiscal expansion is car-
ried out in two ways. The government raises expenditures or it can cut net taxes, i.e.,
the difference between taxes and transfer payments. An expansion in spending raises
the demand for goods and services directly. If the government cuts taxes or increases
transfer payments, mainly the households’ disposable income increases such that they
can spend more on consumption. This indirectly raises the aggregate demand for goods
and services. A contractionary fiscal stimulus is carried out by reducing government
spending or raising net taxes.
Fiscal policy can be conducted pro- or countercyclically to the business cycle. Pro-
cyclicality means that fiscal actions intensify the booms and recessions. In contrast,
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a countercyclical policy, which is advocated by Keynesian economists, means that the
policy acts against the tide of the business cycle: if an economy is in a recession, the
government pursues expansionary fiscal policy to stabilize output. This can be success-
ful if the fiscal expansion is well chosen in intensity and if there are production input
factors such as the labor force or machinery that are idle. Output is raised and prices
are rarely affected in that case. In contrast, if the unemployment rate is very low, an
expansionary fiscal stimulus will affect inflation rather than output.1 Moreover, fiscal
policy is countercyclical if the government pursues a contractionary fiscal policy in a
boom by raising taxes or cutting government expenditure to suppress inflation.
In the business cycle, the economic system is influenced by automatic stabilizers, which
intensify expansionary fiscal policy in a recession and contractionary fiscal policy in a
boom without taking an explicit policy decision. This coincides with countercyclical fis-
cal policy. Some examples are the unemployment benefits or the personal income taxes:
the number of unemployed workers increase in a recession and thus, unemployment ben-
efits as one component of government expenditure rise. Moreover, the income of the
households declines due to the recession such that the personal income tax revenue as
one component of the overall tax revenue declines. Thus, spending is raised and the tax
revenue decreases in a recession, which corresponds to countercyclical fiscal policy.
Not only automatic stabilizers respond to the business cycle, but also the fiscal policy
institutions directly react to changes in the economic situation. Two examples are the
application of fiscal policy during the Great Depression (1929-end 1930s) and during the
current economic crisis (2007/2008-?).
Figure 1.1 shows the world industrial output from June 1925 and from April 2008 on-
wards with monthly data.2 The data are normalized to 100 for the starting period of
the respective series, which is chosen as the last peak before the production begins to
decline.
The run of the two series is more or less similar for the first year after the peak. World
1See for example Weil [126].
2The figure is taken from “A Tale of two Depressions”, by B. Eichengreen and K. O’Rourke
(2009/2010), [45].
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industrial output declines severely in the Great Depression 1929 and in the financial
crisis of 2008. But contrary to the Great Depression a lasting fall in production cannot
be observed for the second and third year after the peak in the current crisis.
Figure 1.1: World Industrial Production
In the 1920s, the economic downturn began in the USA. Contrary to the traditional
policy of laissez-faire in American depressions before 1929, US president Herbert Hoover
decided to respond to the Great Depression shock with several bailout and spending
programs. Farmers’ subsidies were introduced and public works were intensified. In
1929, the government had a budget surplus and decided to cut taxes. But the higher
government expenditures in combination with the decline in income caused a sharp gov-
ernment deficit—see Rothbard [115]. Since Hoover strictly believed in balanced budgets,
the Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1932. To stabilize the budget balance, tax rates
were raised excessively.
The New Deal was engaged with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 dur-
ing times of the lasting recession. This fiscal policy package was a series of economic
programs containing amongst other things the Work Projects Administration, which
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employed unskilled workers in public works projects and the Social Security Act, which
covered unemployment insurance and benefits for retirement, disability, survivorship,
and death. Moreover, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which should strengthen farm-
ers and the National Recovery Administration, which cartelized the American industry,
were part of the New Deal. The latter two Acts caused a further reduction in output.
Overall, the USA did not recover from the depression until World War II.
Brown [26], Peppers [107], or Renaghan [111] amongst others examined fiscal policy for
the period 1929-end 1930s and found that fiscal policy was at least a bit expansionary
during this period. Overall, Roosevelt still believed in balanced budgets and did not
set fiscal policy expansionary enough to help the economy to recover. “In brief, then, it
took the massive expenditures forced on the nation by the second world war to realize
the full potentialities of fiscal policy.”, see Brown [26].
The depression hit Europe at the beginning of the 1930s. Fiscal policy in Germany
was first not very expansionary because the budget deficit as a percent of GDP did
not increase very much. Cohn [37] states that German fiscal policy was even restrictive
through 1932. Then it turned towards expansion. After 1934, the deficits rose, which
was caused by massive spending on public works and rearmament—see Romer [114].
Figure 1.23 shows the fiscal surplus, i.e., the difference between government total rev-
enue and government total spending, in percent of GDP as an approximation of fiscal net
spending for the whole world from 1925 onwards, for advanced and emerging countries
and the world from 2004 onwards. The data are plotted in years and start 4 years before
the main crisis.
The fiscal surplus curve for the Great Depression time period is indeed positive or only
very weakly negative for 1925-1929. It turned into a deficit in 1930, which grew with
the contracting economy. But compared to the world fiscal surplus curve for 2004-2010,
the deficits in the 1930s were very moderate as response to the economic crisis. To fight
the 2008 crisis, a huge expansion in government spending took place, raising the deficit
3The figure is taken from “A Tale of two Depressions”, by B. Eichengreen and K. O’Rourke
(2009/2010), [45].
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per GDP ratio sharply.
It seems, the role of fiscal policy in economic crises is changing. Expenditures have been
raised more excessively by now and the willingness to accept high deficits has increased.4
Figure 1.2: Fiscal Surplus in Percent of GDP
Years
Examples for countercyclical fiscal policy in Germany are the German scrapping pro-
gram for cars and the German fiscal stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009 as an answer to
the 2008 recession. The stimulus packages focused on a child tax credit and on spending
in transportation and education.
In theory, fiscal policy decisions can be made under two assumptions. On one hand,
fiscal policy can be pursued under commitment. In this case, the government optimizes
the present value of the objective function (e.g., a welfare function) and makes binding
optimal policy choices. The future policy actions are specified in advance—see Barro [8].
In particular, Kydland and Prescott [77] look at binding rules for policy as a special form
of commitment. On the other hand, fiscal policy decisions can be taken discretionary. In
4See B. Eichengreen and K. O’Rourke [45].
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that case, the government reoptimizes its fiscal policy decision every period, i.e., it op-
timizes the objective function for each period. As a consequence, the economic business
cycle can directly be taken into account. The optimal choice of fiscal policy today does
not restrict future policy decisions—see Barro [8]. The main limitation of discretionary
policy is its time-inconsistency problem due to the time lag emerging between the point
of time when policy decisions are announced and the time when the fiscal decision is
implemented (if it is indeed implemented).
Fiscal policy can be directly seen in the changes of the government’s budget as already
used in the comparison of the Great Depression and the 2008 crisis. The budget of a
government can be described as the difference between net tax revenues and government
expenditures within one period, e.g., a quarter or a year. Every rise in the budget corre-
sponds to contractionary fiscal policy. In contrast, a reduction in the budget is said to be
expansionary fiscal policy. If the budget is positive, the government is running a surplus.
Contrary, if the budget is negative and thus if government spending exceeds government
net tax revenues, the government is running a budget deficit. When the government
raises its deficit by a fiscal expansion, it issues long-term bonds paying off interest and
uses the proceeds to finance the deficit. By issuing bonds, it directly competes with
private borrowers for money. If all other determinants of the process, in particular, the
money supply, are held constant, the fiscal expansion raises the interest rates. As a
consequence, private investment is reduced, affecting aggregate demand negatively.5
Whether a fiscal stimulus is effective or not depends on the magnitude of the crowd-
ing out effect; a question, which was heavily discussed between classical and Keynesian
economists. Since an expansionary fiscal policy action raises aggregate demand on one
hand though crowds out private investment on the other hand, the overall effect of the
fiscal expansion depends on the relative changes in the directly and indirectly affected
economic components. In an open economy, even more components of output are af-
fected. Higher interest rates caused by the expansion of issuing bonds to finance an
additional deficit attract foreign investors such that they acquire domestic assets. The
5See Weil [126].
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increased demand of domestic currency causes an exchange rate appreciation in the short
run. As a consequence, domestic goods are more expensive for foreigners and foreign
goods are cheaper for residents. Imports rise and exports decline.6
The budget balance can be split into two parts, a cyclical and a structural component.
The cyclical budget balance contains the difference between cyclical components of gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure. Moreover, the structural budget balance is defined
as the difference of tax revenue and government spending if output would be equal to
its potential level.
In most studies, the structural budget balance of a government household is used to
evaluate the fiscal stance, i.e., the way fiscal policy is pursued. The structural budget
balance can be calculated in several ways. The method used by the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) tries to capture changes in the structure of demand and income
in more detail. Compared to other methods, it uses less aggregated data to calculate the
budgetary elasticities, see, e.g., Bouthevillain et al. [23]. Furthermore, different compo-
nents influencing the budget balance are chosen to take cyclical adjustment into account.
A second method to calculate structural and cyclical budget balances is the OECD ap-
proach. Within this approach, output elasticities of government spending and revenues
are calculated for different components of expenditure and tax categories. Then, poten-
tial output is derived. Finally, by combining the output elasticities and the potential
output, the structural balance is calculated.
Economic institutions as the IMF or the OECD analyze the fiscal policy in several
countries—see, e.g., the OECD Economic Outlook No. 74 [103], where fiscal policy in
the three major countries Germany, France, and Italy for 1991-2002 is examined.
The efficacy of fiscal policy, in particular, the difference between shocks in government
expenditure and net taxes and the existence of spill-overs caused by national fiscal policy
to foreign countries are of major interest. The most frequently used working horse to
analyze these questions is the structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) approach. The
main challenge of this approach is to identify uncorrelated structural shocks. In general,
6See Weil [126].
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observations in time series data evolve from different influences. For example, the tax
revenue is affected by changes in income. Moreover, if taxes are changed, the disposable
income is affected and finally overall income changes. Thus, if fiscal variables and other
economic variables (e.g., output, the inflation, or the interest rate) are examined in an
SVAR framework, the resulting fiscal residuals are not independent of each other. The
residuals have to be reestimated. This reestimation adjusts for automatic effects of un-
expected movements in the other economic variables as output on the fiscal variables.
Independent fiscal shocks are identified.
There are different methods to identify these fiscal shocks. A Choleski ordering of the
variables is often used—see, e.g., Fata´s and Mihov [47]. By imposing sign restrictions on
the responses of economic variables to fiscal shocks, Mountford and Uhlig [100] identify
uncorrelated shocks. A different approach is that of Blanchard and Perotti [21] who
focus on the time lag in the decision making and implementation process of fiscal policy.
Hence, they assume that a frequency of quarterly data is too short for a response of
the fiscal variables to changes in output. This assumption is crucial in the identification
process of shocks because cross-dependencies are excluded. Blanchard and Perotti [21]
use institutional information, in particular, elasticities of the fiscal instruments (expen-
ditures and net taxes) with respect to output and prices to identify the fiscal shocks.
The effect of fiscal policy in Germany including only national economic variables is ex-
amined, e.g., by Arcangelis and Lamartina [39], Ho¨ppner [64], Heppke-Falk et al. [61],
Breuer and Buettner [25], or Bode et al. [22]. To analyze spill-over effects of German
fiscal policy to foreign countries, Palacios-Salguero [105] or Giuliodori and Beetsma [57]
introduce trade variables as the exchange rate or imports from member countries of the
European Monetary Union (EMU).
A related topic is to analyze the dependence of national debt to fiscal policy. In this
context, the national debt is defined as the aggregate total stock of government bonds
and outstanding interest payments over time. When the government finances a rise in
the deficit, e.g., for an expansionary fiscal stimulus by borrowing, the national debt is
raised. If bonds are issued, debt can be held by own citizens or by foreigners (in the case
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of borrowing overseas). Greece for example is highly indebted (with 164% in 2011) and
the debt is held mainly by foreigners or institutions that are not part of Greece. Japan
is also highly indebted (about 232% in 2011), but debt is held primarily by domestic
institutions and citizens.
Figure 1.3 shows the ratio of government debt held by non-residents to total government
debt in 2009 for France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and the USA.7
Figure 1.3: Ratio of Debt Held by Non-Residents to Total Government Debt (2009)
In this context, a quite interesting question emerges: does it make any difference to
the level of the capital stock or to the level of utility of domestic citizens if the debt is
internal compared to the one where it is external. Diamond [41] uses the standard two
overlapping generations model implemented by Samuelson [116] to decide, which conse-
quences arise. Barro [7] and Wickens [127] introduce a lump-sum tax payment where
in one case debt is held by foreigners. In the other case, exclusively domestic citizens
7The data are taken from Eurostat for Italy, Germany, and France. The ratio for Greece is taken from
Cabral [30]. The ratio for the USA is approximated by taking the marketable and non-marketable debt
as total public debt. Moreover, the ratio of marketable and non-marketable debt held by non-residents
taken from the OECD database to total debt is calculated. An alternative approach would be to derive
the ratio with external public debt data taken from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, see [68]. The
result is closely the same. The Japanese ratio is an imprecise estimate due to data unavailability.
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hold the debt. They pay the interest due at the beginning of each period. Blanchard
[19] analyzes the effect of debt on the level of steady state consumption and the interest
rate in a finite horizon model. He uses explicit consumption aggregation but he needs
special assumptions to do so, e.g., the assumption that the population does not grow.
Not only the distinction between the kind of debt, but also the effect of debt in spe-
cial economic environments is of common interest. The establishment of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) as an economic organization that has on one hand a unique
currency and one monetary authority but on the other hand pursues national fiscal poli-
cies, which are uncoordinated and independent of other EMU member countries, raises
new questions concerning national fiscal policy and debt levels. Possible problems of a
monetary union, where fiscal authorities act independently, are analyzed by Uhlig [124].
In the current crisis, especially the consequences of high debt levels of member countries
play a major role.
Figure 1.4 gives a broad overview of the public debt per GDP ratio of different countries.
Each value is chosen as median value of the whole year.8
Figure 1.4: World Map of Public Debt in Percent of GDP
8The map is taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website and visualizes the
data from the Historical Public Debt Database (Fiscal Affairs Departmental Data) for 2009. See
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php.
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The orange and deep red areas indicate medium to highly indebted countries, respec-
tively. Highly indebted is defined as a debt per GDP ratio exceeding 75%. A country is
colored green (yellow, orange) if the debt per GDP ratio is smaller than 20% (20-40%,
40-75%) and uncolored if no data is available for that country. Not only the US, but also
Canada, Japan, India, some European, and some African countries are highly indebted
according to the underlying classification scheme.9
Figure 1.5 shows the development of the public debt per GDP ratio for selected countries
in 1980-2012.10 The data for Germany begin in 1991 with the German reunification.
Figure 1.5: General Government Gross Debt in Percent of GDP
All countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and the USA) have one thing in
common: the government gross debt per GDP ratio increased over time. Starting with a
9Note, that the debt to GDP ratio crucially depends on the aggregation of public debt components.
Every institution uses its own definition of debt such that the percentages are not equal for different
databases.
10The graph is taken from the DSI Global Economic Statistics Database. All data are plotted in
current prices.
11
1.1. MOTIVATION
20% debt per GDP ratio for France in 1980, the ratio grew up to 87% in 2011. The ratio
for Japan increased from 52% in 1980 to 232% in 2011. Gross debt per GDP was 40%
for Germany in 1991 and has risen to 83% in 2011. Germany and France show a com-
parable development of the debt per GDP ratio. The USA was indebted with a smaller
ratio than Germany and France at the beginning of the 2000s. The ratio then rose from
2008 onwards and exceeded the respective ratios for Germany and France in 2011. Since
1992, the gross government debt per GDP in Italy amounts to more than 100% (121%
in 2011). Greece’s debt to GDP ratio has increased sharply from 2008 onwards. With
164% in 2011, it is the highest ratio measured for a European country. Japan has the
highest debt per GDP ratio since 1998 (232% in 2011 and 237.5% in 2012).
In this context, an important question is how to reduce the debt levels without having
too much loss in welfare.
Gal´ı and Monacelli [54] develop an EMU-style model consisting of n countries each with
negligible size embedded in a monetary union environment. The country size restriction
implies the absence of feedback effects from the other economies. The model contains
national household and business sectors with imperfect competition and sticky prices,
national fiscal authorities, and one union-wide monetary authority. The monetary au-
thority maximizes union-wide welfare under the assumption that optimal fiscal policy is
carried out. Fiscal authorities offer public goods efficiently and try to stabilize domestic
inflation and the output gap. In contrast, Ferrero [49] includes a role for distortionary
taxes and government debt (in a two country currency union). He assumes that the
fiscal policy of one country affects the second country and thus derives a Phillips curve,
a government solvency constraint, and a demand curve including the terms of trade. As
a consequence, the terms of trade are part of the loss function and therefore, they are
a target for fiscal policy. Alternative simple rules for fiscal and monetary policy are an-
alyzed within this framework. Leith and Wren-Lewis [83] augment the Gal´ı/Monacelli
model by a government sector and examine fiscal and monetary policy if the policy
makers optimize under discretion. They include income taxes as a tax instrument and
analyze the consequences of debt shocks.
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1.2 Outline and Preview of Results
This thesis analyzes the role of government debt and fiscal policy. The study is sub-
divided into 4 parts. The first two parts examine the role of government debt on a
theoretical basis, whereas the last two parts study empirically the German fiscal stance,
the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and national fiscal spill-over effects to foreign countries
using time series data.11 Chapter 6 draws conclusions and gives an outlook on new
topics of research.
In particular, Chapter 2 analyzes the differences in the steady state capital-labor ratio
and the steady state utility level of domestic citizens resulting if debt is held by foreigners
or residents. Building on the standard two overlapping generations model by Samuelson
[116] and Diamond [41], we introduce a third generation, which lives on redistributed
income of another generation. This generation is called the children-generation and lives
together with a parents-generation and an old generation in an overlapping generations
model. Debt is included as external or internal debt and a lump-sum tax is introduced
to ensure interest payments for the outstanding debt. We analyze the effect of debt on
the steady state of the growth model, which can be dynamically efficient or dynamically
inefficient. In the latter case, the individuals of the economy save too much and the
capital stock is too high.
The following is shown: the more income is redistributed from the parents to the chil-
dren, the higher is the steady state capital-labor ratio in the economy. At some critical
point, the redistribution of income leads to a dynamically inefficient steady state. If the
steady state is dynamically efficient, the steady state capital stock declines in both debt
scenarios after the introduction of debt. Also the steady state utility level of individuals
declines with the introduction of debt for both scenarios. If the steady state is dynami-
cally inefficient, the steady state capital-labor ratio rises in the case of an external debt
and falls with debt held by domestic citizens. For the external debt case, the effect on
the utility level cannot be determined in general. However, if residents hold the debt,
11In the theoretical part as well as in the empirical part of this thesis, log or logarithm is used as a
synonym for the natural logarithm.
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they can substitute debt for physical capital and thus reduce the inefficiently high capital
stock. This leads to a rise in utility. Overall, the consequences of debt highly depend on
the debt holder structure.
The third chapter analyzes the effects of a national debt shock in a monetary union.
Based on a European Monetary Union-style model with a single monetary institution
and multiple fiscal authorities, we simulate a national debt shock and analyze different
policy reactions to reduce the debt. Building on Gal´ı/Monacelli [54] and Leith/Wren-
Lewis [83], optimal monetary and optimal national fiscal policy under commitment with
different fiscal instruments are examined.
Taking this context as given, the following is shown: optimal national fiscal policy under
commitment and optimal monetary policy under commitment do not contradict each
other. If debt suddenly increases in a single country, the national government should
optimally lower government spending and raise taxes in order to reduce debt. Since
changes in debt, government spending, and taxes influence the inflation rate, the in-
tensity of a fiscal response is found to be very low to avoid high welfare losses. Thus,
debt would be reduced very slowly. The higher the debt level in the occurrence of an
additional positive shock in debt is, the stronger are the optimal fiscal policy responses
and the higher is the loss in welfare. Comparing direct and indirect taxes, i.e., wage and
sales taxes, as fiscal instruments, the optimal intensity of fiscal responses under commit-
ment depends on the choice of the tax instrument: the fiscal authority has to raise sales
taxes by a higher amount to obtain a comparable optimal debt reduction path. Hence,
an optimal response of sales taxes to a debt shock causes higher national welfare losses.
Overall, optimal fiscal policy including indirect taxes is less effective in reducing debt.
The fourth and fifth chapter present empirical findings about fiscal policy in Germany
for 1991-2009. Chapter 4 examines the fiscal stance. In particular, we first estimate
potential output and the elasticities of the two fiscal policy instruments, government
spending and net tax revenues, with respect to output and prices using quarterly data.
Combining the estimates of the elasticities and the estimated potential output, we obtain
the structural budget balance. The derivation of the fiscal stance defined as changes in
14
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the structural budget balance concludes the analytical part of the situation in Germany
for 1991-2009. Potential output increases within the analyzed period and actual output
lies below its potential level, except for 2000-2002. Using the fiscal stance to assess fis-
cal policy, the following is found: the German government follows a pro-cyclical policy
for most parts of 1991-2000. This behavior changes in 2001 such that fiscal policy is
conducted countercyclically for most parts of 2001-2009. During challenging economic
times fiscal policy responds clearly countercyclically to the economic development for
the whole time horizon 1991-2009.
In the fifth chapter, the effect of fiscal shocks on real variables is examined. Fiscal shocks
in this context are changes in government expenditure and revenues, i.e., fiscal policy
actions. We follow a reduced form VAR approach and use the shock identification pro-
cedure introduced by Blanchard and Perotti [21] to study the effect of fiscal shocks on
important economic variables like output.
First, we introduce a baseline model with the three endogenous variables real log govern-
ment expenditure per capita, real log net tax revenue per capita, and real log GDP per
capita. To analyze different cross-dependencies, this setting is augmented by two (the
inflation and the long-term interest rate) and later four (moreover, the real log imports
from EMU member countries per capita and the real effective exchange rate) additional
endogenous variables. Finally, we do not allow the interest rate and the exchange rate
to move by including the interest and the exchange rate as exogenous variables to decide
which trade variables are affected and whether there exist spill-over effects from one
EMU country to another in a perfectly functioning monetary union. The response of
consumption and investment to fiscal shocks is discussed in detail for all model varia-
tions to find the economic theory matching best the empirical results for Germany. Since
Germany’s economy is export driven, special attention is paid to the response of exports
to fiscal shocks. In this context, robust to all model variations, the following is shown:
the overall deficit rises due to a positive shock in government expenditure and declines
due to a positive net tax shock. Changing net taxes is a more effective instrument in
changing deficits in the short run, whereas varying government expenditure influences
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deficits more strongly in the medium run. A positive shock in government expenditure
first raises output but is followed by a decline in output after a while. Moreover, a
positive shock in the net tax revenue affects output negatively. Overall, the estimated
multipliers are low such that fiscal policy does not seem to be a strong instrument to
stabilize output. Private consumption first rises and then declines due to a rise in gov-
ernment expenditure. The rise fits to Keynesian theory, whereas a decline would follow
with Neoclassical theory. Thus, the observed response of consumption does not explicitly
support one of the two theories. Investment declines due to a positive shock in govern-
ment spending. Furthermore, imports from EMU member countries and exports are
examined in detail. Both variables fall if government spending or net taxes are raised.
Thus, we detect spill-over effects of German fiscal policy to foreign countries since the
exports of EMU member countries and thus foreign GDPs are lowered by German fiscal
shocks. A fiscal coordination for the EMU countries may be a valuable approach to
stabilize not only the economic outcome of one single country but also the situation of
the whole European Monetary Union.
16
CHAPTER 2. DEBT IN A THREE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
Chapter 2
Debt in a Three Overlapping
Generations Model
2.1 Introduction
In the current crisis, government debt of economies plays a major role. Within this
context, there are different types of debt. Greece for example is highly indebted (with
164% in 2011) and the debt is held mainly by foreigners or institutions that are not
part of Greece. Japan is also highly indebted (about 232% in 2011), but contrary to
Greece, debt is held primarily by domestic institutions and citizens. Following Samuel-
son [116] and Diamond [41] who introduced an overlapping generations model type first,
we examine an infinite horizon overlapping generations model including a household sec-
tor and a production sector in the baseline model. We augment the original household
sector by a children-generation. The consumption decision of the additional generation
is constrained by the transfer payments it receives from the parents-generation. The
parents-generation works, saves, consumes, and supports the children without being al-
truistic. Thus, the chosen model structure differs from the model setting of Becker and
Barro [9, 11], who implement altruism by intergenerational transfers into an overlapping
generations model. They use a utility function that depends on the own as well as the
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utility of the descendant generation. No dynamically inefficient solution is possible in
that case.1
Since we want to analyze the effect of different natures of debt for dynamically inefficient
as well as efficient steady states, we choose the approach described above.
The old generation is the same as in the usual two overlapping generations model: it
consumes the amount it saved when being a part of the parents-generation.
A three overlapping generations model is included in few other studies: three generations
are implemented by Marchand et al. [93] and by Docquier et al. [42], who examine laissez
faire and social optimal solutions in an endogenous growth model where human capital
causes the growth of the economy. The three generations are connected by intergener-
ational transfers, i.e., parents finance the pensions of the old as well as the education
of the young in these papers. Melindi Ghidi [97] uses a three overlapping generations
model to analyze effects of demographic shocks on intertemporal consumption and sav-
ing decisions in different life cycle stages. Constantinides et al. [38] try to explain the
equity premium puzzle in the context of a three overlapping generations model. They
introduce debt as well as an equity in the model. The main focus lies on the accumula-
tion of equity and the level of the interest rate.
So far, the role of debt has not been explicitly determined in a three overlapping gener-
ations framework. This is done within the underlying chapter.
To get an idea of what changes arise if we assume a model setting including debt, the
new baseline model is augmented. Based on Barro [7] and Wickens [127], we introduce
a lump-sum tax payment where in one case debt is held by foreigners. In the other case,
domestic citizens, i.e., the parents-generation paying the interest due at the beginning
of the period exclusively hold the debt. Blanchard [19] analyzes the effect of debt on the
level of steady state consumption and the interest rate in a finite horizon model. He uses
a consumption aggregation of different generations but he needs special assumptions to
do so, e.g., the assumption that there is no population growth.
In this infinite horizon type study, the population grows with a constant rate gn > 0.
1See Becker and Barro [9, 11] and Barro/Sala-i-Martin [10].
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A visualization of the law of motion for the capital per labor ratio is undertaken using
MATLAB [94] and a comparison of the model variations with different types of debt is
discussed. Finally, the theoretic foundation of the effects of positive external or internal
debt on the utility level of an individual is given. In this context, we differ between two
cases: the model leads to a steady state that is either dynamically efficient or dynami-
cally inefficient.2 If consumption is too low and thus savings are too high in steady state,
the steady state capital-labor ratio is too high. With too much capital, the steady state
interest rate is too low. As a consequence, the steady state cannot be Pareto optimal
and is dynamically inefficient. Similar to the original overlapping two generations model
analyzed by Diamond [41], the underlying setting shows that debt lowers the utility level
in a dynamically efficient long run equilibrium no matter who holds the debt. The steady
state capital-labor ratio declines. If the steady state solution is dynamically inefficient, a
rising debt raises utility for the internal debt case. The capital stock is inefficiently high
such that with the introduction of debt, citizens substitute debt for physical capital in
their portfolios. Hence, the dynamically inefficient steady state capital per labor ratio
falls. If debt is held by foreigners, it is not part of the domestic citizens’ portfolios.
Capital cannot be substituted by debt. As a consequence, the introduction of debt and
taxes being a subsidy in the dynamically inefficient case, raise disposable income. Sav-
ings are higher and the steady state capital-labor ratio increases. The debt effect on
utility cannot be determined in general due to the existence of counteracting directions
of effects.
The chapter is organized as follows: in the next three sections, a theoretical description
of the new baseline model including three generations is given and the model is aug-
mented by the existence of a debt that is held in the first case by foreigners and in the
second case exclusively by residents. Section 5 calibrates the model using reasonable
parameter values from the recent literature. A visualization as well as a comparison of
the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio is given for the three model specifications.
2The transversality condition in the Ramsey Model ensures that dynamic inefficiency can never
arise. In the underlying model type, it is possible to be in steady state where savings are too high
and consumption is too low (i.e., the steady state is dynamically inefficient in that case).
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To analyze the difference of a debt held by foreigners and an internal debt (i.e., debt is
held by residents in this case), we follow Diamond [41] and derive the effect of a debt
on the utility level of an individual in the sixth section. The last section gives some
conclusions.
2.2 The Three Overlapping Generations Model
Suppose, there are three generations living at the same time: the children-generation,
the parents-generation, and the old generation, which can be described as the grandpar-
ents of the economy. All variables in per capita terms relating to the population size
of the respective generation are marked with a reversed hat, e.g., a variable X changes
to Xˇ . If a variable X is expressed per labor, a tilde is used (X˜). Moreover, the model
variables X are indexed as follows. Xi,t is the variable X of the children-generation
(i = 1), the parents-generation (i = 2), or the old generation (i = 3) in period t. Since
no unemployment is introduced in the model, all members of the parents-generation
work. The size of the parents-generation corresponds exactly to the number of workers,
i.e., the magnitude of labor. As a consequence, a variable X defined in per capita terms
of the parents-generation is equal to variable X in per labor terms. Xˇ2,t = X˜t.
In general, the optimization problem of households can be described as follows. Each
member of one of the generations maximizes a standard constant relative risk aversion
utility function depending only on consumption U(Cˇi,t) =
Cˇ1−σi,t −1
1−σ for the corresponding
lifetime horizon. σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 1/σ is the intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity between consumption in any two periods, i.e., the willingness
to substitute consumption in any two periods. The higher σ, the less willing is a house-
hold to substitute consumption over time. We assume that σ = 1 and thus choose as
utility function U(Cˇi,t) = ln(Cˇi,t). Moreover, the generation population size belonging
to the initial parents-generation is normalized to N2,2 = 1. The initial first period to be
analyzed is period 2 (it is the first period, where all three generations live together). The
demographic structure is described as follows. Every generation grows with a fixed rate
20
CHAPTER 2. DEBT IN A THREE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
gn ∈ [0, 1] in the following periods. It holds that Ni,t+1 = (1 + gn)Ni,t ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and ∀ t ≥ 2. If gn = 0.5, the generation grows by 50%. Moreover, members of a gen-
eration do not die before they finish their lifetime as a member of the old generation.
Hence, the generation size, e.g., of the children-generation in t is equal to the member
size of the parents-generation in t + 1: Ni,t = Ni+1,t+1 ∀ i ∈ 1, 2 and ∀ t ≥ 2. Since
each individual lives for 3 periods, every period is about 25 years long.
The children-generation gets a transfer payment (a donation) from the parents-genera-
tion and decides what amount to consume and what amount to save for the time when
the members of the children-generation are parents.
The parents-generation works and receives labor income. In addition, it gets the savings
from the time when the members were children plus the interest payments net of depre-
ciation. The expenditures of every member of the parents-generation can be described as
follows: parents support the children in the economy and therefore transfer a donation,
which is proportional to their wage. As in the original overlapping generations model
the parents3 decide what amount to save for the consumption when being old and what
to consume now.
The members of the old generation consume the return on savings when they were
parents.
2.3 The Baseline Model
The first part of the following section derives the optimal consumption-savings plans of
an initial parents-, an initial old, and an arbitrary children-generation. Moreover, the
law of motion for the capital-labor ratio in a three overlapping generations model is
calculated. The second part deals with the assumptions, under which the steady state
allocations are optimal. In this context, a condition is stated that can be checked to
decide whether the equilibrium is dynamically efficient or not in the calibration exercise
of Section 5.
3This generation corresponds to the young generation in the original two overlapping generations
model.
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2.3.1 Model Structure
The modeled economy consists of a household sector, which acts like an entrepreneur.
It decides how much money to invest in the business sector by choosing an amount of
saving. The depreciation appears therefore in the household sector. The second sector
are the firms facing constant returns to scale. Hence, the profits of firms are zero.
Labor and capital are used as input factors to produce an output good Y . Without
loss of generality, we can assume that there is a single representative firm behaving
competitively in the sense that it takes the rental prices for the inputs as well as the
output price as given. Furthermore, in later sections, a government sector is introduced
in the model.
Period 2 is the first period to be analyzed as it is the first period, where all three
generations live together. The initial parents-generation, the initial old generation, and
a common children-generation are part of this period. In the following, the optimal
lifetime consumption-savings plans for the three generations are derived. We begin
with the initial old generation living only for one period. Afterwards, the optimization
problem for the initial parents-generation for their 2 periods of lifetime is solved. Finally,
we analyze the maximization problem of an arbitrary children-generation. This includes
the analysis of the parents- and the old generation’s behavior for t > 2. We assume for
all derivations shown in this and the next sections that σ, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, is equal to 1. The general solutions for the optimal consumption-savings plans
of the analyzed generations assuming an arbitrary value for σ can be found in Appendix
A.1.
For the initial old generation, we observe the following: every member of the initial old
generation consumes an amount of Cˇ3,2 in period 2 and does not work, save, or financially
support any other member in the economy. It maximizes the utility of consumption under
the constraint that the whole initial old generation is endowed with the capital per labor
ratio K˜2 including the respective period interest payments with the interest rate r2 net
of depreciation. (1+ r2− δ)K˜2 can be unrestrictedly used for the initial old generation’s
consumption, where δ denotes the constant depreciation rate of capital. The endowment
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per member of the old generation is adjusted by the generation’s population size and
leads to an initial endowment of K˜2/(1 + gn) per old inhabitant. This is caused by the
demographic structure ((1 + gn)N3,2 = N3,3 = N2,2).
Therefore, the maximization problem for every member of the initial old generation is
given by
max
Cˇ3,2
U(Cˇ3,2) (2.1a)
s.t. Cˇ3,2 ≤ (1 + r2 − δ)
K˜2
1+gn
. (2.1b)
The optimal consumption decision of the initial old generation is to consume all they
own, i.e., Cˇ3,2 = (1 + r2 − δ)
K˜2
1+gn
. The optimal consumption choice of the initial old
generation only depends on the initial endowment and the interest rate in period 2.
The initial parents-generation lives in period 2 and 3. It starts living as parent and
becomes old in the next period. The initial parents-generation works and gets in return
an amount of w˜2 per worker. It supports the children-generation by paying d˜2 per
member to the children-generation and decides what amount to consume now (Cˇ2,2)
and what amount to save (Sˇ2,2) for consumption when being old (Cˇ3,3). Overall, the
members of the initial parents-generation maximize the intertemporal utility function
for their lifetime horizon:
max
Cˇ2,2, Sˇ2,2, Cˇ3,3
U(Cˇ2,2) + βU(Cˇ3,3) (2.2a)
s.t. Cˇ2,2 + Sˇ2,2 ≤ w˜2 − d˜2 (2.2b)
Cˇ3,3 ≤ (1 + r3 − δ)Sˇ2,2, (2.2c)
where β denotes the discount factor of utility. Moreover, β = 11+ρ , where ρ is the rate
of time preference.
The optimal decisions concerning the consumption and saving in period 2 and the con-
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sumption in period 3 are given by
Cˇ2,2 =
1
1 + β
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)
(2.2.1)
Sˇ2,2 =
β
1 + β
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)
(2.2.2)
Cˇ3,3 =
β
1 + β
(1 + r3 − δ)
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)
. (2.2.3)
Thus, the initial parents-generation splits its income w˜2 − d˜2 into consumption and
savings in period 2. In period 3, the members consume all they receive for saving Sˇ2,2
in period 2.
The initial parents-generation and the initial old generation living in period 2 have a
shorter overall lifetime compared to an arbitrary parents- or old generation. Contrary,
the children-generation in period 2 lives, as all other children-generations in time t > 2,
for 3 periods. Thus, the maximization problem the children-generation faces in period
2 is the same for all t ≥ 2.
The children decide what amount of their “income”, (the donation d˜t they receive in
period t from the parents-generation) to consume and what amount to save. The amount
of savings when being a child repays to the members of the next period’s (t+1) parents-
generation with interest rt+1Sˇ1,t. Hence, the interest on investment (savings) in period
t is due in period t+1. Because the depreciation appears in this model in the household
sector, the savings (the invested capital) depreciate by δSˇ1,t. The resulting component
is a part of the period t+ 1 parents-generation’s income.
In t + 1, the former children, which are parents by now, work similar to the initial
parents-generation in period 2. They get a wage, support the new children-generation
in t + 1 with a subsidy d˜t+1 and decide what amount of income to consume now and
what amount to save for consumption when being old. In t + 2 the savings of period
t+ 1 are paid back including the interest due in t+ 2 and reduced by the depreciation,
which takes place within period t + 1 and t + 2. The remaining amount is completely
used for the old generation’s consumption. Therefore, the intertemporal maximization
problem of the arbitrary children-generation in period t ≥ 2 is
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max
Cˇ1,t, Sˇ1,t, Cˇ2,t+1, Sˇ2,t+1, Cˇ3,t+2
U(Cˇ1,t) + βU(Cˇ2,t+1) + β
2U(Cˇ3,t+2) (2.3a)
s.t. Cˇ1,t + Sˇ1,t ≤
d˜t
1 + gn
(2.3b)
Cˇ2,t+1 + Sˇ2,t+1 ≤ w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ) Sˇ1,t (2.3c)
Cˇ3,t+2 ≤ (1 + rt+2 − δ) Sˇ2,t+1. (2.3d)
Using the first order conditions, we obtain the following solutions for the optimal behavior
of the children-generation
Cˇ1,t =
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
(1 + rt+1 − δ) [1 + β + β2]
(2.3.1)
Sˇ1,t =
d˜t
1 + gn
−
(w˜t+1−d˜t+1)
1+rt+1−δ
+ d˜t1+gn
[1 + β + β2]
(2.3.2)
Cˇ2,t+1 =
β
[(
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
+ d˜t1+gn (1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
[1 + β + β2]
(2.3.3)
Sˇ2,t+1 = w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
−
[
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
]
(1 + β)
[1 + β + β2]
(2.3.4)
Cˇ3,t+2 = (1 + rt+2 − δ)
[
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
−
[
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
]
(1 + β)
[1 + β + β2]
 . (2.3.5)
Because the arbitrary children-generation lives for three periods, the optimal solutions
describe the lifetime consumption and savings plan. Hence, the optimal consumption
and savings when being a child depend on the current income d˜t and the discounted
future income w˜t+1 − d˜t+1. The future income plays a role because each household op-
timizes for the whole lifetime (3 periods). The present value of income, i.e., income in t
and discounted future income, are split into consumption and savings in t. The optimal
consumption and savings plan of the parents-generation (we now consider period t+ 1)
depends on the current income w˜t+1− d˜t+1 in t+1 and the return for the savings made
as a child. The disposable income is split into consumption and saving in t+1. Finally,
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the consumption when being old depends on the return obtained from saving in t+ 1.
All optimal household decisions have been calculated so far. The economy is character-
ized by the goods, the asset, and the labor market. Thus, the market clearing conditions
for the respective market are derived in the following.
1. For the goods market, consumption Ct and investment It have to equal production
Yt ∀t
Yt = Ct + It. (2.4)
2. The asset market is cleared if the new capital stock for period t+1, Kt+1, is equal
to the savings of the children- and the parents-generation in t. Ni,t denotes the
population size of generation i in period t. The asset market clearing condition is
derived in Appendix A.2.
Sˇ1,tN1,t + Sˇ2,tN2,t = Kt+1. (2.5)
3. Finally, for the labor market it has to hold that the labor Lt needed in t is equal
to the supplied work of the parents-generation N2,t, i.e.,
N2,t = Lt. (2.6)
Firms maximize profits, given as the difference of the product Yt produced by labor Lt
and capital Kt and the marginal costs of capital and labor. The amount of capital and
labor is nonnegative because otherwise, nothing can be produced in the economy. The
firms of the underlying economy are facing the maximization problem
max
Kt, Lt≥0
F (Kt, Lt)− r˘tKt − w˘tLt (2.7)
under a given path of the interest rate r˘t and the wage rate w˘t (given variables are
marked by a semicircle). The specific production function F of the economy is given by
F (Kt, Lt) = Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t ,
26
CHAPTER 2. DEBT IN A THREE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
where α denotes the capital share of income. We use the clearing condition for the labor
market (equation (2.6)) and define the capital-labor ratio as K˜t = Kt/Lt = Kt/N2,t. It
follows that the production per capita, i.e., Yt/Nt can be described as
Yt
Nt
=
1 + gn
3 + 3gn + g2n
K˜αt , (2.8)
where Nt = N1,t+N2,t+N3,t is the overall population. A second equation for the output
per capita ratio is obtained by using the clearing condition for the goods market (2.4)
and the definition of capital accumulation Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It:
Yt
Nt
=
1 + gn
3 + 3gn + g2n
(
Cˇ1,t(1 + gn) + Cˇ2,t +
Cˇ3,t
1 + gn
+ (1 + gn)K˜t+1 − (1− δ)K˜t
)
. (2.9)
Since the structure of the labor market does not change compared to the original two
overlapping generations model, the production side of the underlying economy is the
same as if only the two standard generations live at the same time. Thus, we obtain
Yt = w˜tN2,t + rtKt. (2.10)
The output per capita ratio is then
Yt
Nt
=
1 + gn
3 + 3gn + g2n
(
w˜t + rtK˜t
)
.
If we define the production function with the capital-labor ratio as argument as f(K˜t) =
K˜αt , it results that
f
(
K˜t
)
= w˜t + rtK˜t.
Taking the derivative with respect to the capital-labor ratio K˜t, we get
∂f(K˜t)
∂K˜t
= f ′(K˜t) = αK˜
α−1
t = rt.
The interest rate is therefore given as
rt = αK˜
α−1
t . (2.11)
With diminishing returns to labor and constant returns to scale, firms do not earn any
profits and the wage rate for the parents-generation can be described as
w˜t = K˜
α
t − rtK˜t = f(K˜t)− f
′(K˜t)K˜t = (1− α)K˜
α
t . (2.12)
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Finally, the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio over time is derived. First, the law
of motion for K˜t+2 with t ≥ 2 is calculated, whereas we need a special equation for K˜3.
Since the initial old and the initial parents-generation live in t = 2 and follow special
optimal consumption-savings plans due to the restricted lifetime, the investment being
a function of savings is different compared to all other periods. The accumulated capital
changes in this period and thus, K˜3 cannot be calculated with the law of motion derived
for t ≥ 2. We begin with the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio K˜t+2 with t ≥ 2.
The asset market clearing condition (equation (2.5)) in per labor terms for period t+ 2
leads to
K˜t+2 = Sˇ1,t+1 +
Sˇ2,t+1
1 + gn
. (2.13)
Inserting the optimal solutions derived in equation (2.3.2) and (2.3.4), we obtain
K˜t+2 =
1
(1 + gn) (1 + β + β2)
[(
β + β2
)
d˜t+1 + β
2
(
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
+
(1 + rt+1 − δ) β
2d˜t
1 + gn
−
1 + gn
1 + rt+2 − δ
(
w˜t+2 − d˜t+2
)]
.
We assume that the parents-generation supports the children-generation with a fixed
amount q of their income less the return on savings when being a child, i.e., in total
qw˜tN2,t in period t. The basis for subsidy payments to children does not include the
income due to interest payments on savings when being a child. The intuition is that
money earned by money only outweighs the effort of abstaining from it for one period and
is not redistributed from the parents- to the children-generation. With this assumption,
the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio changes to
K˜t+2 =
1
(1 + gn) (1 + β + β2)
[(
β + β2
)
qw˜t+1 + β
2 (1− q) w˜t+1
+
(1 + rt+1 − δ) β
2qw˜t
1 + gn
−
1 + gn
1 + rt+2 − δ
(1− q) w˜t+2
]
.
As we consider a three overlapping generations model where every generation lives for 3
periods, one period is about 25 years long. Therefore, we can assume that the average
capital stock consisting of machinery, equipment, metal products, buildings etc. is de-
preciated completely in one period on average. Levy [85] estimates the average service
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lives of the aggregate capital stock in the US as 25 years in 1985. The average service
lives decrease between 1950-1985. Schidlowski and Schmalwasser [117] estimate the av-
erage service lives for different assets in 2000 for Germany. Buildings and structures
have an average service life of 66 years, whereas machinery and equipment have an av-
erage service life of 12 years. The Euro area estimates are similar: 68 years for housing
construction and 14 years for metal products and machinery—see Derbyshire et al. [40].
If we assume that 25% of the capital stock consists of buildings and the remaining 75%
are machinery and equipment, the overall average service life is close to 25 years. Thus,
we set the depreciations rate δ equal to 1.
Substituting the interest rate and the wage rate corresponding to equation (2.11) and
(2.12) and with δ = 1, the law of motion of the capital-labor ratio in t+2 only depends
on former capital-labor ratios (the ratios of the periods t+ 1 and t).
K˜t+2 =
1
(1 + (1− q)(1− α)/ (α (1 + β + β2))) (1 + gn)
[
β(q + β)(1 − α)
(1 + β + β2)
K˜αt+1
+
(1− α)αqβ2
(1 + β + β2) (1 + gn)
K˜α−1t+1 K˜
α
t
]
. (2.14)
As in a standard two overlapping generations model, we do not log-linearize the law of
motion for the capital-labor ratio and work instead with the exact equation.
Result 2.1. K˜t+2 for t ≥ 2
• The time horizon comprises 3 periods with three overlapping generations.
• The law of motion for the capital-labor ratio comprises three periods, too.
• There is a component (last line of equation (2.14)) that combines two periods,
namely t and t+1 with each other. Therefore, there are dependencies exceeding
one single period.
Our next step is to determine the capital-labor ratio for period 3, K˜3. Since the initial
parents-generation saves a different amount compared to an arbitrary parents-generation
due to the restricted lifetime, the asset market clearing condition changes to K˜3 =
Sˇ1,2 + Sˇ2,2/ (1 + gn). We insert the optimal choice for savings of the initial parents-
generation and the children-generation (equation (2.2.2) and (2.3.2)). Furthermore, we
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use equation (2.11) and (2.12) as well as the assumption that capital is depreciated
completely within one period, i.e., δ = 1. Then, the law of motion for K˜3 is
K˜3 =
1
1 + (1−q)(1−α)
α(1+β+β2)
(
qβ2 +
(
1 + β + β2
)
β
(1 + gn) (1 + β) (1 + β + β2)
)
(1− α) K˜α2 . (2.15)
Result 2.2. K˜3
The capital-labor ratio in period 3 is determined solely by the initial endowment K˜2.
2.3.2 Optimality of Allocations
In a standard overlapping generations model, the stability of all solutions is not gua-
ranteed—see for example Barro/Sala-i-Martin [10]. The same is true for the underlying
setting. Not all steady state solutions of the model are stable. The necessary condition
for stability of the solution is the same as in the standard overlapping two generations
model (see for example Blanchard/Fischer [20]).
0 <
drt+1
drt
≤ 1.
A marginal increase in the interest rate rt today increases the interest rate in the next
period.
Investment decreases today if the interest rate increases today. As a consequence, the
capital stock of tomorrow decreases. With f ′(K˜t+1) = rt+1 and since the slope of the
production function f decreases with an increasing capital-labor ratio, every decrease
in the capital-labor ratio causes a rise in the interest rate. More intuitively, since the
capital supply of tomorrow is lower due to the decrease in investment today, the interest
rate of tomorrow increases.
As shown, e.g., by Barro and Sala-i-Martin [10], a solution in a standard overlapping
generations model can be dynamically inefficient. The same is true for the underlying
model specification. A dynamically inefficient steady state is a condition of the economy,
where individuals save too much and do not consume enough. As a consequence, the
capital stock is inefficiently high. Moreover, it is not Pareto-optimal. To characterize the
steady states found in the model, it is necessary to define the conditions for dynamical
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efficiency. We can simply use a modified traditional equation stated in Diamond [41]
and do not need to worry about more general conditions as, e.g., developed by Abel et
al. [1] due to the model structure.
In the following, this condition is derived. Moreover, it is shown why the steady state
is indeed not Pareto-optimal if the condition holds. To focus on dynamic efficiency,
we undertake the following steps. Starting with the goods market clearing condi-
tion (equation (2.4)), we transform the equation into f
(
K˜t
)
= K˜αt = Cˇ1,t (1 + gn) +
Cˇ2,t +
Cˇ3,t
1+gn
+ (1 + gn) K˜t+1 − (1− δ) K˜t. In steady state, it holds that f
(
K˜∗
)
=(
Cˇ∗1 (1 + gn) + Cˇ
∗
2 +
Cˇ∗
3
1+gn
)
+ (δ + gn) K˜
∗, where x∗ is the steady state value for vari-
able x. Let c˜∗ = Cˇ∗1 (1 + gn) + Cˇ
∗
2 +
Cˇ∗3
1+gn
denote the total consumption per worker in
the steady state. We get c˜∗ = f
(
K˜∗
)
− (δ + gn) K˜
∗. Suppose that the steady state
condition satisfies
f ′
(
K˜∗
)
− δ < gn. (2.16)
This steady state would be dynamically inefficient and not Pareto-optimal because
dc˜∗
dK˜∗
= f ′
(
K˜∗
)
− (δ + gn) < 0: a positive change in the capital-labor ratio affects
the steady state consumption negatively. Thus, a marginal decrease in capital would
lead to higher available overall consumption. Moreover, the capital stock would be in-
efficiently high. Utility could be raised by substituting consumption for saving. Finally,
this change in savings would cause a reduction in the capital stock.
Hence, equation (2.16) states the condition for dynamical inefficiency of a steady state
solution. Because f ′
(
K˜∗
)
= r∗ with equation (2.11), the steady state solution is dy-
namically inefficient if r∗ < gn + δ and dynamically efficient if r
∗ > gn + δ.
2.4 Governmental Debt and Taxes
To introduce government debt in the baseline model, we assume that there is an initial
debt B3, which is held by foreigners or by residents. For details, see Subsection 2.4.1
and 2.4.2, respectively. Debt is modeled by one-period bonds, which are sold in period
t. The money received from the sale is used, e.g., for infrastructure spending, but an
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explicit government spending variable is not introduced in the model. The bonds plus
an interest on the bonds have to be repaid after one period. So the initial debt B3 is
due in t = 3 and the government has to pay (1 + r3 − δ)B3 to the debt holders. The
rate of return for debt includes, similar to the rate of return for capital, the depreciation
rate. This assumption is necessary to ensure that the residents, who hold the debt in the
internal debt case are willing to hold debt as well as physical capital in their portfolios. If
the rate of return for debt does not include the depreciation rate, debt pays off a higher
amount and capital will not be part of the asset portfolio. For symmetry, we make the
same assumption for the external debt case.4
In order to finance the required interest payments on debt Bt, the government taxes the
parents-generation with a lump-sum tax5 τ˜tN2,t and faces the budget constraint
Bt (1 + rt − δ) = Bt+1 + τ˜tN2,t. (2.17)
The left hand side of equation (2.17) denotes the expenditures of the government and is
equal to the repayment of bonds due in t. The right hand side shows the income of the
government in period t. The government sells new bonds Bt+1, which are due in t + 1
and gets lump-sum taxes τ˜t per member of the parents-generation, i.e., τ˜tN2,t in total.
Since the economy grows with the population growth rate, debt has asymptotically no
effect if the total amount of debt is assumed to be constant. The relative amount of
debt to GDP shrinks in that case over time. Thus, we adjust for the growth rate and
assume that the debt-labor ratio is defined as B˜t =
Bt
N2,t
∀t. B˜t is constant over time, i.e.,
B˜t = B˜ ∀t. If B˜t is declining over time, the importance of debt in the model decreases
for a falling amount of debt. If B˜t is increasing over time, the path for debt would be
explosive.
With a constant debt-labor ratio, equation (2.17) becomes
τ˜t = B˜ (1 + rt − δ)−
Bt+1N2,t+1
N2,t+1N2,t
4We follow Diamond [41].
5See also Barro [7] and Wickens [127].
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and therefore
τ˜t = B˜ (1 + rt − δ) − B˜ (1 + gn)
= B˜ (rt − gn − δ) . (2.18)
Lump-sum taxes τ˜t are chosen according to the interest rate rt in time t and the model
specific constants gn (the population growth rate) and δ (the rate of depreciation). They
can be positive as well as negative because the interest rate is positive and also values
larger than one are reasonable: (1 + ra)25− 1 = rt, where r
a denotes the annual interest
rate and rt is the overall interest rate for the whole period of 25 years. If we assume
that ra = 3%, then rt, the interest rate for one period, would be larger than 1.
If rt − δ > gn, then τt > 0 and the steady state allocation is dynamically efficient. We
can summarize:
Result 2.3. Taxes τ˜
The steady state tax is positive iff the steady state is dynamically efficient and negative
iff the steady state is dynamically inefficient.
Since the interest rate depends on the capital supply, taxes can be formulated as a
function of the capital-labor ratio K˜ if we use equation (2.11):
τ˜t = B˜
(
αK˜α−1t − (δ + gn)
)
. (2.19)
Hence, the higher the capital supply in an economy, the higher the lump-sum taxes to
ensure a constant debt-labor ratio.
2.4.1 Debt held by Foreigners
Under the assumption that debt is held exclusively by foreigners, solely the constraint
for the utility maximization problem of the parents-generation changes: every member
is charged with a tax to guarantee the interest repayment on the government debt paid
to the foreigners. If taxes are positive, parents have less disposable income. Negative
taxes act as a subsidy and raise disposable income.
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We substitute
Cˇ2,2 + Sˇ2,2 ≤ w˜2 − τ˜2 − d˜2 (2.DF-2b)
for the inequality (2.2b) of the initial parents-generation. The optimal choices for con-
sumption and saving Cˇ2,2, Sˇ2,2, and Cˇ3,3 are:
Cˇ2,2 =
1
1 + β
(
w˜2 − τ˜2 − d˜2
)
, (2.DF-2.1)
Sˇ2,2 =
β
1 + β
(
w˜2 − τ˜2 − d˜2
)
, (2.DF-2.2)
Cˇ3,3 =
β
1 + β
(1 + r3 − δ)
(
w˜2 − τ˜2 − d˜2
)
. (2.DF-2.3)
As before, the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is assumed to be equal to one. The
optimal consumption-savings plan for the initial parents-generation now depends on the
disposable income, i.e., the baseline income net of a lump-sum tax. The arbitrary period-
t children-generation has to pay taxes in t+1 when being parents. Thus, also the budget
constraint for the arbitrary children-generation, when being parents, changes. Similarly
to above, we substitute
Cˇ2,t+1 + Sˇ2,t+1 ≤ w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ) Sˇ1,t (2.DF-3c)
for the constraint (2.3c) in the arbitrary children-generation’s maximization problem.
Since the optimal consumption and saving decisions of the children-generation depend
on income today and discounted future income, also equations (2.3.1)-(2.3.5) change.
The income component of the former equations is now net of the lump-sum tax. w˜s has
to be substituted by w˜s − τ˜s for the corresponding point s in time.
6
We assume that the donation d˜ is once again a fixed part q of the income less the return
on savings when being a child, i.e., the wage reduced by the tax d˜t = q (w˜t − τ˜t).
The new law of motion for the underlying model specification is
K˜t+2
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1− β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
K˜1−αt+2 =
(1− q) B˜
(1 + β + β2)
+
1
1 + gn
[(
(1− α) K˜αt+1 − αK˜
α−1
t+1 B˜ + (1 + gn) B˜
)( β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(2.DF-14)
+
(
(1− α) K˜αt − αK˜
α−1
t B˜ + (1 + gn) B˜
) α
(1 + gn)
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)
K˜α−1t+1
]
6For a detailed description see equation (A.DF-3.1)-(A.DF-3.5) of Appendix A.3.
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for the arbitrary case t ≥ 2 and
K˜3
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1− β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
K˜1−α3
=
1
1 + gn
[
(1 + gn)
(
2β + β2 + β3 + qβ2 − qβ + 1− q
)
B˜
(1 + β) (1 + β + β2)
+
(
(1− α) K˜α2 − αK˜
α−1
2 B˜
)( β
1 + β
+
β2q
(1 + β) (1 + β + β2)
)]
(2.DF-15)
for K˜3. If B˜ = 0, the law of motions (equation (2.DF-14) and equation (2.DF-15)) are
the same as in the baseline model, namely equation (2.14) and (2.15). The necessary
condition for stability of the solution is as before 0 < drt+1drt ≤ 1.
2.4.2 Debt held by Residents
Assuming that debt is held exclusively by domestic citizens does not change the optimal
consumption-savings plan for all generations. Thus, equation (2.DF-2.1)-(2.DF-2.3) of
Subsection 2.4.1 as well as equation (A.DF-3.1)-(A.DF-3.5) of Appendix A.3 also hold in
this model specification. No further constraints or conditions appear in the maximization
problems of the three generations.
But the asset market equilibrium condition changes as the savings of the children as well
as the parents do not only have to absorb the supply of the physical capital stock Kt+1
but also the supply of government bonds Bt+1 issued in every period. Therefore, the
new asset market equilibrium condition is
Kt+1 +Bt+1 = Sˇ1,tN1,t + Sˇ2,tN2,t
⇒ K˜t+1 + B˜t+1 = Sˇ1,t +
Sˇ2,t
1 + gn
. (2.DC-5)
The new law of motions for the underlying model specification are
K˜t+2
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
K˜1−αt+2 =
(1− q) B˜
(1 + β + β2)
+
1
1 + gn
[(
(1− α) K˜αt+1 − αK˜
α−1
t+1 B˜ + (1 + gn) b
)( β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(2.DC-14)
+
(
(1−α) K˜αt − αK˜
α−1
t B˜ + (1 + gn) B˜
) α
(1+gn)
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1+β+β2)
)
K˜α−1t+1
]
−B˜
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for the arbitrary case t ≥ 2 and
K˜3
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1− β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
K˜1−α3
=
1
1 + gn
[
(1 + gn)
(
2β + β2 + β3 + qβ2 − qβ + 1− q
)
B˜
(1 + β) (1 + β + β2)
(2.DC-15)
+
(
(1− α) K˜α2 − αK˜
α−1
2 B˜
)( β
1 + β
+
β2q
(1 + β) (1 + β + β2)
)]
− B˜
for K˜3. As before, if we set B˜ = 0, the law of motions (equation (2.DC-14) and equation
(2.DC-15)) are the same as in the baseline model, namely equation (2.14) and (2.15).
The law of motions for the capital-labor ratio are very similar for internal and external
debt. For internal debt, B˜ has to be subtracted on the right hand side of the equations
due to the new asset market clearing condition. Also in this model specification, the
necessary condition for stability of the steady state solution is 0 < drt+1drt ≤ 1.
In the next section, we calibrate all three model specifications and compare the variations
including government debt with the baseline model.
2.5 Calibration of the Models
This section contains a possible visualization of the law of motion for the capital-labor
ratio over time with a reasonable choice of calibration parameters. As explained before,
we assume that the whole capital stock is depreciated within one period (δ = 1). As-
suming that all generations are equally patient concerning the consumption today, we
set the discount factor β equal to 0.9. Suppose, the population of an economy grows
with a rate of 1% per year. This leads to the following growth rate gn within one period
(i.e., 25 years) in the given model: (1 + gn) = 1.01
25. Therefore, gn = 0.28. Since α
denotes the capital share of income, we set it equal to 1/3, which is commonly used.
The average percentage q of expenditure for children compared to pre tax income in a
household with one child lies between 16% and 27% in 2009 for the US—see also Lino
[87]. Based on data in 1998, the average percentage of expenditure for children to net
income for a household with one child in Germany lies between 18.9% and 23.7%—see
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Mu¨nnich and Krebs [101]. Therefore, we decide to set the average ratio of redistributed
income q equal to 0.25: the parents-generation transfers q = 25% of their labor income
as a subsidy to the children-generation. To get a visualization of the law of motion for
capital under consideration of equation (2.14), we choose different starting values K˜2 for
the capital-labor ratio and run for every starting value the law of motion for a chosen
time horizon t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. All paths include the steady state value, i.e., no matter
what starting value is chosen, every capital per labor law of motion converges over time
to K˜∗. The law of motion is three-dimensional, i.e., the dependence on two different
points in time forces the law of motion to lie in a three and not in a two dimensional
space.
We choose B˜ to be the same constant in all model simulations. This constant is inde-
pendent of the respective starting value K˜2 being the initial endowment of the economy.
Since the Maastricht criterion postulates that government debt to GDP must not exceed
0.6, we set the debt-labor ratio B˜ to 60% of the smallest for simulation purposes chosen
initial output produced with the initial capital per labor ratio K˜2.
2.5.1 The Baseline Model
This subsection deals with the baseline model. The figures displayed in Appendix A.4
illustate the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio over time. The three-dimensional
45◦-line shows all possible steady state allocations. It holds K˜t = K˜t+1 = K˜t+2 ∀t on
that line, which is equal to the steady state condition. Figure A.1 and Figure A.2, which
projects the three-dimensional area of Figure A.1 to a two-dimensional view, show the
following.
Observation 2.1.
• The law of motion for the capital-labor ratio is increasing for all starting values
K˜2 < K˜
∗, where K˜∗ denotes the steady state capital-labor ratio value.
• The steady state value for the capital-labor ratio is unique for an appropriately
chosen starting value K˜2.
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From a mathematical point of view, there is a unique positive and stable solution.
For α = 1/3, we obtain 2 real solutions unequal to zero because the equation of
the steady state value is of order 4 and we have two complex solutions or a double
root at zero for q = 0. Moreover, one real root is smaller than zero and one real
root is larger than zero. The absolute value of the two real solutions is the same in
all cases. For stability, the solution has to fulfill 0 < drt+1drt = −
K˜f ′′(∂S˜/∂w˜)
1−f ′′(∂S˜/∂r)
≤ 1,
where S˜ is an aggregate of the amount of savings from the children- and parents-
generation, expressed in per-labor terms. f ′′ is the second derivative of the produc-
tion function f , which has the capital-labor ratio as argument. drt+1drt is the change in
the interest rate r in t + 1 due to a change in the interest rate at time t. With Ac =√
(1− α)
√
(β2(1 + 4αq − α) + q(4 + 3αq + 2αβ + 2β − 3q)), the solution for the steady
state capital per labor ratio is K˜∗ =
[
− 12(q(α−1)αβ) (αβ − β + αq − q +Ac) (1 + gn)
] 1
α−1
if |αβ + αq − (β + q)| < Ac ∀α ∈ (0, 1) (this is true for the underlying calibra-
tion) and K˜∗ =
[
− 12(q(α−1)αβ) (αβ − β + αq − q −Ac) (1 + gn)
] 1
α−1
otherwise, i.e., if
|αβ + αq − (β + q)| > Ac ∀α ∈ (0, 1). The steady state capital-labor ratio in our
calibration is K˜∗ = 0.0683. To check if the steady state value is dynamically ineffi-
cient or not, we use equation (2.16), the condition for dynamical efficiency. Because
f ′
(
K˜∗
)
= 13
(
K˜∗
)−2/3
= 1.9950 > 1.28 = gn + δ, the solution is indeed dynamically
efficient.
As the part q of the parents’ income transferred to the children-generation is set exoge-
nously, based on average data, we vary q and analyze the model implications. Let us
assume that the parents support the children-generation by a higher amount of their
income, then q is set to a new value q1 = 0.3. Parents possess less disposable income
and save less. The children save more when they receive a higher income.
Figure A.3 shows that the steady state value for the capital-labor ratio is higher in that
case. The blue area corresponds to the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio assuming
that q1 = 0.3, whereas the red area shows the ratio under the original parameter choice.
We obtain as new steady state value K˜∗1 = 0.0771. The steady state with q1 = 0.3 is
still dynamically efficient.
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In general, the higher the amount of redistributed income q, the more capital is accu-
mulated in the economy. This is caused by the fact that all generations have the same
time preference, but the children-generation lives for one more period. Hence, children
save a higher amount of the additional unit of income compared to the decrease in the
parents-generation’s savings due to the redistribution of income.
At some critical point, the redistribution of income leads to a dynamically inefficient
steady state capital-labor ratio. In the underlying calibration, the critical value qc is 0.58.
If the amount of redistributed income q exceeds the critical value the economy as a whole
saves too much and consumes too little. The resulting steady state is dynamically ineffi-
cient. If we assume that the parents support their children with a very high amount, say
70% of their income, the steady state value is K˜∗1a = 0.1669. f
′(k∗1a) = 1.0993 < gn + δ;
the steady state is dynamically inefficient. Overall, the following holds.
Observation 2.2.
• The additional redistribution of income between two generations causes a higher
steady state capital-labor ratio.
• The steady state becomes dynamically inefficient for a sufficiently high value of
the average ratio of redistributed income q.
Finally, we vary the rate of substitution of capital to labor. With α1 = 1/2, the new
steady state value of the capital-labor ratio (the intersection point of the 45◦-line with
the blue area in Figure A.4 of Appendix A.4), K˜∗2 = 0.0287, is lower and dynamically
efficient. It holds also for the varied rate of substitution of capital to labor that a higher
amount q of income to be redistributed generates a higher steady state capital-labor
ratio. The critical value of q, changing from a dynamically efficient to a dynamically
inefficient steady state solution is higher, qc2 = 0.87. As a higher capital to labor rate
of substitution leads to a lower steady state capital-labor ratio, the redistribution of
income causing a higher amount of savings does not lead to a dynamically inefficient
steady state capital-labor ratio for the old critical value qc = 0.58. Thus, a higher
amount can be redistributed before reaching a steady state solution in which too much
capital is accumulated, i.e., too much is saved.
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2.5.2 Models Including Government Debt
In the underlying subsection, we compare the modified models including government
debt with the baseline model. All calibration parameters stay the same as in Subsection
2.5.1.
The law of motion for capital per labor in the debt model is harder to handle as the law
of motion in the baseline model. With α = 1/3, we get a polynomial equation of order
3 to be solved for the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio K˜. Two of the three
solutions are complex. Hence, we obtain a unique real solution for equation (2.DC-14)
and equation (2.DC-15) when solving for K˜t+2.
There is no closed form solution for the steady state value. For α = 1/3, the equation
of the steady state value is of order 7 and we find four complex roots, one negative real
solution and two positive real roots. The necessary condition for stability of the solution
is to assume that 0 < drt+1drt ≤ 1, where rt denotes the interest rate in period t—see
Subsection 2.3.2. Therefore, the smaller real steady state value is unstable such that the
law of motion for the capital stock does not lead to a convergence to the steady state,
but the higher of the two different values is stable. Every law of motion of an arbitrary
chosen initial capital per labor value converges to that higher value over time. Thus, we
always choose the largest real steady state value as the unique solution. This procedure
is also used in an arbitrary overlapping two generations model including government
debt, see, e.g., Diamond [41].
As explained above, the debt-labor ratio B˜ is set to 60% of the smallest for simula-
tion purposes chosen initial output produced with the initial capital per labor K˜2. The
steady state capital-labor ratio is labeled by a subscript bex if debt is held exclusively
by externals.
First, we analyze the model including debt held exclusively by foreigners, i.e, external
debt. This is more or less close to the actual situation in Greece where about 80% of
public debt is held by non-residents.
The red area in Figure A.5 of Appendix A.4 shows the simulated law of motion for the
baseline model, whereas the blue area is the simulation result under the model setting as-
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suming that there is an external government debt. For the standard calibration (α = 1/3
and q = 0.25), the two areas in Figure A.5 converge closely to each other with proceeding
time, but the red area always lies above the blue area. Therefore, the steady state value
for K˜ is higher in the case of the baseline model. Indeed, the steady state value for the
capital-labor ratio with external debt is smaller, namely K˜∗bex = 0.0669 < 0.0683 = K˜
∗.
Because f ′(K˜∗bex) = 2.0214 > gn + δ = 1.28, the steady state value is dynamically effi-
cient.
If debt held by foreigners is included in the model, the domestic citizens have to pay
lump-sum taxes to finance the interest payments for debt due at the end of each period.
Thus, the income of the parents-generation declines. Since the donation d˜ is a part of
wage income less taxes, children receive less income leaving all parameters unchanged.
As a consequence, the economy as a whole saves less because parents and children save
less due to a lower amount of disposable income.
If q is varied, the qualitative result is the same as for the baseline model. The redistri-
bution of income lowers the parents’ savings. The children’s savings rise more than the
savings of the parents-generation fall such that the steady state capital-labor ratio rises
with increasing q.
If the amount q of the parents’ income redistributed to the children-generation is greater
or equal to the critical value qcex = 0.58, the economy saves too much and the capital
stock is too high in the steady state. As a consequence, the economy does not consume
enough. Choosing once again q = 0.7, we get a dynamically inefficient steady state value
for the capital-labor ratio: K˜∗bex1 = 0.1677 and f
′(K˜∗bex1) = 1.0961 < 1.28.
The new steady state capital-labor ratio in the dynamically inefficient case is larger than
the respective one in the baseline model. Since taxes are negative if the steady state is dy-
namically inefficient, the disposable income of the parents-generation increases. Hence,
the members of the parents-generation consume and save more. Children obtain more
income because the donation depends positively on the parents-generation’s income and
save more. As a consequence, overall savings increase and the capital-labor ratio in
steady state is higher if debt and taxes are introduced.
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Observation 2.3. External Debt
• There is a unique, stable, positive, and real steady state solution.
• The higher the amount of redistributed income, the higher the steady state
capital-labor ratio.
• If the steady state is dynamically efficient, the introduction of debt held by
foreigners lowers the steady state capital-labor ratio.
• If the steady state is dynamically inefficient, the introduction of external debt
causes a higher steady state capital stock.
Finally, we consider the model variation where debt is held exclusively by residents. This
corresponds more or less to a situation existent in Japan. The actual external public
debt to total public debt ratio is very small such that the major part of public debt is
held by own citizens. The steady state value is labeled with a subscript bc if debt is held
exclusively by domestic citizens.
The red area in Figure A.6 of Appendix A.4 shows, as before, the simulation area under
consideration of the baseline model, whereas the green area is the simulation result for
the described model including government debt held by residents, all in the dynamically
efficient calibration case. The green area in Figure A.6 runs clearly beneath the area of
the baseline model.
By ensuring that 0 < drt+1drt ≤ 1 (see Subsection 2.3.2 for a closer description of the
stability condition), we get a unique stable real steady state value corresponding to the
largest real value obtained when solving the differential equation. For the chosen model
calibration, K˜∗bc = 0.0594, which is smaller than K˜
∗ as well as K˜∗bex . K˜
∗
bc
is dynamically
efficient because f ′(K˜∗bc) = 2.1903 > 1.28.
With the introduction of taxes, the overall disposable income decreases. Thus, the
capital-labor ratio in steady state is smaller than that found for the baseline model.
Moreover, capital can be substituted by debt in the asset portfolio of the parents-
generation if debt is held by residents. Hence, the steady state capital-labor ratio is
even smaller than the one found for the external-debt model.
The higher the amount of redistributed income q, the more capital is accumulated in
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steady state, i.e., the higher the steady state capital-labor ratio. The critical value qcc
for the amount of income redistributed to the children generation for the internal debt
case turning the steady state capital-labor ratio dynamically inefficient is qcc = 0.41 and
thus smaller than the value found for the other model settings. If parents transfer 41%
of their income to the children, the resulting steady state is dynamically inefficient and
the economy saves too much.
If we choose q = 0.7, K˜∗bc1 = 0.1586 and f
′(K˜∗bc1) = 1.1375 < 1.28. The steady state
value for this model choice is dynamically inefficient. Since all generations have the same
time preference, the children-generation would save a higher part than the parents save
less of the redistributed income unit since children live one more period compared to the
parents. Overall savings rise in that case.
Observation 2.4. Internal Debt
• There is a unique, stable, positive, and real steady state solution.
• The higher the amount of redistributed income, the higher the accumulated
physical capital steady state value.
• The introduction of internal debt causes the steady state capital-labor ratio to
decrease no matter if the steady state is dynamically efficient or not.
To compare the difference between a model including external and internal debt, we
use Figure A.7. The green area symbolizing again the model with internal debt runs
strictly beneath the blue area, the simulation under consideration of an external debt.
The figure examines a calibration that leads to dynamically efficient steady state values.
If debt is held by residents, the parents-generation can, contrary to the external debt
setting, substitute debt for capital in their portfolio. The path for the capital-labor ratio
runs below the corresponding external debt law of motion.
Overall, in the dynamically efficient case, the existence of taxes, which have to be paid to
finance foreign debt, reduces disposable income and therefore savings. Thus, the capital
stock decreases. Internal debt reduces the capital stock once more due to the substitution
opportunity of government debt for capital in the portfolios of the individuals. In the
external debt case, parents can only hold physical capital in their portfolio, whereas
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income is split in two possible assets, debt and physical capital if debt is held by residents.
As a consequence, the overall capital stock is smaller if domestic citizens can substitute
debt for capital.
Observation 2.5.
If the steady state is dynamically efficient, the steady state capital-labor ratio is always
smaller for the internal debt case compared to a model where debt is held by foreigners.
In the dynamically inefficient case, K˜∗bex1 > K˜
∗
b1a
> K˜∗bc1 . Therefore, the existence of
debt raises the capital-labor ratio in the steady state if the debt is held exclusively by
foreigners and lowers K˜∗ for internal debt (debt held by residents). With external debt,
the lump-sum tax needed to ensure a constant debt-labor ratio is negative and thus raises
income. Savings increase and, as a consequence, the same is true for the capital stock.
Contrary, if we compare an economy without debt to an economy where debt is held
by own citizens, the residents reduce the inefficiently high capital stock by substituting
capital by debt in their portfolio if the steady state is dynamically inefficient. The next
section answers the question why the steady state capital-labor ratio is lowest in the
internal debt case if the resulting steady states are dynamically inefficient. Moreover, it
is analyzed why K˜∗bex has to be always higher than the respective steady state value for
the baseline model in that case.
2.6 Theoretical Foundation of Debt Effects
We observed in the calibration section that the introduction of debt (B˜ > 0) in the
baseline model without debt (B˜ = 0) causes a lower steady state capital-labor ratio if
the steady state is dynamically efficient. It holds that K˜∗ > K˜∗bex > K˜
∗
bc
. With the
introduction of debt and taxes, the overall level of income is smaller, savings are lower,
and the capital-labor ratio declines. For the case of a debt exclusively held by foreigners
and a model calibration such that the old steady state (the steady state in the baseline
model) is dynamically inefficient, an increase in government debt increases the steady
state capital stock per worker. In this case, 0.1677 = K˜∗bex1 > K˜
∗
1a = 0.1669. Since taxes
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are negative in the dynamically inefficient steady state, overall income is higher and the
amount of savings rises. The capital-labor ratio in steady state is thus higher.
For the internal debt model, the steady state capital-labor ratio falls compared to the
baseline model (0.1669 = K˜∗1a > K˜
∗
bc1 = 0.160033). On one hand, the negative tax raises
the amount of income. On the other hand, there are substitution opportunities because
the asset portfolios of residents contain physical capital and debt. Overall, the steady
state capital-labor ratio declines.
We analyze the effect of debt on the utility of the individuals as it accounts for the
substitution of debt for physical capital in the internal debt case.
Following Diamond [41], we compare the effect of external and internal government debt
on the long run equilibrium capital-labor ratio as well as on the utility level (dU
dB˜
) on a
theoretical basis to verify and explain the results of the calibration section.
2.6.1 External Debt
First, we consider the model specification after the implementation of government debt
held exclusively by foreigners. We use equations (A.DF-3.2) and (A.DF-3.4) as well as
the fact that the donation is a fixed part q of the net income w˜net. Hence, the steady
state total savings rate as a function of the net wage w˜net = w˜− τ˜ and the interest rate
r is
S˜
(
w˜net, r
)
= Sˇ1 +
Sˇ2
1 + gn
=
(
qβ + β2
)
(1 + β + β2) (1 + gn)
w˜net (2.20)
−
(1− q)
(1 + β + β2) (1 + r − δ)
w˜net +
q (1 + r − δ)
(1 + β + β2) (1 + gn)
2 w˜
net.
The stability condition can be stated as
0 <
drt+1
drt
= −
f ′′ ∂S˜∂w˜
(
K˜ + B˜
)
1− f ′′ ∂S˜∂r
≤ 1.
To find a solution for the expression dU
dB˜
describing the change in the utility U due to a
change in debt, we use the fact that the following equations hold:
45
2.6. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF DEBT EFFECTS
dr
dB˜
=
dw˜net
dB˜
∂f ′
∂w˜
+
dr
dB˜
∂f ′
∂r
=
(
−
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
− (r − gn − δ)
)
f ′′
∂S˜
∂w˜
+
dr
dB˜
f ′′
∂S˜
∂r
⇔
dr
dB˜
=
(gn + δ − r) f
′′ ∂S˜
∂w˜
1 +
(
K˜ + B˜
)
f ′′ ∂S˜∂w˜ − f
′′ ∂S˜
∂r
. (2.21)
The expression dr
dB˜
is positive for r > gn + δ because f
′′ < 0, 0 < ∂S˜∂w˜ < 1 and 0 <
∂S˜
∂r .
This is the dynamically efficient case. An increase in debt causes the steady state interest
rate to rise. dr
dB˜
is negative iff r < gn + δ. Hence, in the dynamically inefficient case, an
increasing debt-labor ratio lowers the steady state interest rate.
Result 2.4. dr
dB˜
≷ 0 iff r ≷ gn + δ.
If debt is held exclusively by foreigners, the steady state interest rate rises with the
introduction of debt for a dynamically efficient steady state. The change in the steady
state interest rate due to a change in debt is negative if the steady state is dynamically
inefficient.
The sign of the change in the interest rate due to changes in the debt-labor ratio is the
same as the sign in the relation between the interest rate and the sum of the depreciation
rate and the population growth rate. The argument of a rising steady state interest rate
in a dynamically efficient steady state if debt is held by foreigners, can be explained by
the capital market.
With the introduction of positive taxes in the external debt case, lifetime consumption of
the respective taxpayer, i.e., the members of the parents-generation, is directly reduced.
Taxes are always positive in the dynamically efficient case: r − gn − δ > 0 and τ˜t =
B˜ (r − gn − δ) > 0. The duty to pay taxes lowers the disposable income, which in
return causes a reduction in savings of the parents-generation. Moreover, the decrease
in disposable income leads to a smaller subsidy for the children-generation that is defined
as a fixed amount of income. Thus, also children consume less and save less. Overall,
the steady state capital-labor ratio declines. The capital supply in steady state is lower
and therefore, the interest rate rises.
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If the steady state is dynamically inefficient, r−gn−δ < 0. Hence, τ˜t = B˜ (r − gn − δ) <
0; taxes are negative, i.e., a subsidy. The argument runs in the other direction in that
case. The parents-generation as well as the children have more disposable income. The
steady state capital-labor ratio increases. Moreover, the steady state interest rate falls
( dr
dB˜
< 0).
Overall, an increase in debt forces the steady state capital-labor ratio to fall in the
dynamically efficient case (0.0683 = K˜∗ > K˜∗bex = 0.0669) and to rise in the dynamically
inefficient case (0.1669 = K˜∗1a < K˜
∗
bex1
= 0.1677). The corresponding steady state
interest rate in the calibration exercise rises in the dynamically efficient case (1.995 =
f ′(K˜∗) < f ′(K˜∗bex) = 2.0214) and falls if the steady state is dynamically inefficient
(1.0993 = f ′(K˜∗1a) > f
′(K˜∗bex1) = 1.0961).
The following expression determines the change in the net wage rate w˜net due to changes
in the debt-labor ratio:
dw˜net
dB˜
=
dw˜
dr
dr
dB˜
−
d
[
(r − gn − δ) B˜
]
dB˜
= −K˜
dr
dB˜
− B˜
dr
dB˜
− (r − gn − δ)
= −
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+ (gn + δ − r) . (2.22)
For the dynamically efficient case, the change in the net wage rate is negative because
dr
dB˜
is positive and dw˜
net
dB˜
> 0 for r < gn + δ.
The total derivative shown in the following equation describes the effect of debt on
utility:7
dU
dB˜
=
dw˜net
dB˜
∂U
∂w˜
+
dr
dB˜
∂U
∂r
. (2.23)
The first missing component is ∂U∂w˜ . We use the fact that
∂U
∂Cˇ1
= ∂U
∂Cˇ2
(1 + r − δ) and
∂U
∂Cˇ3
= ∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
1
(1+r−δ)
)
and describe the derivative of utility with respect to the wage rate
7See Diamond [41].
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as
∂U
∂w˜
=
∂U
∂Cˇ1
∂Cˇ1
∂w˜
+
∂U
∂Cˇ2
∂Cˇ2
∂w˜
+
∂U
∂Cˇ3
∂Cˇ3
∂w˜
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
∂Cˇ1
∂w˜
(1 + r − δ) +
∂Cˇ2
∂w˜
+
∂Cˇ3
∂w˜
(
1
1 + r − δ
))
(2.24)
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
1− q + q
(
1 + r − δ
1 + gn
))
.
Rearranging equations (2.3b)-(2.3d) such that the two savings rates are eliminated, we
can write the steady state wage rate in dependence of the three different consumptions,
where d˜ = qw˜,
w˜ =
1
1 + r − δ
Cˇ3 + d˜− (1 + r − δ)
(
d˜
1 + gn
)
+ (1 + r − δ) Cˇ1 + Cˇ2 (2.25)
and obtain after differentiation with respect to w˜:
1 +
(r − gn − δ) q
1 + gn
=
1
1 + r − δ
∂Cˇ3
∂w˜
+ (1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ1
∂w˜
+
∂Cˇ2
∂w˜
. (2.26)
Therefore, the equality of the second and last row of equation (2.24) holds. Next step is
to find an expression for ∂U∂r , where
∂U
∂r
=
∂U
∂Cˇ1
∂Cˇ1
∂r
+
∂U
∂Cˇ2
∂Cˇ2
∂r
+
∂U
∂Cˇ3
∂Cˇ3
∂r
. (2.27)
Once again using equation (2.25), we know that
∂w˜
∂r
= −
1
(1 + r − δ)2
Cˇ3 +
1
(1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ3
∂r
−
d˜
1 + gn
+ Cˇ1 + (1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ1
∂r
+
∂Cˇ2
∂r
= −
1
(1 + r − δ)2
Cˇ3 − Sˇ1 +
1
(1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ3
∂r
+ (1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ1
∂r
+
∂Cˇ2
∂r
= 0
and thus
∂U
∂r
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
1
(1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ3
∂r
+ (1 + r − δ)
∂Cˇ1
∂r
+
∂Cˇ2
∂r
)
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
Sˇ1 +
1
(1 + r − δ)2
Cˇ3
)
(2.28)
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
Sˇ1 +
1
(1 + r − δ)
Sˇ2
)
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such that equation (2.23) changes to
dU
dB˜
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(r − gn − δ)
(
1 +
(r − gn − δ) q
1 + gn
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
(
1 +
(r − gn − δ) q
1 + gn
)
B˜
dr
dB˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
+
(
K˜ − Sˇ1 −
Sˇ2
1 + r − δ
)
dr
dB˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
III
+ K˜
(r − gn − δ) q
1 + gn
dr
dB˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
IV
 . (2.29)
The first term (I) denotes the change in utility arising from the tax needed to finance
the amount that is additional to the outstanding debt. The respective term is multiplied
by
(
1 + (r−gn−δ)q1+gn
)
due to the redistribution of income. It is positive if r − gn − δ >
0.8 The second term shows the change in the tax burden, once again multiplied by(
1 + (r−gn−δ)q1+gn
)
, which occurs because of a change in the interest rate and thus in the
interest repayments due to the existing debt. Both terms are positive iff r > gn+δ, which
corresponds to the condition for a dynamically efficient steady state. For r < gn+δ (i.e.,
the dynamically inefficient case), the multiplier
(
1 + (r−gn−δ)q1+gn
)
has to be evaluated. We
already know that (r − gn − δ) < 0 and B˜
dr
dB˜
< 0. With 0 < r < gn + δ ≤ gn + 1 and as
a consequence 0 < r1+gn < 1, it holds that
gn+δ
1+gn
≤ 1. Therefore, −1 < r1+gn −
gn+δ
1+gn
< 0
and finally 0 ≤ 1− q < 1 + q
(
r
1+gn
− gn+δ1+gn
)
< 1 with 0 < q ≤ 1. The chosen bound for
q is natural, because parents can at most give their whole wage income as a subsidy to
their children. They would solely have the income from savings when being parents to
decide what to consume and what to save in that case. We showed that the multiplier(
1 + (r−gn−δ)q1+gn
)
is always positive. As a consequence, the first as well as the second
term is negative iff r < gn + δ. The third expression in brackets can be rewritten as
K˜ − Sˇ1 −
Sˇ2
1+r−δ =
(
K˜ − Sˇ1
)
(r−gn−δ)
(1+r−δ) = Sˇ2
(r−gn−δ)
(1+gn)(1+r−δ)
. Since dr
dB˜
has the same sign
as r − gn − δ, term III is always positive: the movement of the interest rate causes the
utility to fall for the third term in the dynamically efficient as well as in the dynamically
inefficient case. Finally, as r − gn − δ has the same sign as
dr
dB˜
, the last term (IV) is
always positive.
8The tax is positive in that case, see equation (2.18).
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Overall, we see that external debt causes the utility level of residents to fall in long-run
equilibrium if the solution is dynamically efficient because all four terms are positive in
that case. Thus, the negative sign in front of the bracket in equation (2.29) controls the
direction of the effect. If the solution is dynamically inefficient (r < gn + δ), we do not
know, which of the effects outweighs one or another. Term I and II are negative in that
case and term III and IV are positive as before. A rise in debt causes counteracting
effects such that the overall effect depends on the respective model parameters.
Result 2.5. dU
dB˜
< 0 if r > gn + δ,
dU
dB˜
=? if r < gn + δ.
If debt is held by foreigners, a rise in debt lowers the steady state utility level of the
residents if the steady state is dynamically efficient. The effect of external debt on the
utility level in a dynamically inefficient steady state cannot be determined in general.
2.6.2 Internal Debt
We now turn to the model extension assuming that debt is held exclusively by residents.
The overall savings rate in steady state is S˜
(
w˜net, r
)
= Sˇ1 +
Sˇ2
1+gn
and in equilibrium,
we can describe the interest rate as
r = f ′
(
S˜
(
w˜net, r
)
− B˜
)
. (2.30)
If we are not in steady state, the interest rate is
rt+1 = f
′
(
S˜
(
w˜nett+2, w˜
net
t+1, w˜
net
t , rt+2, rt+1
)
− B˜
)
.
Therefore, we get as stability condition
0 <
drt+1
drt
=
−
(
K˜ + B˜
) <0︷︸︸︷
f ′′
>0︷︸︸︷
∂S˜
∂w˜
1− f ′′︸︷︷︸
<0
∂S˜
∂r︸︷︷︸
>0
≤ 1. (2.31)
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We examine the effect arising on the future interest rate if the wage rate increases by a
marginal unit. With
drt+1
dw˜t
=
dw˜nett
dw˜t
∂f ′
∂w˜t
+
drt+1
dw˜t
∂f ′
∂rt+1
and
drt+1
dw˜t
=
<0︷︸︸︷
f ′′
>0︷︸︸︷
∂S˜
∂w˜
1− f ′′︸︷︷︸
<0
∂S˜
∂r︸︷︷︸
>0
< 0, (2.32)
the interest rate in t+1 falls if the wage rate increases in t. This reaction is as expected:
if the wage increases, then the savings increase and thus, with more capital supply, the
interest rate decreases. Using the equations
dr
dB˜
=
dw˜net
dB˜
∂f ′
∂w˜
+
dr
dB˜
∂f ′
∂r
+
dB˜
dB˜
∂f ′
∂B˜
and
dw˜net
dB˜
=
dw˜
dr
dr
dB˜
−
d
[
(r − gn − δ) B˜
]
dB˜
=
dw˜
dr
dr
dB˜
− B˜
dr
dB˜
− (r − gn − δ)
= −
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
− (r − gn − δ) ,
we get the effect of a change in debt on the interest rate. Because dB˜
dB˜
∂f ′
∂B˜
= f ′′ (−1) and
the inner derivative of f ′ with respect to B˜ is -1 and dB˜
dB˜
= 1, the change in the interest
rate due to a change in debt is
dr
dB˜
=
−f ′′
(
(r − gn − δ)
∂S˜
∂w˜ + 1
)
1 +
(
K˜ + B˜
)
f ′′ ∂S˜∂w˜ − f
′′ ∂S˜
∂r
. (2.33)
The difference between equation (2.21) and equation (2.33) is the additional −f ′′ in the
numerator of the fraction. Thus, the effect of debt held by foreigners has to be summed
by a positive number in order to get the effect of the internal debt on the interest rate. To
determine dr
dB˜
for the internal debt case, we have to analyze a dynamically efficient and
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a dynamically inefficient steady state. The change in the interest rate after an increase
in the debt-labor ratio for the dynamically efficient case (r > gn + δ) is positive since
the equation is positive. With the introduction of a positive tax to ensure a constant
debt-labor ratio in steady state, disposable income is smaller and thus, consumption
and savings of the parents- and the children-generation decline. Less capital in steady
state is supplied. As a consequence, the steady state interest rate rises. Since we sum
a positive number to the respective terms for dr
dB˜
in the external debt case, a rise in
debt with the same intensity raises the steady state interest rate more if debt is held by
residents. With the opportunity of domestic citizens to substitute debt for capital, less
capital is held in that case. Due to the lower supply of capital, the interest rate rises
and is thus higher than in the external debt case where a substitution of physical capital
is not possible.
Result 2.6. dr
dB˜
with External Debt < dr
dB˜
with Internal Debt if r > gn + δ.
If internal debt is introduced, the steady state interest rate raises by a higher amount
compared to the external debt scenario in the dynamically efficient case.
For the dynamically inefficient case, we have to examine the expression in brackets in
the numerator. If ∂S˜∂w˜ (r − gn − δ)+ 1 > 0, the interest rate falls. Otherwise, the interest
rate rises. The inequality ∂S˜∂w˜ (r − gn − δ) ≷ −1 is to be determined. In our model the
following equation holds by assumption:9
0 <
∂S˜
∂w˜
< 1.
Therefore, we have to check if gn < r in the dynamically inefficient case for all plausible
variable specifications. If the population growth rate gn is smaller than the steady state
interest rate r, then δ + gn − r < 1 and therefore r − gn − δ > −1. With 0 <
∂S˜
∂w˜ < 1,
∂S˜
∂w˜ (r − gn − δ) > −1 and thus
∂S˜
∂w˜ (r − gn − δ) + 1 > 0. Then
dr
dB˜
is positive for the
dynamically efficient as well as the dynamically inefficient case. As a consequence, the
interest rate increases in the dynamically inefficient case.
9Following Diamond [41], p. 1131, we assume that consumption is always a normal good. Thus, the
upper and lower bounds are true.
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The problem to show that gn < r is that there is no closed form solution for the steady
state value of r. If we consider equation (2.DC-14), we get for α = 1/3 a polynomial
with exponents 1, 1/3, 2/3, −1/3, −2/3, −4/3. Multiplying this equation with K˜4/3
delivers an equation with only positive exponents. If we finally substitute K˜1/3 with
a variable z, we get a polynomial of order 7 to be solved. For details see Appendix
A.5. The nulls of the polynomial equation can only be found for given model parameter
values. We always get 7 solutions and choose each time the largest positive real solution
as steady state value just as in the traditional overlapping generations model with two
generations.
We decide to test for the reaction of r to a change in q, β, and gn in a plausible data
domain, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, 0.8 ≤ β ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ gn ≤ 1. The upper bound for
the population growth is chosen to be 100% within 25 years (more than a doubling of
population in that time is per intuition not plausible). This corresponds to an annual
population growth rate of about 2.8%. The data of the world bank [69] show that the
industrial countries are always below this growth of population in average per year.
Using a grid search with a step width of 0.0001 for each variable, we see that the
steady state interest rate reacts in a linear, i.e., unique way to changes in each variable:
β ↑ ⇒ r ↓ & q ↑ ⇒ r ↓ & gn ↑ ⇒ r ↑. Therefore, we have to compare the steady state
interest rate in a setting with the largest discount factor β possible (β = 1), the largest
ratio of distributed income q possible, this means, q = 1 and all possible population
growth rates gn.
Table 2.1 shows the results for 0.1 step changes in gn. The steady state value of the
interest rate r in the dynamically inefficient case for the model including internal debt is
larger than all reasonable population growth rates gn for 25 years.
10 Finally, we showed
that r > gn holds for reasonable parameter choices. As a consequence, an increase
in debt causes the steady state interest rate to rise also in the dynamically inefficient
case. We once again argue with the capital market. On one hand, with a negative
10The interest rate for 25 years can be larger than 1 because even in the case of a 3% annual interest
rate, we obtain r = 1.09.
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tax being introduced in the dynamically inefficient case, disposable income rises and so
do savings. The capital supply rises. On the other hand, if debt is held by domestic
citizens, the inefficiently high capital stock is reduced by substituting debt for capital
in the portfolio of the parents-generation. Overall, the substitution effect outweighs
the rise in capital due to the additional disposable income such that the steady state
capital-labor ratio decreases. Hence, the steady state capital-labor ratio declines for the
dynamically efficient and the inefficient case.
gn r gn r
0 0.5877 0.6 0.9502
0.1 0.6477 0.7 1.011
0.2 0.7077 0.8 1.073
0.3 0.7681 0.9 1.1339
0.4 0.8286 1 1.1955
0.5 0.8893
Table 2.1: Grid search to verify r > gn for the dynamically inefficient case.
As a consequence, if the supplied capital stock in steady state is lower, the steady state
interest rate increases not only in the dynamically efficient but also in the dynamically
inefficient case if the debt-labor ratio rises. This coincides with the calibration exercise:
for the dynamically efficient case 0.0683 = K˜∗ > K˜∗bc = 0.0594, 1.995 = f
′(K˜∗) <
f ′(K˜∗bc) = 2.1903 and for the dynamically inefficient case 0.1669 = K˜
∗
1a > K˜
∗
bc1
= 0.1586,
1.0993 = f ′(K˜∗1a) < f
′(K˜∗bc1) = 1.1375.
Result 2.7. dr
dB˜
> 0
If debt is held by residents, the steady state interest rate rises no matter if the steady
state is dynamically efficient or inefficient.
To answer the question, why own citizens substitute debt for capital such that the steady
state capital-labor ratio decreases also for the dynamically inefficient case, we analyze
the effect of a change in the debt-labor ratio to the utility level of individuals in long-run
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equilibrium. Similar to Subsection 2.6.1, we get11
dU
dB˜
=
dw˜net
dB˜
∂U
∂w˜
+
dr
dB˜
∂U
∂r
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
[
dw˜net
dB˜
(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))
+
(
Sˇ1 +
1
1 + r − δ
Sˇ2
)
dr
dB˜
]
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
[(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+
(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))
(r − gn − δ) −
(
Sˇ1 +
1
1 + r − δ
Sˇ2
)
dr
dB˜
]
.
This is true because the constraint
(
1 + q
(
r−gn−δ
1+gn
))
= ∂Cˇ1∂w˜ (1 + r − δ)+
∂Cˇ2
∂w˜ +
1
1+r−δ
∂Cˇ3
∂w˜
holds as before and
∂U
∂w˜
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
∂Cˇ1
∂w˜
(1 + r − δ) +
∂Cˇ2
∂w˜
+
1
1 + r − δ
∂Cˇ3
∂w˜
)
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))
.
Moreover, we know that
∂U
∂r
=
∂U
∂Cˇ1
∂Cˇ1
∂r
+
∂U
∂Cˇ2
∂Cˇ2
∂r
+
∂U
∂Cˇ3
∂Cˇ3
∂r
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
∂Cˇ1
∂r
(1 + r − δ) +
∂Cˇ2
∂r
+
1
1 + r − δ
∂Cˇ3
∂r
)
=
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(
Sˇ1 +
1
1 + r − δ
Sˇ2
)
because
∂w˜
∂r
= 0 =
∂Cˇ1
∂r
(1 + r − δ)−
d˜
1 + gn
+ Cˇ1 +
∂Cˇ2
∂r
+
1
1 + r − δ
∂Cˇ3
∂r
−
1
(1 + r − δ)2
Cˇ3.
Finally, the following expression for the change in utility due to a change in debt is
found.
dU
dB˜
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
[(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))
(r − gn − δ) +
(
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
))
B˜
dr
dB˜
+q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
)
K˜
dr
dB˜
+
(
K˜ − Sˇ1 −
Sˇ2
1 + r − δ
)
dr
dB˜
]
(2.34)
11See also Diamond [41].
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= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(r − gn − δ)
[
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
)
+
q
1 + gn
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+
1
r − gn − δ
(
B˜ + K˜ − Sˇ1 −
Sˇ2
(1 + r − δ)
)
dr
dB˜
]
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(r − gn − δ)
[
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
)
+
q
1 + gn
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+
1
r − gn − δ
(
−
Sˇ2
1 + r − δ
+
Sˇ2
1 + gn
)]
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(r − gn − δ)
[
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
)
+
q
1 + gn
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+
Sˇ2
(1 + r − δ) (1 + gn)
dr
dB˜
]
= −
∂U
∂Cˇ2
(r − gn − δ)
[
1 + q
(
r − gn − δ
1 + gn
)
+
q
1 + gn
(
K˜ + B˜
) dr
dB˜
+
B˜ + K˜ − Sˇ1
1 + r − δ
dr
dB˜
]
. (2.35)
Equation (2.34) can be interpreted as follows: the first term in brackets shows changes
in the utility in terms of taxes needed to finance the increase in debt. The second term
is characterized as the taxes needed to finance the increased interest payments on the
existing debt and the third term is an additional term depending on capital and debt as
well as the change in the interest rate due to a rise in debt. The last term is the changed
value of factor payments.
As the signs of the first three terms only depend on (r − gn − δ), the multiplier (1+
q
(
r−gn−δ
1+gn
))
, which is always positive, and dr
dB˜
, the effects on utility for these parts can
be evaluated. But it is not obvious to assess the last term. Therefore, we rewrite the
last term and derive equation (2.35). It can be seen that the last term only depends on
the sign of dr
dB˜
.
Overall, r−gn− δ as well as all terms in brackets are greater than zero: utility decreases
with an increase in the debt-labor ratio if the equilibrium is dynamically efficient. For the
dynamically inefficient case, a positive debt-labor ratio raises the steady state interest
rate and dr
dB˜
> 0 holds. Moreover, 1 + q r−gn−δ1+gn > 0. As a consequence, all terms in
brackets are positive also for the dynamically inefficient case. With r − gn − δ < 0,
the utility level increases with an increase in the debt-labor ratio if the equilibrium is
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dynamically inefficient. Hence, if domestic citizens hold a higher debt in a dynamically
inefficient steady state, utility rises. If debt is introduced, individuals can substitute the
two assets debt and physical capital in their portfolios. Since this substitution leads to
a rise in utility, the amount of capital in the portfolios is indeed lowered. Thus, the
inefficiently high capital stock is reduced.
Result 2.8. dU
dB˜
≷ 0 iff r ≶ gn + δ.
If the steady state is dynamically efficient, the introduction of internal debt lowers
utility. For a dynamically inefficient steady state, internal debt establishes substitution
opportunities of debt for physical capital. Utility rises in that case and the inefficiently
high capital stock is reduced.
To summarize, the steady state capital-labor ratio is smaller in a model including debt
than the one found for the baseline model if the steady state is dynamically efficient.
With the asset market clearing condition not only the steady state capital-labor ratio, but
also the savings in the economy decline if debt is introduced. Therefore, the hypothesis
that government spending or the existence of government debt lowers private savings is
supported for a dynamically efficient steady state. Moreover, the introduction of external
or internal debt causes the utility level of an individual in steady state to fall in that
case. It is not possible to evaluate in general, which debt lowers utility more. On one
hand, the steady state interest rate is more affected by an internal debt suggesting a
higher reduction of utility in that case. On the other hand, the steady state capital-labor
ratio is smaller if debt is held by residents. Since the steady state interest rate is higher,
the steady state tax rate to ensure a constant debt-labor ratio is higher. Thus, income
is smaller. Furthermore, citizens can substitute debt for physical capital in their asset
portfolios. Overall, the steady state capital-labor ratio is smaller than in an external-
debt setting. Thus, it lowers the negative influence of debt on the utility level if all other
values would be the same for internal and external debt. As a consequence, the intensity
of the reduction in utility caused by the internal debt cannot be determined in general
in comparison to the respective intensity caused by the introduction of external debt.
In the dynamically inefficient case, utility in the long-run equilibrium with external debt
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is lower than the utility level without debt, because the already inefficiently high capital
stock rises even more. Since the lump-sum taxes introduced together with debt are
negative, the individuals have more disposable income. Thus, savings and the capital
stock increase. If debt is held by residents, the parents-generation can substitute debt
for capital in their portfolios and raise the utility level in long-run equilibrium. As a
consequence, the inefficiently high capital supply is reduced.
2.7 Conclusions
In the last chapter, we have derived a variation of the known overlapping two genera-
tions model by implementing one additional generation, the children-generation. This
generation interacts with the parents-generation corresponding to the known young gen-
eration of a general overlapping two generations model. Parents redistribute parts of
their income to the children such that they can consume and save. The model setting
of the baseline specification has been characterized by a household sector containing the
three generations and a production sector. We have assumed that capital fully depreci-
ates within 25 years and that government debt has a 25-year, this means, a one-period
maturity. Government debt has been implemented by augmenting the baseline model.
Two variations were analyzed: government debt held by foreigners and debt held by do-
mestic citizens. In both cases, taxes have to be paid by the working generation to ensure
interest repayments on debt. Since the economy grows due to the growing population, a
fixed absolute amount of government debt would have asymptotically no effect. Hence,
we adjusted for the population growth and chose the debt-labor ratio to be constant.
The standard results for a general overlapping two generations model could be carried
over to the underlying model extension. We found a unique stable, positive, real steady
state solution for all model specifications.
A steady state can be dynamically efficient or dynamically inefficient. Dynamic ineffi-
ciency is characterized by a situation, where individuals consume too few and save too
much. The capital stock is inefficiently high. If a higher amount of income in our model is
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redistributed from the parents- to the children-generation, the steady state capital-labor
ratio is higher. For a critical amount of income redistribution, the accumulated capital
stock becomes inefficiently high. The steady state changes from dynamic efficiency to
dynamic inefficiency.
We analyzed the changes caused by the introduction of external or internal debt in
dynamically efficient and inefficient steady states. The effect of debt in a dynamically
efficient case is as expected. The introduction of government debt and a positive tax to
ensure a constant debt-labor ratio reduces disposable income, no matter if debt is held
by foreigners or residents. Savings decrease and the steady state capital-labor ratio is al-
ways lower in a debt scenario. As a consequence, the steady state interest rate is higher.
The utility level of the individuals in long-run equilibrium declines. For the dynamically
inefficient case, the effect of external and internal debt was analyzed separately. Since
there are counteracting effects, it is not possible to determine the change in utility due
to the introduction of external debt in general. On the one hand, utility increases be-
cause the tax needed to finance the additional debt burden is negative and thus raises
disposable income. Overall savings are higher and more capital is accumulated. As a
consequence, the steady state interest rate decreases and changes the tax burden, caus-
ing utility to rise. On the other hand, the utility level in steady state declines because
the factor payments depend on taxes (which are negative) and the change of the interest
rate due to the introduction of debt (which is negative, too). Thus, the product of these
components is positive and has a negative influence on the utility level. The overall
effect of external debt on utility depends on the relative intensity of the counteracting
effects. If domestic citizens exclusively hold the government debt, utility increases in
the dynamically inefficient case, because the individuals substitute government bonds
for capital. Thus, the inefficiently high capital stock of the economy is reduced implying
a gain in utility.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Fiscal Policy Under
Commitment in an EMU Model
3.1 Introduction
To analyze the impact of debt in the European Monetary Union (EMU) is still an im-
portant question. In this context, further questions occur: how does an optimal national
fiscal policy under commitment in a monetary union framework look like? What are
the effects of a policy as the response to a rise in debt? Do different tax rates induce
different optimal fiscal policy decisions? What is the loss of welfare if a debt shock hits
a country? Is there a difference if the country is already indebted at a higher level?
Is the optimally chosen national fiscal policy compatible with an inflation stabilizing
union-wide monetary policy?
We try to answer these questions by analyzing the effects of a national debt shock in a
monetary union framework. Furthermore, we describe the optimal response of a single
member country to a shock in debt and, finally, draw the connection to the policy of the
union as a whole. Building on Gal´ı/Monacelli [54] and Leith/Wren-Lewis [83], we ana-
lyze the optimal fiscal response to a debt shock in a situation where the government has
access to different fiscal instruments. The basic model includes an IS-curve developed
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within the households sector and a New-Keynesian Phillips curve derived from profit
maximizing firms in a Calvo-price setting framework.1 There is monopolistic compe-
tition and price rigidities. The model is augmented by an active government sector,
which sets taxes and the amount of government spending. This sector faces a solvency
constraint, relating actual and former debt levels to government revenue (taxes) and
expenditure (government spending). Two tax instruments are introduced separately,
a sales tax or an income tax, in particular a wage tax.2 We compare the effect of a
debt shock on the optimal policy of the respective government as well as on the basic
variables such as output or inflation for the two tax instruments. The sales tax causes
an additional distortion in the goods market, whereas the wage tax distorts the labor
market. A lump-sum tax and an employment subsidy is chosen to offset distortions in
the markets. It is assumed that fiscal authorities as well as the union-wide monetary
authority have access to a commitment technology.
Optimal monetary and Ramsey fiscal policy in a model including sticky prices in a one-
country environment are analyzed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [118]. Their main result
is that price stickiness induces a deviation from the Friedman rule, i.e., an interest rate
rule unequal to zero in equilibrium. Furthermore, the optimal inflation volatility is found
to be close to zero such that a rise in inflation is avoided in any case. As a consequence,
e.g., in the occurrence of a rise in government spending, debt and taxes are raised, both
following a near random walk behavior. Fiscal as well as monetary policy have to be
coordinated in this setting. Contrary to their model, we assume that optimal monetary
and fiscal policy are conducted by different independent institutions.
Leith and Wren-Lewis [82] use a sticky-price New Neo-Classical Synthesis model to an-
alyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy. On one hand, the government has access to
a commitment technology, i.e., it optimizes the present value of an objective function
(e.g., a welfare function) and obtains one optimal policy rule for all horizons. On the
other hand, the government decides under discretion, i.e., the government reoptimizes
1See also Calvo [32].
2Since profits are not distributed, the income tax in the underlying model is levied only on wage
income such that we call the income tax in the following a wage tax.
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every period. The optimal choice of fiscal policy today does not restrict future policy
decisions—see, e.g., Barro [8]. Leith and Wren-Lewis confirm that an optimal precom-
mitment policy induces a random walk behavior of debt. For discretion, debt will always
return to its initial steady state level even without having an explicit debt stabilizing
target. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis [75] analyze the impact of different degrees of fiscal
feedback in a one country model with rigidities if monetary policy is optimal. Optimal
fiscal feedback is small. If the intensity of fiscal feedback is raised, monetary policy
becomes weaker and as fiscal policy is less effective, welfare declines. Leith and Wren-
Lewis [78] find that fiscal policy has to be self-stabilizing if monetary policy seeks to
respond to changes in inflation in a multi-good Blanchard-Yaari setup. This overlapping
generations type model has a special structure. Agents face an exogenous probability
to die and different generations exist at any point in time. The generations are not
connected to previous generations—see also Yaari [132] and Blanchard [19]. Within this
framework, Leith and Wren-Lewis show that monetary policy is forced to be passive if
fiscal policy is not self-stabilizing.
Lombardo and Sutherland [89] analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy interactions
in a two country model, i.e., an open economy setting, under price stickiness. Two mon-
etary institutions and two fiscal authorities are implemented. Assuming that monetary
policy is set cooperatively, a cooperative fiscal policy leads to welfare gains.
Possible problems of a monetary union, where fiscal authorities act independently, are
analyzed by Uhlig [124]. He examines, e.g., free-riding problems and crisis scenarios and
concludes that bad national fiscal policies can lead to instability in the EMU even with
an excellent monetary policy. He suggests a better structure of institutions to face crisis
scenarios. Grimm and Ried [58] use a two-country model within an EMU framework and
examine different static games where the monetary policy and the two fiscal authorities
cooperate or do not cooperate, one leads, etc. They find that cooperation between all
authorities and monetary leadership causes the lowest welfare losses. Moreover, a coop-
eration between the two fiscal policy makers is harmful not only for the single country
welfare but also for the union-wide welfare. Leith and Wren-Lewis [81] show that the
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fiscal response for the stability of debt is higher if consumers do not live forever in a
two country open economy EMU framework with overlapping generations. If the unique
monetary policy tries to stabilize inflation, each country has to stabilize debt because
one country can only compensate a weak fiscal policy of another country in a very limited
way. In case of one fiscal authority who does not stabilize its debt, the other country
cannot compensate without losing welfare. As a consequence, to stabilize debt in the
whole union, the monetary authority has to abandon the inflation target. It conducts
a passive policy such that a rise in inflation lowers debt in the respective country not
stabilizing debt per se.
Optimal simple rules for fiscal policy in a two country model setting are examined by
Kirsanova et al. [76]. They find welfare gains if governments respond on output gaps,
national inflation, and national debt. The gains in welfare are negligible if the national
government also focuses on the terms of trade and union-wide variables. Beetsma and
Jensen [12] analyze the mechanisms of fiscal stabilization and commitment policy in a
two-country monetary union. Fiscal policy rules stabilizing shifts in inflation as well
as the terms of trade are examined. Leith and Wren-Lewis [79] investigate fiscal pol-
icy using different instruments for stabilization in open economies being no member
or part of the EMU and compare effectiveness and welfare costs. Gal´ı and Monacelli
[54] develop a model consisting of n countries each with negligible size in a monetary
union environment. The small country size implies the absence of feedback effects from
other economies. The monetary authority maximizes union-wide welfare. It assumes
that optimal fiscal policy is carried out. Fiscal authorities want to offer public goods
efficiently. Moreover, they try to stabilize domestic inflation and the output gap. In
contrast, Ferrero [49] includes a role for distortionary taxes and government debt (in a
two country currency union). She assumes that the fiscal policy of one country affects
the second country and thus derives a Phillips curve, a government solvency constraint,
and a demand curve including the terms of trade. In this case, the terms of trade are
part of the loss function and are therefore a target for fiscal policy. In this context, alter-
native simple rules for fiscal and monetary policy are analyzed. Leith and Wren-Lewis
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[83] augment the Gal´ı/Monacelli model by a government sector and examine fiscal and
monetary policy under the assumption that the policy makers optimize under discretion.
They only consider income taxes as a fiscal instrument. In contrast to Leith and Wren-
Lewis [83], we assume that the policy authorities optimally decide under commitment.
Our equations derived from the wage tax scenario differ in some respect from those
found by Leith and Wren-Lewis. Furthermore, we examine the effect of a sales tax as
fiscal policy instrument. A theoretical foundation of optimal monetary policy is given
for both scenarios. We simulate a positive national debt shock and analyze different
policy reactions to reduce the debt. All optimal fiscal actions as a response to a debt
shock and the union-wide optimal monetary policy do not contradict each other.
The optimal fiscal responses can be described as follows. If debt suddenly increases in
a single country, the national government should optimally lower government spending
and raise taxes in order to reduce debt. Since variations in debt, government spending,
and taxes change the inflation rate, the intensity of the optimal fiscal response is found
to be very low to avoid high welfare losses. As a consequence, debt is reduced very
slowly.
The study shows that the higher the debt level is when an additional positive shock in
debt occurs, the stronger are the optimal fiscal policy responses and the higher is the loss
in welfare. Comparing wage with sales taxes as fiscal instruments, the fiscal authority
has to raise sales taxes by a higher amount to obtain a comparable optimal debt reduc-
tion path. Hence, an optimal choice of sales taxes to reduce debt causes higher national
welfare losses. Under commitment, the optimal intensity of fiscal responses depends on
the choice of the tax instrument. Indirect taxes seem to be less effective in reducing
debt.
The next section describes the main assumptions of the model and derives all major
equations needed to simulate the model. The third section shows the social planner’s
optimization problem. In the fourth section, the union-wide as well as the national op-
timal policy problem are solved. The union-wide solution is derived from a theoretical
basis, whereas for the national problem, the underlying model is calibrated. Optimal
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fiscal policy in response to a shock in debt is derived and different fiscal instruments are
compared. The last section concludes.
3.2 The Model
The setup is based on the monetary union model of Gal´ı and Monacelli [54]. Similar to
Leith and Wren-Lewis [83], it consists of three sectors. The household sector optimizes
utility subject to a budget constraint. The government sector maximizes the supply of
public goods subject to a solvency constraint relating debt levels to expenditures and
revenue of the government sector. Public goods are assumed to be equal to the consumed
goods of the government. Due to an existing home bias, see e.g., Brulhart et al. [27],
on domestic goods for the OECD countries, we assume that all goods consumed by the
government sector are produced in the home country. This assumption is also made
by Gal´ı and Monacellli [54]. The firms sector optimizes profits subject to a Calvo-price
setting rule. Since we analyze a multi country model, a section describing the terms
of trade and the international risk sharing is added. Moreover, the equilibrium of the
model is characterized. Finally, the model equations are rewritten with log deviation
variables from the flex price equilibrium.
3.2.1 The Household Sector
In the underlying section, we derive the first order conditions for the utility maximization
problem of the representative household in the underlying setup. Households maximize a
utility function, where consumption and public goods raise while labor lowers the level of
utility. Public goods are provided by the government sector. The goods consumed by the
residents are partly produced abroad and partly in the domestic country. The households
face a budget constraint. Expenditure, e.g., costs for consumption and assets, must not
exceed the income, for example wages and payoffs of assets. There is no investment or
capital in the setup.
The derivation is described in more detail in the following. In general, a variable Xit
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denotes variable X for country i in period t. For simplification, we assume a perfect
asset market.3 Moreover, every member country of a monetary union has zero weight.4
This negligible size of a single country implies that there are no feedback effects from the
other economies, e.g., if fiscal policy in one country changes. Furthermore, every country
is comparable in size. Comparability is assumed with respect to monetary policy. The
central bank of a union as a whole should be independent of a single member country’s
movements. The same size means that the households of every country are facing the
same budget constraints and thus pursue the same consumption plan.5 The continuum
of households is of size one and uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
The representative household of a single member country i maximizes the present value
of utility depending on consumption Cit at time t, a public good G
i
t at time t, and on
time spent working N it at time t.
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Cit , G
i
t, N
i
t
)
, (3.1)
where β denotes the intertemporal discount factor. The period utility function U
(
Cit ,
Git, N
i
t
)
is given by
(
1− ψi
)
logCit +ψ
i logGit −
(N it)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ . ψ
i ∈ [0, 1) denotes the relative
weight of public goods Git to consumption goods C
i
t in the utility function. The supply
of public goods, which can be seen, e.g., as the level of infrastructure, raises the utility
level of a household. It is defined as the aggregate of different goods j, all produced in
the home country
Git =
(∫ 1
0
Git(j)
(ε−1)/εdj
)ε/(ε−1)
, (3.2)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of public goods
produced in country i. Since all countries are assumed to be homogenous with respect
to public goods supply behavior, the elasticity is the same in every specific country i.
The time spent working N it adds some disutility to the function at time t, where ϕ is
the elasticity of labor supply. Moreover, Cit is the consumption aggregate defined as
3A consumer can trade claims to contracts with payoffs for all possible states.
4With this assumption, we follow Gal´ı and Monacelli [54].
5The assumptions coincide with the ones found in the Gal´ı/Monacelli paper [54].
66
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY IN AN EMU MODEL
a weighted product of consumption goods produced in the home country (Cii,t) and of
consumption goods produced in a foreign country (CiF,t), i.e.,
Cit =
(
Cii,t
)1−ν (
CiF,t
)ν
(1− ν)1−ν νν
. (3.3)
The subscript i or F shows the producing country of the good. Moreover, ν ∈ [0, 1) is
the weight of the imported goods of country i. With this approach, we follow Gal´ı and
Monacelli [54]. Since ν < 1, every country also consumes domestic goods. The larger ν,
the more households are willing to consume goods produced in other countries. Thus,
ν is a measure of openness. Since households in different countries may have different
preferences concerning the willingness to import goods, the consumption baskets can be
different. Even if the law of one price holds, the consumer price index (CPI) inflation can
be different across countries—see Gal´ı and Monacelli [54]. The domestic consumption
goods Cii,t are an aggregate of different goods j, which are all produced in country i
Cii,t =
(∫ 1
0
Cii,t(j)
(ε−1)/εdj
)ε/(ε−1)
, (3.4)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods produced
in country i. Every good is only produced in one country. ε is the same for public goods
as well as for consumption goods. We assume that households and the government
are homogenous in that context. The amount of imported goods CiF,t is defined as the
aggregate quantity of goods produced in foreign countries f
CiF,t = exp
∫ 1
0
cif,tdf, (3.5)
where cif,t = logC
i
f,t is the logarithm of an index containing the goods consumed by
country i and produced in country f
Cif,t =
(∫ 1
0
Cif,t(j)
(ε−1)/εdj
)ε/(ε−1)
. (3.6)
Since we want to compare the effect of indirect and direct taxes, we differentiate between
two scenarios. On one hand, we assume that the national government only levies wage
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taxes τ i,lt . On the other hand, a sales tax with tax rate τ
i,s
i,t is raised. Some equations
depend on the choice of the tax instrument such that they are displayed separately for
the respective setup. The labels .W and .S in the equations stand for wage tax and sales
tax, respectively. The budget constraint of the representative household of country i in
period t can be written as follows.∫ 1
0
P it (j)C
i
i,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
P ft (j)C
i
f,t(j)djdf
+Et
[
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
]
≤ Πit +D
i
t +W
i
tN
i
t
(
1− τ i,lt
)
− T it (3.7.W)(
1 + τ i,si,t
)∫ 1
0
P it (j)C
i
i,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
(
1 + τ f,st
) ∫ 1
0
P ft (j)C
i
f,t(j)djdf
+Et
[
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
]
≤ Πit +D
i
t +W
i
tN
i
t − T
i
t . (3.7.S)
The details are explained in the next paragraph. The first term denotes the home con-
sumption of country i. This term is equal to the aggregate of the amount of domestically
produced goods Cii,t(j) consumed by residents, which are weighted with the respective
prices P it (j). The second term is the consumption in country i of products produced
in other countries f , integrated over all foreign countries f ∈ [0, 1]. The single goods
Cif,t(j) produced in country f and consumed in country i are evaluated with their respec-
tive prices P ft (j). The last term on the left hand side (Et
[
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
]
) is the expected
discounted value of payoffs of a portfolio where Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor
for one period ahead payoffs and Dit+1 is the nominal payoff of the chosen portfolio
held at the end of period t. The discount factor Qt,t+1 is assumed to be the same in
all countries. The right hand side of the respective inequality is the “income” of the
household: Πit denotes the profit share of the firms acting in a monopolistic competition
framework6, W it is the nominal wage rate, N
i
t the time worked, and T
i
t is a lump-sum
tax introduced to finance a steady state subsidy, which offsets the distortions caused by
imperfect competition and the respective taxes in the steady state. τ i,lt denotes the wage
tax levied by the government and τ i,si,t , τ
f,s
t is a sales tax being a markup on the price P
i
t
for country i or P ft for country f . Every good within one country is subject to the same
tax rate. There is no investment in the model. All products in the constraints are given
6This is due to the Calvo-pricing assumption.
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in nominal terms. We assume that the law of one price holds in the monetary union.
The representative household maximizes equation (3.1) subject to equation (3.7.W) and
(3.7.S), respectively. It decides how to divide an available amount of expenditure be-
tween different available goods. To eliminate the integrals in the constraint inequalities,
we use the demand function for a particular good j produced in country i, f , country i’s
domestic and imported goods price index, as well as the substitution rules for imported
and domestic goods.
Since some equations depend on the chosen tax instrument, we derive the necessary equa-
tions for the wage and sales tax scenario separately. We begin with a setup assuming that
national governments can only raise a wage tax. The demand function Cii,t(j) for good
j produced in country i is given by the aggregate domestic consumption goods weighted
with the price of good j relative to the domestic price index P it =
(∫ 1
0 P
i
t (j)
1−εdj
)1/(1−ε)
,
i.e.,
Cii,t(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
Cii,t. (3.8)
The demand function for imported goods is given by
Cif,t(j) =
(
P ft (j)
P ft
)−ε
Cif,t, (3.9)
where P ft =
(∫ 1
0 P
f
t (j)
1−εdj
)1/(1−ε)
is the price index of the aggregate goods imported
from country f and, by the law of one price, is equal to country f ’s domestic price level.
With the former derivations, the first and the second integral in the budget constraint
(equation (3.7.W)) is given by
∫ 1
0 P
i
t (j)C
i
i,t(j)dj=
(
1/P it
)−ε
Cii,t
∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
)1−ε
dj = P itC
i
i,t
and
∫ 1
0 P
f
t (j)C
i
f,t(j)dj = P
f
t C
i
f,t. If we optimize across imported goods by a country, it
holds that
P ft C
i
f,t = P
∗
t C
i
F,t, (3.10)
where P ∗t = exp
∫ 1
0 p
f
t df is the union-wide price index, i.e., an aggregate of the foreign
countries’ price indices and, from the perspective of a single country, the price index of
imported goods. Finally, we need an expression for the last integral and can express the
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total expenditure on imported goods as∫ 1
0
P ft C
i
f,tdf = P
∗
t C
i
F,t. (3.11.W)
As before, Cif,t are the goods produced in country f and consumed in country i, whereas
CiF,t are all imported goods consumed in country i. The consumer price index P
i
c,t =(
P it
)1−ν
(P ∗t )
ν is the weighted product of the domestic and the union-wide price index,
weighted by ν, the measure of openness. Since the consumed goods are weighted in the
same manner, the representative basket being the basis for CPI calculation should have
the same composition. Optimization between domestic and imported goods implies that
P itC
i
i,t = (1−ν)P
i
c,tC
i
t and P
∗
t C
i
F,t = νP
i
c,tC
i
t . The overall consumption expenditures can
be summarized as P itC
i
i,t + P
∗
t C
i
F,t = P
i
c,tC
i
t . Furthermore, the new budget constraint is
given by
P ic,tC
i
t + Et
[
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
]
≤ Πit +D
i
t +W
i
tN
i
t
(
1− τ i,lt
)
− T it . (3.12.W)
The expenditure (for consumption and assets) are less or equal to the income, i.e., the
sum of profits, assets, and net wage minus the lump-sum tax, which has to be payed by
each household.
If we assume that governments only have access to sales taxes instead of a wage tax,
the equations for the optimal choice of imported goods are different. Since the sales tax
has no effect on the optimal choice within one country (every price of goods within one
country includes the same tax rate) only the equations for the imported goods depend
on the chosen tax instrument
(
1 + τ f,st
)
P ft C
i
f,t =
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
P ∗t C
i
F,t, where 1 + τ
∗,s
t =
exp
∫ 1
0 log
(
1 + τ f,st
)
df . The total expenditure on imported goods is thus given by∫ 1
0
(
1 + τ f,st
)
P ft C
i
f,tdf =
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
P ∗t C
i
F,t. (3.11.S)
The measure of openness, ν, weights the components for the index of sales taxes:(
1+τ i,st
)
=
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)1−ν (
1 + τ∗,st
)ν
. The optimal allocation of expenditures between
domestic and foreign goods imported by country i is given by
(
1+τ i,si,t
)
P itC
i
i,t = (1−
ν)
(
1+τ i,st
)
P ic,tC
i
t and
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
P ∗t C
i
F,t = ν
(
1 + τ i,st
)
P ic,tC
i
t . The overall consump-
tion expenditure is
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
P itC
i
i,t +
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
P ∗t C
i
F,t =
(
1 + τ i,st
)
P ic,tC
i
t .
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Furthermore, the new budget constraint can be written as
(
1 + τ i,st
)
P ic,tC
i
t + Et
[
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
]
≤ Πit +D
i
t +W
i
tN
i
t − T
i
t . (3.12.S)
The expenditure (for consumption and assets) on the left hand side has to be less or
equal to the income, i.e., the sum of profits, assets, and wage minus the lump-sum tax,
which is payed by each individual. Since the introduction of a sales tax raises the price
for each good, the sales tax operates as a price premium.
As a next step, we derive the first order conditions of a household facing the optimization
problem formulated in equation (3.1) subject to equation (3.12.W) or equation (3.12.S).
Again, we start with the wage tax scenario. The derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to consumption, labor, and assets implies:
λt =
(
1− ψi
) 1
CitP
i
c,t
,
λt =
(
N it
)ϕ
W it
(
1− τ i,lt
) , and
λt = Etλt+1βR
∗
t , respectively.
λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier at time t. R
∗
t =
1
EtQt,t+1
is the gross nominal return
of a riskless one-period bond, which yields one unit in t+ 1. Furthermore, R∗t = 1 + r
∗
t ,
where r∗t is the nominal interest rate and the monetary policy instrument of the unique
monetary authority in the monetary union. Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier leads
to the following two first order conditions
Cit
(
N it
)ϕ
=
(
1− ψi
)
W it
(
1− τ i,lt
)
P ic,t
, (3.13.W)
Et
Cit+1P
i
c,t+1
CitP
i
c,t
= βR∗t . (3.14.W)
The last equation is the consumption Euler equation. Since Ci denotes the consumption
goods, CiP ic is the overall consumption value. The last equation links expected future
consumption value with the current consumption value and the nominal rate of return.
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To obtain a linear system of equations, the first order conditions are log-linearized
r̂w it = ϕn̂
i
t + ĉ
i
t −
̂
log 1− τ i,lt ,
ĉ it = Etĉ
i
t+1 −
(
l̂ogR
∗
t −Etπ
i
c,t+1
)
,
where small letters denote variables in logarithms. For the tax rate, the logarithms are
explicitly labeled. rwit are real wages in logs, and x̂ is the deviation of a variable x from
its steady state value x¯. The log deviation of real wages depends on the log deviation of
labor, consumption, and taxes. Moreover, the log-linearized consumption Euler equation
shows that the log deviation of consumption today depends on the expected log deviation
of consumption tomorrow, the log deviation of the nominal rate of return, and the
expected consumer price inflation rate tomorrow. If the equations are rewritten in log
variables and not as log deviations from steady state, we obtain with
̂
log 1− τ i,lt =
− τ¯
i,l
1−τ¯ i,l
̂
log τ i,lt
ϕnit+c
i
t+
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ i,lt − rw
i
t=log
(
1− ψi
)
+ log
(
1− τ¯ i,l
)
+
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ¯ i,l, (3.15.W)
cit=Etc
i
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
c,t+1 − ρ
)
, (3.16.W)
where ρ is the steady state value for the nominal gross rate of return. Using equation
(3.14.W), we obtain log R¯ = − log β = ρ.
We follow the same steps for the scenario including a sales tax. We get the following
first-order conditions
Cit
(
N it
)ϕ
=
(
1− ψi
)
W it
P ic,t
(
1 + τ i,st
) , (3.13.S)
Et
Cit+1P
i
c,t+1
(
1 + τ i,st+1
)
CitP
i
c,t
(
1 + τ i,st
) = βR∗t . (3.14.S)
Contrary to the wage tax scenario, not the wage, but the prices are influenced by a tax.
Thus, in both first order conditions, the price index is multiplied by the respective tax
rate. The equations are log-linearized and finally stated in log level form.
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With
̂
log 1 + τ i,st =
τ¯ i,s
1+τ¯ i,s
̂
log τ i,st , we obtain
ϕnit+c
i
t+
τ¯ i,s
1+ τ¯ i,s
log τ i,st −rw
i
t=log
(
1−ψi
)
− log
(
1+ τ¯ i,s
)
+
τ¯ i,s
1+ τ¯ i,s
log τ¯ i,s, (3.15.S)
cit=Etc
i
t+1−
(
logR∗t −Etπ
i
c,t+1−ρ
)
+
τ¯ i,s
1+ τ¯ i,s
Et
(
log τ i,st+1− log τ
i,s
t
)
. (3.16.S)
The first equation shows that the log real wages depend on log labor, log consumption,
log taxes, and some constants. Moreover, equation (3.16.S) denotes the corresponding
consumption Euler equation. Log consumption today depends on the expected log con-
sumption tomorrow, the difference of the log nominal rate of return and its steady state
value, the expected CPI inflation tomorrow, and the difference of the expected log tax
rate tomorrow and the log tax rate today.
3.2.2 The Terms of Trade
In the following subsection, we analyze the terms of trade that are defined by the relation
of the price indices of two countries for the scenario including a wage tax and depend
additionally on the relation between the tax rates in two countries if a sales tax is included
in the model. Moreover, it is shown that the consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate
is a linear combination of the log terms of trade and the domestic inflation rate. Union-
wide CPI inflation is equal to union-wide inflation. The derivations are explained in
detail in the following.
The bilateral terms of trade Sif,t between a country i and a country f for the model
including a wage tax is the ratio of the price index of country f and i7
Sif,t =
P ft
P it
, (3.17.W)
whereas the effective terms of trade is defined as
Sit =
P ∗t
P it
= exp
∫ 1
0
log Sif,tdf. (3.18.W)
Moreover, the CPI price index P ic,t can be written as P
i
c,t = P
i
t
(
Sit
)ν
=
(
P it
)1−ν
(P ∗t )
ν . To
obtain a system of linear equations, we log-linearize the equations above. The following
7See also Gal´ı/Monacelli [54].
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relationship holds between the CPI inflation πic,t and the domestic inflation π
i
t:
pic,t = p
i
t + νs
i
t ⇔ π
i
c,t = π
i
t + ν∆s
i
t. (3.19.W)
As before, small letters denote variables in logs. If we take the equation on the left hand
side (the log-linearized definition of the CPI price index) for two different points in time
and subtract the equations, the CPI-inflation can be described as shown on the right
hand side.
The overall log effective terms of trade over all countries are
∫ 1
0 s
i
tdi = 0. This is due
to the fact that the overall effective terms of trade sum up to 1. As a consequence, the
log overall effective terms of trade are equal to zero. After integrating the right hand
side equation of (3.19.W) over all countries i, it can be observed that the world inflation
rate equals the CPI-inflation for the union as a whole: π∗c,t = π
∗
t , where
∗ symbolizes a
union-wide variable.
If the government chooses a sales tax as fiscal instrument, we obtain equation (3.17.S)
for the terms of trade Sif,t between two countries i and f and equation (3.18.S) for the
effective terms of trade Sit of country i.
Sif,t =
P ft
(
1 + τ f,sf,t
)
P it
(
1 + τ i,si,t
) , (3.17.S)
Sit =
P ∗t
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
P it
(
1 + τ i,si,t
) = exp ∫ 1
0
logSif,tdf. (3.18.S)
With the equations for the index of overall sales taxes and the CPI-price index, it
holds that P ic,t
(
1 + τ i,st
)
= P it
(
Sit
)ν (
1 + τ i,si,t
)
=
(
P it
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))1−ν (
P ∗t
(
1 + τ∗,st
))ν
⇔ P ic,t = P
i
t
(
Sit
)ν ( 1+τ i,si,t
1+τ∗,st
)ν
= P it
(
P ∗t
P it
)ν
. The CPI price index depends on the sales
tax rate. Since the CPI-inflation should be stated depending on domestic and world
inflation, we take logarithms and obtain equation (3.19.S) for the CPI-inflation πic,t of
country i
πic,t = π
i
t + ν∆s
i
t +∆ log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
−∆ log
(
1 + τ i,st
)
= (1− ν)πit + νπ
∗
t . (3.19.S)
The two tax rate terms sum up to zero, which can also be seen from the fact that
P ic,t = P
i
t
(
P ∗t
P it
)ν
and thus, in logs, pic,t = (1− ν) p
i
t + νp
∗
t . If we then integrate over all
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countries i, we obtain p∗c,t = p
∗
t . Furthermore,
∫ 1
0 π
i
tdi = π
∗
t . As a consequence, π
∗
c,t = π
∗
t ,
i.e., the union-wide CPI-inflation is equal to the union-wide inflation rate.8
3.2.3 International Risk Sharing
In this subsection, we develop a relationship between log home consumption cit of a
country i and the log union-wide overall consumption c∗t . The derivation is based on
the consumption Euler equation obtained from the utility maximization problem of the
households. Since the Euler equation depends on the choice of the fiscal tax instrument,
both scenarios are analyzed separately.
If the government levies wage taxes, the corresponding consumption Euler equation
(3.14.W), applied to two countries i and f , implies
β
Cft
Cft+1
P fc,t
P fc,t+1
= Qt,t+1 = β
Cit
Cit+1
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
. (3.20.W)
We assume that the stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1 is the same for all countries. The
solution for the difference equation (3.20.W) is ϑiC
f
t P
f
c,t = C
i
tP
i
c,t.
9 Thus,
ϑiC
f
t
P fc,t
P ic,t
= Cit = ϑiC
f
t
(
Sif,t
)1−ν
. (3.21.W)
If there are zero net foreign assets and if every country faces an identical initial envi-
ronment, ϑi = ϑ = 1 ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (3.21.W) changes to C
i
t = C
f
t
(
Sif,t
)1−ν
.
To obtain a linear system of equations, we take logarithms. Log domestic consumption
cit depends on log foreign consumption c
f
t in the following way: c
i
t = c
f
t + (1− ν) s
i
f,t.
After integrating over all countries f , we obtain an equation describing the relationship
between log consumption cit of country i to log world consumption c
∗
t :
cit = c
∗
t + (1− ν) s
i
t. (3.22.W)
For the model including a sales tax, the consumption Euler equation (3.14.S) is different.
Moreover, the effective price, i.e., the price including the tax markup determines the
8The result is the same as for a wage tax scenario.
9This is true, because β(Cft P
f
c,t)/(C
f
t+1P
f
c,t+1) = β(C
i
tP
i
c,t)/(C
i
t+1P
i
c,t+1) ⇔ (C
f
t P
f
c,t)/(C
f
t+1P
f
c,t+1) =
(CitP
i
c,t)/(C
i
t+1P
i
c,t+1). Inserting the solution leads to (C
f
t P
f
c,t)/(C
f
t+1P
f
c,t+1)=(ϑiC
f
t P
f
c,t)/(ϑiC
f
t+1P
f
c,t+1),
which is true ∀ t and all constants ϑi 6= 0.
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exchange relation between the terms of trade of one and another country. With the
Euler equation applied to two countries, we obtain a difference equation of the form:
β
Cft
Cft+1
P fc,t
P fc,t+1
(
1 + τ f,st
)
(
1 + τ f,st+1
) = Qt,t+1 = β Cit
Cit+1
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
(
1 + τ i,st
)
(
1 + τ i,st+1
) , (3.20.S)
which is solved by
ϑiC
f
t
P fc,t
P ic,t
(
1 + τ f,st
)
(
1 + τ i,st
) = Cit = ϑiCft Sif,t
(
Sft
Sit
)ν
= ϑiC
f
t
(
Sif,t
)1−ν
. (3.21.S)
Assuming ϑi = 1 ∀i ∈ [0, 1], we take logarithms and obtain c
i
t = c
f
t + (1− ν) s
i
f,t. If we
integrate over all countries f , the log consumption cit in country i depends on the log
world consumption and the log effective terms of trade, i.e.,10
cit = c
∗
t + (1− ν) s
i
t. (3.22.S)
3.2.4 The Government Sector
The government decides which amount of public goods optimally to provide. It faces
a solvency constraint, which relates current debt to the present value of former debt,
expenditure for public goods, and revenue in terms of taxes.
Public goods Git, e.g., infrastructure, are produced in the home country i and optimiza-
tion between goods produced in country i implies—see also equation (3.2)—that
Git =
(∫ 1
0
(
Git(j)
)(ε−1)/ε
dj
)ε/(ε−1)
,
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between different goods produced in the
same country. ε > 1 is the same for all countries and also enters the households’ opti-
mization of different goods produced in one country.
The government faces a solvency constraint relating present debt Bit in country i for
period t to income sources, expenditure, and former debt. We assume that seigniorage
does not present any source of income for the national government sectors such that
10The equation is the same as for the wage tax scenario, equation (3.22.W).
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taxes (wage and sales taxes, respectively) are the only component of government rev-
enue. Expenditures are described as public goods Git, which have to be payed by the
government. Furthermore, a lump-sum tax T it as well as an employment subsidy χ
i
t on
the wage is included. The steady state of the economy is only efficient if the distor-
tions in both markets, the labor and the goods market, are offset. If there are taxes
on income together with Calvo-pricing, both markets are distorted. The employment
subsidy, which is financed by the lump-sum tax has to be chosen to offset the underlying
distortions. With sales taxes and Calvo-pricing, only the goods market is distorted such
that the employment subsidy is chosen to offset the corresponding distortion.
We follow Leith and Wren-Lewis [83] and define the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government in country i as a function of debt, government expenditure, and
government revenue. Hence, the solvency constraint for the two scenarios is given by
Bit = R
∗
t−1B
i
t−1 + P
i
tG
i
t −W
i
tN
i
t τ
i,l
t − T
i
t + χ
i
tW
i
tN
i
t , (3.23.W)
Bit = R
∗
t−1B
i
t−1 + P
i
t
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
Git − P
i
t Y
i
t τ
i,s
i,t − T
i
t + χ
i
tW
i
tN
i
t . (3.23.S)
Debt today is equal to the present value of former debt. Moreover, government spending
today is added and the tax revenue today is subtracted since actual expenditure aug-
ment debt and revenues reduce debt. P itG
i
t or
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
P itG
i
t denotes the public goods
valued with prices P it and
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
P it , respectively. An additional expenditure of the
governmental authority is the employment subsidy, which is a part of the wage income.
The tax revenue consists of the lump-sum tax and the amount of wage taxes and sales
taxes, respectively.
If we define Bi,rt as the real debt (i.e., the nominal debt level B
i
t divided by the price level
P it of country i) multiplied by the rate of return for country i at time t, B
i,r
t =
BitR
∗
t
P it
,
the respective budget constraint changes to
Bi,rt
R∗t
=
P it−1
P it
Bi,rt−1 +G
i
t −
(
τ i,lt − χ
i
t
)W it
P it
N it −
T it
P it
,
Bi,rt
R∗t
=
P it−1
P it
Bi,rt−1 +G
i
t − τ
i,s
i,t
(
Y it −G
i
t
)
+ χit
W it
P it
N it −
T it
P it
.
Since the employment subsidy is chosen to offset distortions in the markets when being
in steady state and is financed by the lump-sum tax, the last two terms sum up to zero.
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Log-linearizing around the steady state delivers:
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
log
(
Git
G¯i
)
−
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
r̂w it + n̂
i
t + νŝ
i
t
)
−
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
̂
log τ i,lt , (3.24.W)
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
log
(
Git
G¯i
)
−
τ¯ i,si P¯
iY¯ i
B¯iR¯
ŷ it
−
τ¯ i,si P¯
i
B¯iR¯
(
Y¯ i − G¯i
) ̂
log τ i,si,t . (3.24.S)
3.2.5 The Business Sector
Within this section, the characteristics of firms acting in a market with monopolistic
competition and price rigidities are analyzed. The optimal reset price under Calvo-
price setting is calculated. Furthermore, we develop the marginal costs for the firms’
production. Finally, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve describing the supply side of the
model is derived.
We begin with the production function for a specific good Y i(j) produced in country
i. The product Y it (j) depends on the technology level A
i
t of country i and the labor
N it (j) utilized to produce good j, Y
i
t (j) = A
i
tN
i
t (j). The log technology a
i
t = logA
i
t =
ρaa
i
t−1 + ε
i,a
t follows an AR(1) process with ρa ∈ [0, 1] and ε
i,a
t is white noise. The
demand function for a good Y it (j) depends on the price for good j, the overall price
level of country i, the elasticity of substitution of different goods in one country, and the
overall output produced in country i
Y it (j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
Y it . (3.25)
The overall output produced in country i is defined as the aggregate of the different goods
Y it (j), Y
i
t =
(∫ 1
0
(
Y it (j)
)(ε−1)/ε
dj
)ε/(ε−1)
, and the overall labor used for production is
equal to N it =
(∫ 1
0
(
N it (j)
)(ε−1)/ε
dj
)ε/(ε−1)
. If we integrate Y it (j)
(ε−1)/ε over all firms j
and take it to the power of εε−1 , it holds that Y
i
t = A
i
tN
i
t . Taking logarithms leads to the
following linear equation: yit = a
i
t+n
i
t. Log output is equal to the sum of log technology
and log labor.
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Since only a specific part of firms can reset prices, the average price P it in country i is
given by a Calvo-price setting rule
P it =
[
(1− θ)
(
P¯ it
)1−ε
+ θ
(
P it−1
)1−ε] 11−ε
, (3.26)
where θ denotes the part of firms not being able to reset prices to the reset price P¯ it . The
reset price is derived in the following. Firms maximize their profits, i.e., the difference
of revenue and costs. If we optimize the objective function of a firm j in real terms, we
obtain the traditional optimal reset price in log-linearized form:
p¯it = (1− βθ)
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
(
log µit+s +mc
i
t+s + p
i
t+s
)
, (3.27)
where mci denotes the log real marginal costs weighted with the domestic price index
and log µit is the optimal price markup in the absence of sticky prices, i.e., in a flexible
price equilibrium. Because the absence of sticky prices implies that there is zero inflation
in steady state, log µit is the markup apparent in a zero inflation steady state. In the flex
price equilibrium, the marginal costs are exclusively driven by the optimal price markup.
Thus, mcit = − log µ
i
t.
To derive a New-Keynesian Phillips curve type equation, we take the following steps:
using equation (3.27) we get for the reset price in t+ 1 that p¯it+1 = (1− βθ)
∑∞
s=0 (βθ)
s
Et+1
(
log µit+1+s +mc
i
t+1+s + p
i
t+1+s
)
⇔
p¯it
1−βθ = mc
i
t+p
i
t+log µ
i
t+
θβ
1−θβEtp¯
i
t+1. If we
log-linearize equation (3.26), we obtain pit = (1− θ) p¯
i
t+θp
i
t−1 and therefore p¯
i
t =
pit−θp
i
t−1
1−θ .
The optimal reset price in log-linearized form can be rewritten as
1
(1−θβ) (1−θ)
(
pit − θp
i
t−1
)
=
θβ
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
Et
(
pit+1 − θp
i
t
)
+wit − a
i
t + log
(
1− χit
)
+ log µit
⇔
1
(1−θβ) (1−θ)
(
pit − p
i
t−1
)
=
θβ
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
Et
(
pit+1 − p
i
t
)
−
1
1−θβ
pit−1
+
θβ
1−θβ
pit + w
i
t − a
i
t + log
(
1− χit
)
+ log µit
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and θ(1−θβ)(1−θ)
(
πit
)
= θβ(1−θβ)(1−θ)Et
(
πit+1
)
− pit + w
i
t − a
i
t + log
(
1− χit
)
+ log µit. Thus,
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is
πit = βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
θ
[
wit − a
i
t + log
(
1− χit
)
+ log µit − p
i
t
]
= βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
θ
[
mcit + log µ
i
t
]
. (3.28)
To obtain a formula for the log real marginal costs mcit, we use the fact that real firms’
costs are equal to
W itN
i
t (j)(1−χit)
P it
=
W itY
i
t (j)(1−χit)
P itA
i
t
. Therefore, the real marginal costs are
MCit =
W it (1−χit)
P itA
i
t
, and the log real marginal costs are
mcit = w
i
t − p
i
t − a
i
t + log
(
1− χit
)
. (3.29)
If we use the first order condition of the household’s optimization problem (equation
(3.15.W) and (3.15.S)), we obtain the following equations for the two different model
settings.
mcit =ϕn
i
t + c
i
t +
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ i,lt − log
(
1− ψi
)
−
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ¯ i,l − log
(
1− τ¯ i,l
)
−ait + log
(
1− χit
)
+ νsit
=ϕyit − (1 + ϕ) a
i
t + c
i
t +
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ i,lt − log
(
1− ψi
)
−
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
log τ¯ i,l
− log
(
1− τ¯ i,l
)
+ log
(
1− χit
)
+ νsit, (3.30.W)
mcit =ϕn
i
t + c
i
t +
τ¯ i,s
1+ τ¯ i,s
log τ i,st − log
(
1− ψi
)
−
τ¯ i,s
1+ τ¯ i,s
log τ¯ i,s + log
(
1 + τ¯ i,s
)
−ait + log
(
1− χit
)
+ νsit + log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
− log
(
1 + τ i,st
)
=ϕyit − (1 + ϕ) a
i
t + c
i
t +
τ¯ i,s
1 + τ¯ i,s
log τ i,st − log
(
1− ψi
)
−
τ¯ i,s
1 + τ¯ i,s
log τ¯ i,s
+ log
(
1+ τ¯ i,s
)
+ log
(
1−χit
)
+ νsit + log
(
1+ τ i,si,t
)
− log
(
1+ τ i,st
)
. (3.30.S)
Finally, the steady state tax rates are chosen such that they absorb all distortions caused
by the markup shock. Moreover, the employment subsidy compensates the distortions
caused by the tax. For the wage tax, it holds in steady state that τ¯ i,l = 1 − 1/µ¯i
and with 1/µ¯i = M¯C
i
= 1−χ¯
i
1−τ¯ i,l
=
(
1− χ¯i
)
µ¯i ⇔ χ¯i = 1 −
(
1/µ¯i
)2
. Furthermore,
log
(
1− τ¯ i,l
)
= − log µ¯i. The description of the steady state tax level or the natural
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level of taxes in Subsection 3.2.7 is comparable. The natural level of taxes is the tax
rate in the flex price equilibrium.
For the steady state sales tax, it holds analogously that µ¯i − 1 = τ¯ i,si and M¯C
i
=(
1− χ¯i
) (
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
= 1/µ¯i ⇔ χ¯i = 1−
(
1/µ¯i
)2
, log
(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
= log µ¯i.
3.2.6 Equilibrium and the Fiscal Variable g
As a first step to analyze the equilibrium, the market clearing condition for a good j
produced in country i can be stated as
Y it (j) = C
i
i,t(j) +
∫ 1
0
Cfi,t(j)df +G
i
t(j)
=
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε [
Cii,t +
∫ 1
0
Cfi,tdf +G
i
t
]
, (3.31)
where the first term Cii,t(j) in equation (3.31) denotes the consumption of domestic goods
in country i, the second term symbolizes the overall exports
∫ 1
0 C
f
i,t(j)df of domestic
goods to foreign countries f , whereas the last term Git(j) are the public goods in country
i. There is no investment in the model. For the second row, we use the optimality con-
ditions obtained by optimizing between different goods produced in one country. Thus,
the overall production of a good j can be described as the sum of weighted consumption
of overall domestic goods, overall public goods, and overall exports of domestically pro-
duced goods. With P itC
i
i,t = (1− ν)P
i
c,tC
i
t ,
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
P itC
i
i,t = (1 − ν)
(
1 + τ i,st
)
P ic,tC
i
t ,
and equation (3.21.W), (3.21.S), the market clearing condition (equation (3.31)) changes
to
Y it (j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε [(
Sit
)ν
Cit +G
i
t
]
. (3.32)
Using Y it =
(∫ 1
0
(
Y it (j)
) ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
, we obtain for the overall production Y it in country i
the market clearing condition
Y it =
(
Sit
)ν
Cit +G
i
t, (3.33)
which holds for both model settings. We follow Leith and Wren-Lewis [83] and introduce
the fiscal variable git = − log
(
1−
Git
Y it
)
in the model setup. All model equations are
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rewritten with respect to the new fiscal variable. With yit− g
i
t = log Y
i
t + log
(
1−
Git
Y it
)
=
log
(
Y it −G
i
t
)
and after log-linearization, equation (3.33) can be described as
yit − g
i
t = νs
i
t + c
i
t. (3.34)
The log output in country i depends on the fiscal variable git, log consumption c
i
t and
the log effective terms of trade sit. As before, the overall log effective terms of trade sum
up to zero
∫ 1
0 s
i
tdi = 0 because the effective terms of trade for all countries are equal
to one. We define the union-wide variables as follows: y∗t =
∫ 1
0 y
i
tdi, c
∗
t =
∫ 1
0 c
i
tdi, and
g∗t =
∫ 1
0 g
i
tdi. After integrating over all countries i, the overall market clearing condition
can be stated as
y∗t = c
∗
t + g
∗
t . (3.35)
Union-wide log output is equal to the sum of union-wide log consumption and the union-
wide fiscal variable. If we use the overall market clearing condition and additionally the
fact that Etπ
i
c,t+1 = Et
(
pit+1 − p
i
t
)
+ νEt
(
sit+1 − s
i
t
)
, Etπ
i
c,t+1 = Etπ
i
t+1 + νEt∆s
i
t+1 +
Et∆ log
(
1 + τ i,si,t+1
)
−Et∆ log
(
1 + τ i,st+1
)
, respectively, the consumption Euler equations
(3.16.W) and (3.16.S) can be rewritten as11
yit = Ety
i
t+1 −
(
logR∗t −Etπ
i
t+1 − ρ
)
− Et∆g
i
t+1, (3.36.W)
yit = Ety
i
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − ρ
)
− Et∆g
i
t+1 +
τ¯ i,si
1 + τ¯ i,si
Et∆ log τ
i,s
i,t+1. (3.36.S)
We want to substitute git for log
Git
G¯i
in the government solvency constraints. With
logGit = log
(
Git
Y it
Y it
)
= log
Git
Y it
+ yit = log
(
1− e−g
i
t
)
+ yit, the term log
(
1− e−g
i
t
)
can be
linearized around steady state in the following way: log
(
1− e−g
i
t
)
≈ 1−γ
i
γi
git + log γ
i +
1−γi
γi
log
(
1− γi
)
. γi = G¯
i
Y¯ i
is defined as the steady state government expenditure per
output ratio. Thus,
log
Git
G¯i
= logGit − log G¯
i =
1− γi
γi
ĝ it + ŷ
i
t ,
where ĝ it and ŷ
i
t are the log deviations of the original variables from the respective steady
state value. With equation (3.34), the two government solvency constraints (equation
11Note that
τ¯
i,s
i
1+τ¯
i,s
i
Et∆ log τ
i,s
i,t+1 = Et∆ log
(
1 + τ i,si,t+1
)
.
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(3.24.W) and (3.24.S)) become
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γi
γi
)
+ τ¯ i,l
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
ĝ it
+
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
−
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
ŷ it −
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1 + ϕ)
(
ŷ it − a
i
t
)
−
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i(
1− τ¯ i,lt
)
B¯iR¯
̂
log τ i,lt , (3.37.W)
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γi
γi
)(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
ĝ it +
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
−
τ¯ i,si P¯
iY¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
ŷ it −
τ¯ i,si P¯
i
B¯iR¯
(
Y¯ i − G¯i
) ̂
log τ i,si,t . (3.37.S)
Furthermore, equations (3.30.W) and (3.30.S) change with the introduction of the fiscal
variable g and with equation (3.34) to
mcit = (1 + ϕ)
(
yit − a
i
t
)
− git + log
(
1− χit
)
− log
(
1− ψi
)
− log
(
1− τ i,lt
)
, (3.38.W)
mcit = (1 + ϕ)
(
yit − a
i
t
)
− git + log
(
1− χit
)
− log
(
1− ψi
)
+ log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
. (3.38.S)
Overall, all equations needed for the model setting have been derived. The demand side
of the model is given by the Euler equation (3.36.W) and (3.36.S). The New-Keynesian
Phillips curve is given by equation (3.28), where the log real marginal costs are defined
in equation (3.38.W) and (3.38.S). To summarize, the following can be stated.
Model Description 3.1.
• The demand if wage taxes are used as fiscal instrument:
yit = Ety
i
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − ρ
)
− Et∆g
i
t+1.
• The demand if sales taxes are used as fiscal instrument:
yit = Ety
i
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − ρ
)
− Et∆g
i
t+1 +
τ¯ i,si
1+τ¯ i,si
Et∆ log τ
i,s
i,t+1.
• The New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
πit = βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ
[
mcit + log µ
i
t
]
.
Finally, we develop an equation that sheds light on the relationship between domestic
output, the terms of trade, and overall consumption. Equation (3.34) describes how log
83
3.2. THE MODEL
output depends on the fiscal variable, the log consumption, and the log terms of trade.
Furthermore, equation (3.22.W) and (3.22.S) show that union-wide log consumption is
a function of domestic log consumption and the log terms of trade. Combining the
equations, we obtain
∆yit = ∆g
i
t +∆c
∗
t +∆s
i
t.
If the government uses a wage tax as fiscal instrument, the log effective terms of trade
depend on the domestic as well as the union-wide price level. For the sales tax scenario,
the domestic and union-wide tax rate additionally influence the log effective terms of
trade. If we substitute for the log effective terms of trade in the equation described
above, the two following equations result, depending on the tax instrument.
∆yit = ∆g
i
t +∆c
∗
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t, (3.39.W)
∆yit = ∆g
i
t +∆c
∗
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t +∆ log
(
1 + τ∗,st
)
−∆ log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
)
. (3.39.S)
These additional equations show that the change in domestic log output depends on
the change in the fiscal variable, the change in union-wide consumption, the difference
in the union-wide and the domestic inflation rate, and, if sales taxes are levied, on the
difference between the union-wide and the domestic log tax rate. Thus, the equations
are a measure of competitiveness as they relate changes in domestic variables to changes
arising between the domestic country and the union as a whole.
Finally, the model is closed by the policy maker’s decision, who faces the government
solvency constraint given by equation (3.37.W) and (3.37.S), respectively.
3.2.7 Gap Variables
The last step in the derivation of the setup is to rewrite the model equations in gap
variables form, i.e., in deviations form. We define the natural level of a variable as the
level that would occur if there are no nominal rigidities. Then, the gap of a variable x
is assumed to be the difference of the variable xt and its natural level x
n
t . The natural
level of log output ynt is thus the level that would occur in an economy without nominal
rigidities. The gap variable xi,gt of variable x
i is given by xi,gt = x
i
t − x
i,n
t = x̂
i
t − x̂
i,n
t ,
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where x̂ denotes the log-deviation of variable x from steady state. Without nominal
rigidities, the log of the real marginal costs is exclusively driven by the optimal markup
on prices for a flex price equilibrium. Therefore, mcit = − log µ
i
t for both model settings.
If we use equation (3.38.W) and (3.38.S), an expression for the natural output level of
each model setup is obtained
yi,nt =a
i
t +
gi,nt
1 + ϕ
−
log
(
1− χit
)
1 + ϕ
+
(
1− ψi
)
1 + ϕ
+
(
log
(
1− τ i,lt
))n
1 + ϕ
−
log µit
1 + ϕ
yi,nt =a
i
t +
gi,nt
1 + ϕ
−
log
(
1− χit
)
1 + ϕ
+
(
1− ψi
)
1 + ϕ
−
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))n
1 + ϕ
−
log µit
1 + ϕ
.
The New-Keynesian Phillips curves can then be rewritten in gap form as
πit=βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
θ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
(
log τ i,lt
)g)
, (3.40.W)
πit=βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1− θβ) (1− θ)
θ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,si
1 + τ¯ i,si
(
log τ i,si,t
)g)
. (3.40.S)
The Euler equations (3.36.W) and (3.36.S) change to
yi,gt = Ety
i,g
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − logR
∗,n
t
)
− Et∆g
i,g
t+1, (3.41.W)
yi,gt = Ety
i,g
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − logR
∗,n
t
)
− Et∆g
i,g
t+1
+
τ¯ i,si
1 + τ¯ i,si
Et∆
(
log τ i,si,t+1
)g
, (3.41.S)
where the log natural level of the rate of return for the two settings is given by
logR∗,nt = Et∆y
i,n
t+1 + ρ− Et∆g
i,n
t+1, (3.42.W)
logR∗,nt = Et∆y
i,n
t+1 + ρ− Et∆g
i,n
t+1 +
τ¯ i,si
1 + τ¯ i,si
Et∆
(
log τ i,si,t+1
)n
. (3.42.S)
The log natural level of taxes is chosen to offset the markup shock on inflation. Hence,
it holds that (
log
(
1− τ i,lt
))n
= − log µit = −
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
(
log τ i,lt
)n
,(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))n
= log µit =
τ¯ i,s
1 + τ¯ i,si
(
log τ i,si,t
)n
.
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Equations (3.39.W) and (3.39.S) change to
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t +∆c
∗,g
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t −∆a
i
t +∆a
∗
t , (3.43.W)
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t +∆c
∗,g
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
)g)
−∆
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))g
−∆ait +∆a
∗
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))n
−∆
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))n
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆µ̂ it
, (3.43.S)
where µ̂ it =
log µit
log µ¯ denotes the markup shock on prices.
Finally, the solvency constraints of the government are rewritten in gap form:
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γi
γi
)
+ τ¯ i,l
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
gi,gt
+
(
1− R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt −
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
log τ i,lt
)g
1− τ¯ i,l

+
1− R¯
R¯
ait −
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
µ̂ it , (3.44.W)
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γi
γi
)(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
gi,gt +
(
1− R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
−
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
−
1− R¯
R¯
)(
log τ i,si,t
)g
+
1− R¯
R¯
ait
+
(
1− R¯
R¯
−
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
1 + τ¯ i,si
τ¯ i,si
µ̂ it . (3.44.S)
To summarize, the model consists of the following equations in gap form.
Model Description 3.2. The Wage-Tax Model
• The demand side of the model:
yi,gt = Ety
i,g
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
i
t+1 − logR
∗,n
t
)
− Et∆g
i,g
t+1
• The New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
πit = βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,l
1−τ¯ i,l
(
log τ i,lt
)g)
• The change in competitiveness:
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t +∆c
∗,g
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t −∆a
i
t +∆a
∗
t
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Model Description 3.2. The Wage-Tax Model—cont.
• The government solvency constraint:
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1−γi
γi
)
+ τ¯ i,l W¯
iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
gi,gt +
(
1−R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
− τ¯
i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
log τ i,lt
)g
1−τ¯ i,l
)
+ 1−R¯
R¯
ait −
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
µ̂ it
Model Description 3.3. The Sales-Tax Model
• The demand side of the model:
yi,gt =Ety
i,g
t+1−
(
logR∗t −Etπ
i
t+1− logR
∗,n
t
)
−Et∆g
i,g
t+1+
τ¯ i,si
1+τ¯ i,si
Et∆
(
log τ i,si,t+1
)g
• The New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
πit = βEtπ
i
t+1 +
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,si
1+τ¯ i,si
(
log τ i,si,t
)g)
• The change in competitiveness:
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t +∆c
∗,g
t + π
∗
t − π
i
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
)g)
−∆
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))g
−∆ait +∆a
∗
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))n
−∆µ̂ it
• The government solvency constraint:
β
(
b̂ i,rt − l̂ogR
∗
t
)
= b̂ i,rt−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1−γi
γi
)(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
gi,gt +
(
1−R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
−
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
− 1−R¯
R¯
)(
log τ i,si,t
)g
+ 1−R¯
R¯
ait +
(
1−R¯
R¯
− G¯
iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
1+τ¯ i,si
τ¯ i,s
i
µ̂ it
3.3 The National Problem
The following section derives the solution for the national social planner’s problem as
well as the national welfare function being the objective function to make government
expenditure and tax decisions. First, the solution for the natural levels of output, labor,
consumption, public goods, etc. in equilibrium is derived. Then, the national fiscal
policy maker’s optimization problem is analyzed in detail.
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3.3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner maximizes the utility function U
(
Cit , G
i
t, N
i
t
)
=
(
1− ψi
)
logCit +
ψi logGit −
(N it)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ subject to the composition of output
max U
s.t. Y it = A
i
tN
i
t and
Y it =
(
Sit
)ν
Cit +G
i
t = C
i
i,t +
∫ 1
0
Cfi,tdf︸ ︷︷ ︸
exports
+Git, (3.45)
where Cit =
(Cii,t)
1−ν
(exp
∫ 1
0
logCi
f,t
df)
ν
(1−ν)1−ννν
is the overall consumption of country i and consists
of the consumption of domestic and imported goods. Let λSP,t denote the Lagrange mul-
tiplier of the maximization problem at time t. Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian
resulting from the maximization problem (3.45) with respect to Cii,t, C
j
i,t, N
i
t , and G
i
t
gives the following first order conditions.
λSP,t =
(
1− ψi
)
(1− ν)
Cii,t
λSP,t =
(
1− ψi
)
(ν)∫ 1
0 C
j
i,tdj(
N it
)ϕ
= λSP,tA
i
t
λSP,t =
(
ψi
)
Git
,
such that
(
N it
)ϕ
= Ait
(1−ψi)(1−ν)
Cii,t
= Ait
(1−ψi)(ν)∫
1
0
Cji,tdj
= Ait
(ψi)
Git
.
⇔ Cii,t =
Ait(1−ψi)(1−ν)
(N it)
ϕ
⇔
∫ 1
0 C
f
i,tdf =
Ait(1−ψi)ν
(N it)
ϕ and C
f
i,t =
Ait(1−ψi)ν
(N it)
ϕ
⇔ Git = A
i
t
(ψi)
(N it)ϕ
.
If we substitute the previous equations into Y it = A
i
tN
i
t = C
i
i,t+
∫ 1
0 C
f
i,tdf+G
i
t, we obtain
AitN
i
t =
Ait
(N it)
ϕ and
(
N it
)1+ϕ
= 1 in the flex price equilibrium. As a consequence, the
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natural values of the respective variables are calculated as
N i,nt = 1,
Y i,nt = A
i
t,
Ci,ni,t =
(
1− ψi
)
(1− ν)Ait =
(
1− ψi
)
(1− ν)Y i,nt ,
Cf,ni,t =
(
1− ψi
)
νAit =
(
1− ψi
)
νY i,nt , and
Gi,nt = ψ
iAit = ψ
iY i,nt .
With the last equation for the natural level of public goods, we obtain 1 −
Gi,nt
Y i,nt
=
1− ψi ⇔ γi,n = ψi and gi,nt = − log
(
1− ψi
)
∀t. Thus, the natural level of government
expenditure per output is constant for all periods and the same is true for the natural
level of the fiscal variable g. If we aggregate over all countries and assume that the
weight of public goods to consumption goods in the utility function is the same for all
countries, i.e., γn = γi,n = ψi = ψ ∀i, we obtain as union-wide natural levels
N∗,nt = 1,
Y ∗,nt = A
∗
t ,
C∗,nt = ψA
∗
t ,
G∗,nt = (1− ψ)A
∗
t ,
g∗,nt = − log (1− ψ) , and
G¯i
Y¯ i
=
G¯
Y¯
= γn = ψ,
where A∗t = exp
∫ 1
0 logA
f
t df denotes the overall aggregated technology level of the entire
monetary union. The natural level of the terms of trade is thus Si,nt =
Ait
A∗t
. Taking
logs, we obtain si,nt = a
i
t − a
∗
t . In the flex price equilibrium, i.e., in the absence of
price rigidities, the terms of trade only depend on the difference of the domestic and the
union-wide technology.
3.3.2 The National Fiscal Policy Maker’s Problem
To solve the national fiscal optimization problem, the welfare function for the entire
union as well as for a single country has to be calculated. The welfare function of
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one country is equal to the infinite sum of the discounted utility of the representative
household. Moreover, the welfare for the union as a whole is the aggregate of the national
welfare functions. As a consequence, the union welfare function is the integral over all
national welfare functions. Following Woodford [130], we use a second order log linear
approximation of the utility function to obtain a linear quadratic approximation of the
welfare functions.
(1− ψ) logCit + ψ logG
i
t −
(N it)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ is the national utility function. Furthermore, the
aggregate of the utility of households is given by (1− ψ)
∫ 1
0 logC
i
tdi + ψ
∫ 1
0 logG
i
tdi −∫ 1
0
(N it)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ di. For the first term, we know with equations (3.22.W), (3.22.S), and (3.33)
that cit = y
i
t − g
i
t − νs
i
t, νs
i
t =
ν
1−ν
(
cit − c
∗
t
)
, c∗t =
∫ 1
0 c
f
t df , c
i
t = (1− ν)
(
yit − g
i
t
)
+ νc∗t .
Thus, the consumption term involves an exact first order log approximation such that a
second order approximation is not possible. The last two terms are expanded to a second
order. If the three approximated terms are written in gap variables form, we obtain
ci,gt = (1− ν)
(
yi,gt − g
i,g
t
)
+ ν
∫ 1
0
cf,gt df + tip,(
N it
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
≈ yi,gt +
ε
2
varj{p
i
t(j)} +
1 + ϕ
2
(
yi,gt
)2
+ tip, and
ψ logGit ≈ (1− γ
n) gi,gt −
(1− γn)
2γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+ γnyi,gt + tip,
where tip denotes the term independent of policy decisions and includes the resid-
ual term12 absorbing the remaining part of the second order approximation. The
second equation holds because
(N it)
1+ϕ
1+ϕ ≈ n
i,g
t +
(1+ϕ)
2
(
ni,gt
)2
+ tip. With the de-
mand function of a good Y i(j) (equation (3.25)) and Y it (j) = A
i
tN
i
t (j), it holds that
N it =
Y it
Ait
∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
dj ⇔ ni,gt = y
i,g
t + log
(∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
dj
)
.
The second term log
(∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−ε
dj
)
changes with a second order approximation to
the cross-sectional distribution of relative prices of second order, i.e., ε2varj{p
i
t(j)}—see
Leith and Wren-Lewis [83]. The variance-term does not enter in the approximation of
ni,gt because it is of higher order than 2 and therefore absorbed by the tip-term. Finally,
the last equation including government spending holds due to the definition of the fiscal
12I.e., O(‖ξ‖3)-terms.
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variable g and with ψ = γn.
Collecting terms (i.e., the term for consumption, labor, and the public good), we can
express the utility function as
U it = (1− ψ) (1− ν)
(
yi,gt − g
i,g
t
)
+ (1− ψ) νc∗,gt + (1− γ
n) gi,gt
−
(1− γn)
2γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+ γnyi,gt − y
i,g
t −
ε
2
varj{p
i
t(j)} −
(1 + ϕ)
2
(
yi,gt
)2
+ tip
= −
(1− γn)
2γn
(
gi,gt
)2
−
ε
2
varj{p
i
t(j)} −
(1 + ϕ)
2
(
yi,gt
)2
+ tip. (3.46)
The remaining linear term − (1− γn) ν
(
si,gt
)
is part of the tip-term because with the
negligible size of one country, we can assume that there are no feedback effects from the
rest of the countries in the EMU. Furthermore, by abandoning si,gt , a conflict between
the national and international welfare function is avoided. Since
∫ 1
0 s
i,g
t di = 0, the terms
of trade component is not part of the union-wide welfare function. If we would assume
that there is some kind of response from the other countries, the terms of trade could
be an interesting part of the welfare function. One could try to include sit as linear term
to obtain an approximation. A linear term in a linear quadratic scenario does not imply
the correct first order welfare loss (see, e.g., Benigno and Woodford [16, 17]). Thus, it
has to be eliminated, e.g., by a method first described in Benigno and Woodford [15]
and utilized also by Lipinska [88] and Benigno and Benigno [14]. To be able to apply
the method, a broader description of the terms of trade as well as the responses of other
countries on national fiscal actions of one country is necessary. This is not part of the
underlying setup.
With
∑∞
t=0 β
t ε
2varj{p
i
t(j)} =
ε
2
θ
(1−θβ)(1−θ)
∑∞
t=0 β
t
(
πit
)2
(for the derivation of the equal-
ity see Woodford [130], Chapter 6.), the discounted sum of utilities, i.e., the welfare
function for one country i, is given by
WF it =
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Cit , G
i
t, N
i
t
)
= −
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
1
2
(
(1− γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+
ε
λ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2)]
+ tip, (3.47)
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where λ = (1−θβ)(1−θ)θ . The equation states a loss function due to the negative sign in
front of all terms.
Finally, we derive the welfare function for the union as a whole. Therefore, all wel-
fare functions are aggregated. In the individual country’s welfare function, the effec-
tive terms of trade are included in the tip-term. Taking the integral over all coun-
tries i, we obtain with Si,nt =
Ait
A∗t
⇔ si,nt = a
i
t − a
∗
t that − (1− γ
n) ν
∫ 1
0 s
i,g
t di =
(1− γn) ν
(∫ 1
0 s
i,n
t di−
∫ 1
0 s
i
tdi
)
= tip − 0. As a consequence, the welfare function of
the union as a whole is given by
WFt =
∫ 1
0
WF it di
= −
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
[
(1− γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+
ε
λ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2]
di+ tip. (3.48)
Since the union-wide welfare function consists of quadratic terms of the respective indi-
vidual country’s gap variables, the welfare function cannot be stated as a function of the
union-wide variables (
∫ (
xit
)2
di 6=
(∫
xitdi
)2
). As a consequence, we can only derive the
optimal choice of the monetary union’s optimal interest rate on a theoretical basis and
we cannot simulate the optimization problem. A union-wide IS, a Phillips curve, and
the overall consumption as a sum of the union-wide log output y∗t and the union-wide
log fiscal variable g∗t can be calculated only depending on union-wide variables. But it
is not possible to display the objective function (the welfare function) exclusively as a
function of union-wide variables.
Model Description 3.4. The Welfare Functions
• The national welfare function:
WF it = −
∑∞
t=0 β
t
[
1
2
(
(1−γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+ ελ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2)]
+ tip
• The union-wide welfare function:
WFt = −
1
2
∑∞
t=0 β
t
∫ 1
0
[
(1−γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+ ελ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2]
di+ tip
The first part of the next section derives the theoretical solution for the optimal choice of
the interest rate. The second part of the section simulates the optimal policy choice under
92
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY IN AN EMU MODEL
commitment of an individual country in the occurrence of a debt shock. It compares
the model setting with direct or indirect taxes as fiscal instrument and analyzes the
similarities and differences. It is shown that the optimal choices are consistent with the
optimal union-wide monetary policy.
3.4 Solution for the Welfare Optimization Problems
The first subsection derives the solution for the union-wide problem by minimizing the
loss of the union subject to the national constraints.
3.4.1 The Union-Wide Solution
The optimization problem for the union as a whole is summarized in the Lagrangian of
the monetary authority, which is given by the union-wide welfare function (3.48) subject
to the national constraints and the aggregation formulas. Because the national gov-
ernment cannot directly influence the union-wide variables, they are subsumed in one
variable. Therefore, we rewrite the respective equations including union-wide terms as
the rate of return or union-wide consumption, i.e., the equation on changes in output and
the government solvency constraint. The union-wide variables fy∗ and fb∗ are intro-
duced. If the government levies a wage tax, the changes in output (equation (3.43.W))
and the solvency constraint (equation (3.44.W)) of the national authorities become
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t − π
i
t −∆a
i
t + fy
∗
t (3.49.W)
fy∗t = ∆y
∗,g
t −∆g
∗,g
t + π
∗
t +∆a
∗
t
βb̂ i,rt = b̂
i,r
t−1 − π
i
t +
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γn
γn
)
+ τ¯ i,l
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
gi,gt
+
(
1− R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt −
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
log τ i,lt
)g
1− τ¯ i,l

+
1− R¯
R¯
ait −
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
µ̂ it + fb
∗
t (3.50.W)
fb∗t = β l̂ogR
∗
t = β
(
−y∗,gt + g
∗,g
t + Ety
∗,g
t+1 − Etg
∗,g
t+1 + Etπ
∗
t+1
)
+ β (ρa − 1) a
∗
t .
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For the sales tax model, we obtain new equations for the change in output (equation
(3.43.S)) and for the government budget constraint (equation (3.44.S)):
∆yi,gt = ∆g
i,g
t − π
i
t −∆
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))g
−∆ait −∆µ̂
i
t + fy
∗
t (3.49.S)
fy∗t = ∆y
∗,g
t −∆g
∗,g
t + π
∗
t +∆a
∗
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
)g)
+∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))n
βb̂ i,rt = b̂
i,r
t−1 − π
i
t +
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1− γn
γn
)(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
gi,gt +
(
1− R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
−
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
−
1− R¯
R¯
)(
log τ i,si,t
)g
+
1− R¯
R¯
ait
+
(
1− R¯
R¯
−
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
1 + τ¯ i,si
τ¯ i,si
µ̂ it + fb
∗
t (3.50.S)
fb∗t = β l̂ogR
∗
t = β
(
−y∗,gt + g
∗,g
t + Ety
∗,g
t+1 − Etg
∗,g
t+1 + Etπ
∗
t+1
+
τ¯∗,s
1 + τ¯∗,s
Et∆
(
log τ∗,st+1
)g)
+ β (ρa − 1) a
∗
t − β
τ¯∗,s
1 + τ¯∗,s
µ̂ ∗t ,
where β
(
Etc
∗,n
t+1 − c
∗,n
t
)
= β (ρa − 1) a
∗
t
13 and c∗,gt = y
∗,g
t − g
∗,g
t with equation (3.35).
The Lagrangian for the wage tax model setting is equal to the infinite sum of the union-
wide welfare function subject to the constraints given by the equations describing the
setup. It can be expressed as
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[∫ 1
0
−
1
2
(
(1− γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+
ε
λ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2)
di
+ξiy,t
(
∆yi,gt −∆g
i,g
t + π
i
t +∆a
i
t −∆y
∗,g
t +∆g
∗,g
t − π
∗
t −∆a
∗
t
)
+ξib,t
(
βb̂ i,rt − b̂
i,r
t−1+π
i
t−
(
G¯iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(
1−γn
γn
)
+ τ¯ i,l
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
)
gi,gt −
(
1−R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
+
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
log τ i,lt
)g
1− τ¯ i,l
− 1− R¯
R¯
ait +
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
µ̂ it
−β
(
−y∗,gt + g
∗,g
t + Ety
∗,g
t+1 − Etg
∗,g
t+1 + Etπ
∗
t+1
)
− β (ρa − 1) a
∗
t
)
+ξipi,t
(
πit − βEtπ
i
t+1 − λ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,l
1− τ¯ i,l
(
log τ i,lt
)g))
13See also Subsection 3.3.1.
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+ωy∗,t
(∫ 1
0
yi,gt di− y
∗,g
t
)
+ωg∗,t
(∫ 1
0
gi,gt di− g
∗,g
t
)
+ωpi∗,t
(∫ 1
0
πi,gt di− π
∗,g
t
)
+ωτ∗,t
(∫ 1
0
(
log
(
1− τ i,lt
))g
di−
(
log
(
1− τ∗,lt
))g)]
.
Taking the derivative with respect to yi,gt , π
i,g
t , the fiscal variables
(
log
(
1− τ i,lt
))g
, gi,gt ,
b̂ i,rt−1, and the union-wide variables y
∗,g
t , π
∗,g
t , g
∗,g
t , and
(
log
(
1− τ∗,lt
))g
, we rearrange
the equations and obtain the following first order conditions:
ξb,t = ξb,t−1 (3.51.W)
ωy∗,t = −ωg∗,t (3.52.W)
ωpi∗,t = −ξ
i
y,t − ξ
i
b,t−1 (3.53.W)
λξipi,t =
W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
ξib,t (3.54.W)
0 = (1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
1− γn
γn
)
gi,gt − ξ
i
pi,tλϕ
−ξib,t
(
1−R¯
R¯
−
τ¯ i,lW¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
ϕ+
Y¯ iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1− γn)
)
+ ωy∗,t + ωg∗,t (3.55.W)
0 =
ε
λ
πit + ξ
i
y,t + ξ
i
b,t + ξ
i
pi,t + ωpi∗,t − ξ
i
pi,t−1. (3.56.W)
The derivative with respect to b̂ i,rt−1 (equation (3.51.W)) shows that the Lagrange mul-
tiplier is equal for all t. Thus, the budget constraints of governments affect the opti-
mization problem of the authority always with the same intensity. Integrating equation
(3.53.W) over all countries i yields: −
∫ 1
0 ξ
i
y,tdi−
∫ 1
0 ξ
i
g,tdi = ωpi∗,t. If we integrate equa-
tion (3.56.W) and combine it with the previous result, we obtain ελπ
∗
t +
∫ 1
0 ∆ξ
i
pi,tdi = 0.
Restructuring and integrating the first order conditions with respect to yi,gt and g
i,g
t , we
can state that
(
1−γn
γn
)
g∗,gt = −
(
τ¯ i,l
1−τ¯ i,l
)
y∗,gt . Furthermore, we rewrite equation (3.55.W)
as 0 = (1 + ϕ) yi,gt +
(
1−γn
γn
)
gi,gt − ξ
i
pi,t
(
1−R¯
R¯
+
(1−τ¯ i,l)W¯ iN¯ i
B¯iR¯
ϕ+ Y¯
iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1− γn)
)
λB¯iR¯
W¯ iN¯ i
. If
the modified equation is integrated and the previous results are used, we get επ∗t const+
1−γn
γn ∆g
∗,g
t +(1 + ϕ)∆y
∗,g
t = επ
∗
t const+
(
1 + ϕ− τ¯
l
1−τ¯ l
)
∆y∗,gt = 0. const =
(1−ψ)(1−τ¯ l)
1−γn +
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(1 + ϕ)
(
τ¯ l − 1
)
= ϕ
(
τ¯ l − 1
)
, with N¯ i = 1 ∀i (normalization) and τ¯ l = τ¯ i,l = 1− 1/µ¯ ∀i
(the constant term const depends on the steady state tax rate, γn, ψ, and ϕ). The
last equation reveals that the steady state tax rate is chosen to absorb distortions
caused by the steady state price markup shock µ¯. Furthermore, we assume that the
steady state value for the debt per output ratio is equal for all member countries
( B¯
i
Y¯ iP¯ i
= B¯
Y¯ P¯
= dss ∀i).
For t = 0, it holds that επ∗0const +
(
1 + ϕ− τ¯
l
1−τ¯ l
)
y∗,g0 = 0. We follow the result of
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [118], who show that the optimal inflation rate should be close
to zero.
Hence, we assume that the monetary policy authority focuses on zero inflation. Then,
π∗0 = 0 such that y
∗,g
0 = 0. Furthermore, g
∗,g
0 = 0. With E0π
∗
1 = 0, it follows
with the Phillips curve π∗t = βEtπ
∗
t+1 + λ
(
(1 + ϕ) y∗,gt − g
∗,g
t − log
(
1− τ∗,lt
)g)
that
log
(
τ∗,l0
)g
= 0. Because εE0π
∗
1const +
(
1 + ϕ− τ¯
l
1−τ¯ l
)
∆E0y
∗,g
1 = 0 it holds that
E0y
∗,g
1 = 0.
The IS-curve for the union as a whole
y∗,gt = Ety
∗,g
t+1 −
(
logR∗t − Etπ
∗
t+1 − logR
∗,n
t
)
logR∗,nt = Et
(
y∗,nt+1 − y
∗,n
t
)
+ ρ−Et
(
g∗,nt+1 − g
∗,n
t
)
= (ρa − 1) a
∗
t + ρ
implies that the difference between the log rate of return R∗ and the natural log rate
of return is equal to zero. Thus, an optimal policy carried out by the single monetary
policy authority for the union implies that the log rate of return is set equal to the log
natural rate of return. Therefore, the interest rate is set equal to the natural rate of
interest.
If the government raises a sales tax, the corresponding Lagrangian is given by
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[∫ 1
0
−
1
2
(
(1− γn)
γn
(
gi,gt
)2
+
ε
λ
(
πit
)2
+ (1 + ϕ)
(
yi,gt
)2)
di
+ξiy,t
(
∆yi,gt −∆g
i,g
t + π
i
t +∆
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))g
+∆ait +∆µ̂
i
t
−∆y∗,gt +∆g
∗,g
t − π
∗
t −∆a
∗
t −∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))g
−∆µ̂ ∗t
)
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+ξib,t
(
βb̂ i,rt − b̂
i,r
t−1 + π
i
t −
Y¯ iP¯ i
B¯iR¯
(1− γn)
(
1 + τ¯ i,si
)
gi,gt −
(
1− R¯
R¯
)
yi,gt
+
(
Y¯ iP¯ iγn
B¯iR¯
−
1− R¯
R¯
)((
log τ i,si,t
)g
+
1 + τ¯ i,si
τ¯ i,si
µ̂ it
)
−
1− R¯
R¯
ait
−β
(
−y∗,gt + g
∗,g
t + Ety
∗,g
t+1 − Etg
∗,g
t+1 + Etπ
∗
t+1
)
−β
τ¯∗,s
1 + τ¯∗,s
Et∆
(
log τ∗,st+1
)g
− β (ρa − 1) a
∗
t + β
τ¯∗,s
1 + τ¯∗,s
µ̂ ∗t
)
+ξipi,t
(
πit − βEtπ
i
t+1 − λ
(
(1 + ϕ) yi,gt − g
i,g
t +
τ¯ i,si
1 + τ¯ i,si
(
log τ i,si,t
)g))
+ωy∗,t
(∫ 1
0
yi,gt di− y
∗,g
t
)
+ωg∗,t
(∫ 1
0
gi,gt di− g
∗,g
t
)
+ωpi∗,t
(∫ 1
0
πi,gt di− π
∗,g
t
)
+ωτ∗,t
(∫ 1
0
(
log
(
1 + τ i,si,t
))g
di−
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))g)]
.
Solving once again for the first order conditions by taking derivatives, similar to the
above, it follows that ελπ
∗
t +
∫ 1
0 ∆ξ
i
pi,tdi = 0. As for the wage tax model, we integrate
parts of the first order conditions to obtain a relationship between the inflation rate and
the Lagrange multipliers of domestic output, of the domestic fiscal variable, and of the
domestic and the union-wide inflation rate. Finally, integrating the first order conditions
resulting from differentiation with respect to yi,g and gi,g, the following relation between
the output gap and the fiscal variable gap holds
1− γn
γn
g∗,gt = −
 1dssR¯
(
1 + τ¯ i,si − γ
nτ¯ i,si + γ
n/τ¯ i,si
)
− (β − 1) 1/τ¯ i,si
1+τ¯ i,si
τ¯ i,si
(
1
dssR¯
γn − (β − 1)
)
 y∗,gt .
A relationship between π∗t , ∆y
∗,g
t , and ∆g
∗,g
t can be obtained. With the Phillips curve
and under optimal monetary policy, the tax gap variable
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st
))g
is equal to
zero. With Etπ
∗
t+1 = 0, it follows that Ety
∗,g
t+1 = 0 and Etg
∗,g
t+1 = 0. With Et+1π
∗
t+2 =
Etπ
∗
t+1 = 0, and with the Phillips curve for period t + 1 and by taking expectations
at time t, we obtain Et log
(
1 + τ∗,st+1
)g
= 0. In the respective IS-curve (y∗,gt = Ety
∗,g
t+1 −(
logR∗t − logR
∗,n
t
)
+Etπ
∗
t+1−Et∆g
∗,g
t+1+Et∆
(
log
(
1 + τ∗,st+1
))g
), the terms including out-
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put, inflation, and the fiscal variables are equal to zero. Therefore,
(
logR∗t − logR
∗,n
t
)
=
0. As a consequence, under optimal monetary policy, the central bank should follow
logR∗t = logR
∗,n
t .
Result 3.1. Optimal Monetary Policy
For the union-wide monetary authority it is optimal under commitment to set the
interest rate equal to its natural level. The result holds independent of the tax instru-
ment used by the national government.
3.4.2 The National Solution
Finally, we analyze the national solution for the optimization problem under commit-
ment. By doing so, the optimal rule for g and the respective tax rate under commitment
are found. To capture the dynamics of the model, the effect of a debt shock on the
model variables is simulated.
The sources of a debt shock are quite different for the two settings due to the different
solvency constraints, equations (3.50.W) and (3.50.S). Hence, we analyze different sce-
narios of shock occurrences.
Each setup includes a markup price/inflation shock as well as a shock in technology.
Thus, we assume that the shock in national debt is a linear combination of the two
shocks, which are already a part of the model.
The next part describes the optimal solution for the wage tax model and the second part
carries out the whole analysis for the sales tax model.
For both model settings, the calibration parameters are chosen similar to the model
parameters used by Gal´ı and Monacelli [54]. Gal´ı and Monacelli [54] choose a value of
ϕ = 3, whereas Leith and Wren-Lewis [83] set the value to 1. As a consequence, we
assume to set it to the mean value: ϕ = 2. The qualitative results are robust to the
choice of ϕ. µ¯i, the markup on prices is set to 1.2, such that ε = 6, where ε is the
elasticity of substitution between different goods all produced in one country. We set θ,
the part of firms who are not able to reset prices equal to 0.75. This corresponds to an
annual price adjustment. Finally, the discount factor is set to β = 0.99, which implies an
annual interest rate of 4% in steady state. The parameter of openness is set at ν = 0.4.
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The Euro Area average debt per output ratio lies since the foundation of the EMU
between 0.68 and 0.85. The respective ratios for single member countries lie between
0.4 and 1.4. See also the ECB statistics website [67]. As a consequence, according to
the Euro Area criterion, we choose a value of 0.6 for the steady state value dss, which
corresponds to the debt per output ratio. This implies for the steady state government
spending per output ratio γn in the wage tax setting a value of about 20% and is equal
to ψ, the weight of public goods in the utility function of households. The ratio of
consumption to steady state GDP is therefore 80%, where 60% (1 − ν = 0.6) of the
consumption goods are domestically produced.
The choice of the steady state debt per output ratio being 0.6 implies that the steady
state government spending per output ratio γn is 0.16 in the sales tax model. Hence,
the ratio of overall consumption to steady state GDP is 84%. As before, 60% of the
consumption goods are produced in the own country.
Smets and Wouters [122] estimated the parameters of a technology shock using Bayesian
estimation techniques for the Euro Area. We use their results and assume that the AR(1)
shock in technology, i.e., the productivity shock is modeled with a high degree of per-
sistence (ρa = 0.99) and a standard deviation of 0.69. For the i.i.d. price markup shock,
we assume a standard deviation of 0.19.
3.4.3 The National Solution in the Wage Tax Model
To obtain the optimal fiscal policy of a country i under unconstrained commitment, we
follow So¨derlind [123]. As a first step, we state that
~A0
 ~x1,t+1
Et~x2,t+1
 = ~A1
 ~x1,t
~x2,t
+ ~B1~ut +
 ~ǫt+1
0
 ,
where ~xt =
 ~x1,t
~x2,t
 and ~x1,t = (yi,gt−1, gi,gt−1, b̂ i,rt−1, ait−1, πit−1 − Et−2πit−1,(log τ i,lt−1)g)′ is
the vector including all predetermined variables of the model, ~x2,t =
(
fb∗t , fy
∗
t , a
i
t, π
i
t
)′
are all forward looking variables of the model, and ~ut =
(
gi,gt ,
(
log τ i,lt
)g)′
consists of the
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decision variables of the fiscal authority. ~ǫt is the vector containing the shock residuals
on the corresponding variables of vector ~x1,t. A shock in technology is directly included
because ait = ρaa
i
t−1 + ǫ
a
t . The markup shock in prices and therefore in inflation can be
implemented as πit = Et−1π
i
t+ ǫ
pi
t , where ǫ
pi
t = µ̂t. The next step is to calculate
~A−10 such
that ~A = ~A−10
~A1 and ~B = ~A
−1
0
~B1. The shock vector is also multiplied by ~A
−1
0 . The
influence of shocks on the respective variables of the model is captured in the structure
of ~A−10 .
Finally, the model can be formulated as ~x1,t+1
Et~x2,t+1
 = ~A
 ~x1,t
~x2,t
+ ~B~ut + ~A−10
 ~ǫt+1
0
 .
We derive the welfare function value which is given byJ0=E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
[
~x′t ~Q~xt + 2~x
′
t
~U~ut+
~u′t
~R~ut
]
.14
Then, we optimize under commitment: the fiscal authority maximizes the expected in-
finite welfare. The resulting optimal policy rule is constant over time. Hence, once an
optimal rule is found, there are no changes in the policy for the following periods. The
solution is time consistent.
Shocks, specifically a debt shock, are analyzed.15 The wage tax model includes a gov-
ernment budget constraint, where a markup shock as well as a shock in productivity
influences the debt of the respective country. Thus, the shock in debt is introduced as a
linear combination of the two particular shocks. We calibrate the intensity of the shocks
such that they are weighted with their standard deviations. Since the Phillips curve, the
IS curve, and the government budget constraint cause a lagged shock processing in the
system, the shocks are chosen in such a manner that debt rises by one unit 2 periods
after the occurrence of the two shocks.
Because the debt variable b depends on the rate of return, the steady state value for b
is a function of the natural rate of return. Furthermore, the monetary authority sets
the interest rate equal to its natural rate, which is driven by the technology process.
14 ~Q and ~R are symmetric, see So¨derlind [123].
15All figures show the respective gap variables.
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Because ρa = 0.99 (technology shows a close random walk behavior), also the steady
state debt behaves close to a random walk. This corresponds to the results found by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [118].
If a shock in technology and inflation occurs that causes a positive one unit deviation
from steady state debt, the impulse responses shown in Figure 3.1 are observed. One
simulated period is equal to one quarter.
The rise in debt forces the fiscal authority to optimally raise taxes and to lower gov-
ernment spending if they want to stabilize debt (i.e., eliminate the deviation of debt
from its steady state value) as soon as possible.16 The simulated time horizon is long to
illustrate that indeed all variables revert back to the zero line.
The optimal policy actions are very smooth such that the reversion process lasts for
a long time. The low intensity of the optimal fiscal response to a debt shock can be
explained as follows. On the one hand, debt should be lowered, on the other hand, do-
mestic inflation should not be strongly distorted. A distortion in inflation would cause
a loss of competitiveness and high welfare losses. To avoid an economic disadvantage,
fiscal actions are pursued only very slightly.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock (Wage Tax, b, g, t)
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse response of output and inflation to a one unit debt shock.
The decrease in government spending forces output to decline. Taxes rise and lower
output additionally.
Higher wage taxes do have a negative impact on the labor supply because workers earn
16Note, that log government spending is a linear combination of y and g.
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less disposable income. Furthermore, the marginal costs of firms are higher than before
due to the positive influence of the log tax rate and thus lower output.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock (Wage Tax, y, π)
Inflation immediately rises before reverting to the zero line. The higher inflation lowers
the competitiveness of the national country. This additionally reduces output. In the
reversion process of all variables, country i slowly regains competitiveness.
The half-time of the debt shock, i.e., the point in time after the occurrence of the shock,
when debt diverges 0.5 units from steady state, is reached after 18 years. The optimal
fiscal actions, lowering government spending and raising taxes, are indeed pursued with
a very low intensity such that it lasts long until the debt deviation from the natural level
drops by 50%.
The log rate of return directly captured in the foreign variable fb∗t converges from above
to the log natural rate of return. The natural rate of return depends in general on con-
stants and the technology process. As a consequence, it is not a constant but converges
to a fixed value after the occurrence of a temporary shock because technology is an
AR(1) process with ρa < 1.
Overall, the calculated optimal national fiscal policy does not contradict the optimal
EMU monetary policy.
If only technology is shocked, all responses as well as the obtained welfare loss are closely
the same. Thus, the shock in technology in the mixed shock scenario is the driving force
of a shock in debt on the model variables.
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Result 3.2. The Wage-Tax Model
• In the occurrence of a debt shock, under commitment, the government optimally
lowers government spending and raises taxes to offset the shock.
• This lowers output.
• The inflation rate impulse response is hump-shaped and very weak.
• The optimal fiscal actions are very smooth.
• The half-time of debt under optimal commitment policy is simulated with 18
years.
• A shock in technology controls the shock in debt.
• Optimal monetary and fiscal policy under commitment coincide.
In the remainder of the subsection, we analyze the consequences of selective restrictions
on the model structure and calculate the loss in welfare due to the debt shock. Moreover,
robustness checks on the calibration parameters are performed.
First, we compare the optimally found fiscal policy under unconstrained commitment
with one committing to a specific simple rule. Fiscal policy under unconstrained commit-
ment means that the predetermined as well as the forward looking variables are included
in the optimal policy description.
If the government commits to a simple rule, only the predetermined variables of the
model are part of the rule. For a closer description, see So¨derlind [123]. By setting the
shadow prices of the forward looking variables in the model equal to zero, we automati-
cally follow a commitment rule. Comparing the obtained optimal values for government
spending and taxes when constraining the shadow prices to zero or without constraint,
it shows that the difference for the optimally chosen tax rule is minimal and lies in the
range of 2x10−13.17 The differences for g are even smaller (2x10−17).
Moreover, the welfare function value is calculated if a one unit debt shock hits the
system. We sum up all periodical values that are larger than 1x10−22 such that the
approximated overall infinite welfare function value is sufficiently exact. The overall loss
in welfare caused by the temporary debt shock is equal to 3.3564x10−8 .
17This holds except for the very first optimal value. In this case, the difference is larger.
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Robustness is tested by varying different calibration parameters. If we assume that the
ratio of firms that are able to adjust their prices, is larger (θ1 = 0.35 < θ): the price
stickiness is small and all impulse responses are almost the same—see Figure 3.3 and
3.4. Only the impulse response of inflation changes quantitatively. Inflation reaches its
maximum faster, already after 5 years, and reverts more quickly back to the zero line.
Furthermore, the intensity of the response to a debt shock is higher if prices are more
flexible (inflation is affected more). The response for the baseline calibration lies in a
range of 10−17 and with θ = 0.35 is 10−13. Overall, the response of inflation remains
very small. But the change in the inflation response affects the welfare. The welfare
loss rises to 9.488x10−5, which is far more than 3.3564x10−8 obtained with the basic
calibration values.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with more Flexible Prices
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with more Flexible Prices
As a second step on robustness, we vary the steady state debt per output ratio. The
impulse responses of output, taxes, and government spending after the occurrence of a
one unit debt shock are proportional to the amount the steady state debt per GDP ratio
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changes. If we assume that dss1 = 0.4 = 2/3dss (see Figure 3.5 and 3.6), the output
response e.g. for the 5th period, is 2/3 of the former response for the 5th period with
the baseline calibration parameters.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.4
Only inflation does not change proportionally. The response is more positive than mul-
tiplying the corresponding baseline calibration value with 2/3. Therefore, the change
in inflation is less than proportional. The maximum response is reached faster and the
reversion process starts after 6 years. This behavior is due to feedback effects of the
other variables.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.4
If we raise the steady state value (dss2 = 0.85 = 17/12dss), the respective responses for
government spending, output, and taxes are once again proportional to the standard
impulse response when assuming that dss = 0.6—see Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The inflation
rate responds less than proportional, just as for a decrease in the steady state debt out-
put ratio. Moreover, the qualitative response changes.
First, inflation rises, lowering the competitiveness of the national country, but when re-
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gaining competitiveness, the inflation rate is even overcompensated by the positive tax
rate such that it turns negative before reverting to the zero line.
3.7 and 3.8.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.85
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.85
Overall, the fiscal authority changes the optimally found government spending and tax
rates with a higher intensity in the occurrence of a one unit debt shock if the debt
ratio is already at a higher value. The loss for a debt level of dss1 = 0.4 is lower
(J1 = 1.4917x10
−8), whereas the loss is higher for a higher debt level (J2 = 6.736x10
−8
with dss2 = 0.85.). The increase in the loss of welfare is more than proportional compared
to the increase in steady state debt per output.
Result 3.3. The Wage-Tax Model
An additional unit of debt is more fatal if the economy is already indebted at a higher
level.
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3.4.4 The National Solution in the Sales Tax Model
For the optimization problem in the respective setting, we formulate the objective func-
tion as  ~x1,t+1
Et~x2,t+1
 = ~A
 ~x1,t
~x2,t
+ ~B~ut + ~A−10
 ~ǫt+1
0
 ,
where the vector of predetermined variables ~x1,t =
(
yi,gt−1, g
i,g
t−1, b̂
i,r
t−1, a
i
t−1,−Et−2π
i
t−1,
πit−1,
(
log τ i,si,t−1
)g)′
contains 7 variables. The markup shock was included in the wage
tax setup as one variable πit−1 − Et−2π
i
t−1. Thus, ~x1t consisted of 6 variables. Now, we
split the shock variable in two separate parts (−Et−2π
i
t−1, π
i
t−1). This is caused by the
model structure: πit−1 is needed separately for the welfare function implementation in
the sales tax setting. The vector of forward looking variables ~x2,t =
(
fb∗t , fy
∗
t , a
i
t, π
i
t
)′
is the same as before and the policy instrument vector is ~ut =
(
gi,gt ,
(
log τ i,si,t
)g)′
. ~ǫ
contains all shocks. The welfare function is described in a comparable manner as the
respective one for the wage tax scenario. We once again optimize under unrestricted
commitment.
An analysis of the impulse responses in the occurrence of a one unit shock in debt is
carried out. If the government raises an indirect tax (i.e., a sales tax in the underlying
study), the shock processing is quite different compared to the one found for the wage
tax model. Since the output gap and the technology process variable both enter the
government budget constraint with exactly the same multiplier, a shock in productivity
does not directly affect debt in the first period of the shock occurrence. After one period,
the variables that are affected directly by a shock in technology and that are moreover a
part of the government budget constraint, change the debt. In contrast, a price markup
shock is directly included in the government solvency constraint, as for the wage tax set-
ting, and influences debt immediately. To keep comparability, we include both shocks,
once again weighted with the respective standard deviation and normalized such that
the deviation of debt from its steady state value is one unit 2 periods after the shocks.
To find the driving force of a debt shock in the sales tax model, we compare a shock in
technology with the linear combination of a technology and a price markup shock. Debt
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should respond to the respective shock(s) in the same way for both shock scenarios. If
only a shock in technology takes place, a slightly stronger shock is needed to compensate
for the missing shock in inflation.
Government spending, output, and inflation respond less strong. Taxes respond slightly
stronger. Thus, the government optimally lowers government spending less strong and
raises taxes more. As a consequence, output declines less strong because the smaller de-
crease in government spending outweighs the additional increase in taxes. The welfare
loss is higher if additionally a price markup shock occurs. The result holds although the
technology shock per se has a slightly higher intensity when being implemented uniquely.
The price markup shock does not affect the optimal policy actions very strongly, but the
loss in welfare raises. Overall, the shock in technology is the main driving force for the
optimal policy responses.
We analyze the impulse responses of the model variables due to a shock in debt caused
by the same linear combination of technology and price markup shock as for the wage
tax model. Qualitatively, the impulse responses of the fiscal variables are the same as
before—see Figure 3.9. If debt increases, the government decides to raise taxes and
to lower government spending. The result is clear from intuition if we assume a debt
stabilizing national fiscal policy. The debt smoothing path is similar for both scenarios.
Moreover, the negative change in government spending is comparable in size: if the fiscal
authority can only raise a sales tax, government spending decreases after 2 periods by
0.00406, whereas it declines to -0.004302 in the wage tax model. Thus, only a 5% change
can be observed.
Since the government spending response and the debt path are closely the same for both
models, the two tax instruments can be directly compared concerning their effectiveness.
The increase in sales taxes as fiscal instrument is far more intense than before under the
same model circumstances. The sales tax rate rises by 0.072 units, the wage tax rate was
raised by 0.061 in the occurrence of a positive one unit debt shock. This corresponds
to a rise of 18%. To compensate for the additional debt, sales taxes are raised more
intensely. They are not that effective as a wage tax instrument to reduce debt again.
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Thus, a higher sales tax rate is optimally needed under commitment to involve the same
optimal debt reduction path.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock (Sales Tax, b, g, t)
The response of output is comparable for both model settings. But the change in infla-
tion, which is caused by the rise in debt differs qualitatively as well as quantitatively. In
the very first period after the occurrence of the shock,18 the change in inflation is posi-
tive. This lowers competitiveness. Then, it turns negative. Afterwards, it overshoots the
zero line and reverts to the zero line from above—see Figure 3.10. Overall, the inflation
rate responds far more intense to a debt shock in the sales tax model scenario.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock (Sales Tax, y, π)
Debt diverges by 0.5 units from steady state after 18 years. The half-time of debt is
closely the same as for the wage tax model. Moreover, the optimal debt reduction path
is the same for both fiscal tax instrument setups. The rate of return and therefore, the
interest rate, which is captured in variable fb∗t converges after the temporary shock to
18Note that the first period is not plotted.
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its natural level. Once again, the natural level does not only depend on constants but
also on the AR(1) process of technology and converges to a fixed value in the absence
of a permanent shock. In this case, the log rate of return, which is set by the monetary
authority converges from below to its natural level, whereas it converges from above
for the wage tax rate case. Overall, the chosen optimal national fiscal policy does not
conflict with the optimal EMU monetary policy.
Under commitment, the fiscal authority pursues a constant policy. We compare the op-
timal fiscal policy found under unrestricted commitment and a policy following a simple
rule. In the first case, also the forward looking variables matter for the optimal decision,
whereas policy with a simple rule means that the fiscal response only depends on the
predetermined variables. The optimally chosen tax rate in the two cases differs signif-
icantly. The difference lies in the range of 8.8x10−3. The optimal tax rates would be
chosen smaller when committing to a simple rule. The choice for g would differ by only
about 1.5x10−17. Committing to a simple policy rule would influence the optimal choice
of taxes significantly.
Result 3.4. The Sales-Tax Model
• Under commitment, the government optimally lowers government spending and
raises taxes in the occurrence of a positive debt shock.
• Output diminishes when a shock in debt takes place.
• The inflation rate impulse response is first positive, the turns negative before
overshooting the zero line and finally reverting to zero.
• The optimal fiscal actions are very smooth.
• The half-time of debt under optimal commitment policy is 18 years.
• A shock in technology mainly influences the shock in debt.
• A price markup shock severely lowers welfare.
• Optimal monetary and fiscal policy under commitment coincide.
The loss function value in the occurrence of a one unit debt shock is 2.4921x10−6 .
Thus, a comparable debt shock causes a larger loss than in the wage tax model. If the
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government can only levy sales taxes, the inflation is affected more such that welfare
losses are larger. Overall, if we compare the two settings, the following can be found.
Result 3.5. The Wage-Tax vs. the Sales-Tax Model
• Under optimal commitment policy, sales taxes are raised more compared to wage
taxes to obtain the optimal debt reduction path.
• Thus, sales taxes are less effective in reducing debt.
• The inflation rate impulse response is different for the two scenarios.
• The half-time of debt under optimal commitment policy is closely the same for
both tax instruments.
• Welfare losses are higher if the government can only raise sales taxes.
For robustness, we vary the price stickiness (i.e., the parameter θ)—see Figure 3.11 and
3.12. If prices are more flexible (e.g., θ1 = 0.35 < θ), all variables are affected less except
of the inflation rate. The difference for the optimal choice of government spending is
about 1x10−3, whereas the optimal tax response changes by 5x10−3. Overall, the shift in
optimal government spending is smaller than in taxes if prices are more flexible. Thus,
it suffices to raise taxes less and to lower government spending less to counteract the
rise in debt with more flexible prices. The inflation rate responds more to a shock in
debt when prices can adjust more quickly. Hence, inflation decreases more and then
overshoots the zero line by a higher amount. The difference of the intensity lies in a
range of 1x10−4.
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Figure 3.11: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with more Flexible Prices
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with more Flexible Prices
The loss in welfare increases to 3.4413x10−5. For the baseline calibration, it was
2.4921x10−6 . Thus, even with the weaker optimal fiscal policy actions and the less neg-
ative response of output, the loss in welfare strongly increases. The additional change
in inflation due to more flexible prices severely affects the welfare in the economy.
As a second step for robustness checks, the steady state debt per output ratio is varied
(see Figure 3.13-3.16).
As in the wage tax model, the impulse responses of output, government spending, and
taxes change proportionally to a change in the steady state debt level. If dss1 = 0.4 =
2/3 dss, the impulse responses of the respective variables are less intense than before.
They are equal to the original responses multiplied by a factor of 2/3.
0 100 200 300 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Debt
0 100 200 300 400
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−3 Government Spending
0 100 200 300 400
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Taxes
Figure 3.13: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.4
Contrary to the wage tax model setting, not only the model variables responses described
above change proportionally but also the respective one for inflation. The minimum and
the maximum of the response curve are proportional to the change in the steady state
debt.
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Figure 3.14: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.4
Figure 3.15 and 3.16 show the impulse responses for a higher national steady state debt
level. If dss rises to dss2 = 0.85 = 17/12 dss, then government spending, taxes, and, as a
consequence, output respond more strongly with a factor of 17/12. As in the wage tax
model, due to an additional rise in debt, the policy actions in a more indebted economy
are more intense to involve the optimal debt reduction path. Hence, also output is af-
fected more.
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Figure 3.15: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.85
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Figure 3.16: Impulse Responses to a 1 Unit Debt Shock with dss1 = 0.85
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The loss function value for dss1 is J1 = 1.1076x10
−6 , whereas it is calculated as J2 =
5.0015x10−6 for dss2 = 0.85. The loss in welfare increases sharply in the occurrence of a
positive debt shock if the economy is already indebted at a higher level.
Result 3.6. The Sales-Tax Model
If an economy is already highly indebted, an additional rise in debt causes a more than
proportional loss in welfare when conducting optimal fiscal policy under commitment.
Overall, the real variables responses are fully robust to changes in the calibration values
chosen according to recently found values for the EMU.
3.5 Conclusions
The underlying New-Keynesian model setting is an aggregate of different national coun-
tries and hence different national governments with one union-wide monetary authority.
Following an inflation stabilizing monetary policy, the interest rate is set to preserve in-
flation stability. The optimal national fiscal policy under commitment does not conflict
with the optimal monetary policy setting the interest rate equal to its natural level.
We have analyzed the effect of a positive debt shock on government expenditure, taxes,
output, and inflation. Moreover, the loss in welfare has been calculated. Wage taxes or
sales taxes as the only source of revenue for a national government have been included.
The main difference arising in the two model settings is the shock processing. Debt
is directly influenced by both shocks apparent in the model setting for the wage tax
model. In contrast, for the sales tax setting, only the markup shock on prices affects
debt directly.
With optimal fiscal policy, government spending is lowered whereas taxes are raised in
the occurrence of a rise in debt. A strong response of inflation to the debt shock would
cause a high amount of welfare loss. As a consequence, the fiscal variables are set under
optimal commitment policy in a smooth way. Debt is only reduced very slowly. More-
over, the deviation of the remaining model variables from their steady state values lasts
for long. The intensity of response depends proportionally on a change in the steady
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state debt per output ratio. Assuming a higher debt output ratio, a positive debt shock
causes a more than proportional loss in welfare. Thus, a one unit debt shock hits an
economy indebted at a higher level harder and the fiscal response is stronger.
Overall, optimal fiscal policy under commitment with indirect taxes as fiscal instrument
seems to harm welfare more than optimal policy with wage taxes. Furthermore, policy
with indirect taxes is less effective in reducing debt.
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The Fiscal Stance in Germany for
1991-2009
4.1 Introduction
To create a meaningful environment for empirical studies as SVARs where fiscal shocks
are examined, we analyze the de facto situation in Germany for the time after the reuni-
fication, i.e., for 1991-2009. The main objective is to evaluate the fiscal policy situation
for which many steps have to be taken. To obtain a first insight into the situation of Ger-
many, its potential output and the output gap is calculated.1 Horn et al. [65] describe
the importance of potential output and its calculation difficulties. There exists a variety
of methods to obtain a measure for the unobservable potential output. Depending on
the chosen method, the definition of potential output varies. The three most important
approaches are the split time-trend method, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter method
(see also Hodrick and Prescott, [63]), and the production function based approach. The
split time-trend method calculates for each business cycle the trend growth of GDP. One
of the main disadvantages of this method is that it relies mainly on ad hoc judgements of
the current technology level, capital stock, and labor force. Structural changes are not
1All estimations are carried out using MATLAB [94].
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taken into account. The GDP smoothing method using a Hodrick-Prescott filter calcu-
lates a trend of the GDP data series for the whole horizon. Thus, structural breaks are
smoothed over the whole period and cause measurement inaccuracies of the calculated
detrended output series if suddenly, changes in the demand and supply of goods occur.
Finally, the production function based approach calculates potential output as the mag-
nitude that is consistent with the current technology, labor, and capital formation level.
More details are given for example in Giorno et al. [56].
Contrary to methods like the split time-trend method the underlying study builds on the
production function based approach used by the OECD: output is assumed to depend on
the available input factors of an economy. Moreover, potential output is defined as the
output produced with the capital stock and potential employment. Since we assume as
an approximation that the government sector “produces” at its potential level,2 i.e., the
actual output in the government sector is equal to the potential output level, we apply
the production function based approach only to the business sector of the economy. The
business sector is defined as the entirety of economic actors excluding the government
sector, see also Giorno et al. [56].
The output gap, which provides information on the business cycle, can be defined in
several ways, e.g., as the deviation of output from its long-run stochastic trend. In some
studies, the output gap is described as the deviation of output from the flexible-price
output, which is obtained in an economy without nominal rigidities. A third possible
definition of the output gap is the deviation of output from the level obtained by using
the current technology level and the available capital and labor inputs to full capacity,
i.e., the potential output. A broad overview on different definitions of the output gap
and their implications is given by Kiley [73]. We choose the same definition as the IMF
and the OECD and define the output gap as the difference between actual and potential
output.
To assess the fiscal policy situation in Germany, one can use for example fiscal policy
2Implicitly, we assume that the government uses the entire available capital stock and the whole
number of employees—see also Giorno et al. [56].
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rules directly, correlation coefficients between the cyclical components of the real gov-
ernment expenditure and real GDP, the amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle, or the fiscal
budget balance as a tool. Cimadomo et al. [35] examine five OECD countries and in-
terpret fiscal policy behavior by estimating fiscal policy rules directly. They find that
fiscal policy becomes more countercyclical in Germany over time. Kaminsky et al. [71]
analyze fiscal policy for Germany by calculating the correlation coefficient between the
cyclical components of real government spending and real GDP. Moreover, they calcu-
late the amplitude of the fiscal policy cycle in 1960-2003. Fiscal policy is evaluated as
pro-cyclical for the first indicator, whereas it is found to be countercyclical for the latter
one. Thus, there is no clear tendency for Germany within the analyzed time horizon.
Frankel et al. [51] examine the correlation coefficient between the cyclical components of
real government spending and real GDP. They split their data sample in two parts, 1960-
1999 and 2000-2009. For the first period, they find that Germany pursues a pro-cyclical
fiscal policy, whereas it changes to a countercyclical policy for the second subperiod.
There are many studies that calculate fiscal balances and the associated elasticities, e.g.,
Mohr [99], Hermann et al. [62], Giorno et al. [56], or Van den Noord [125] with varying
time context and data frequency. The budget balance measures the difference between
revenues and expenditures of the government. A surplus (deficit) in the balance suggests
a contractionary (expansionary) fiscal policy. Changes in the overall budget balance,
the current fiscal balance, the primary balance, which excludes interest payments, or the
structural balance, which is the cyclically-adjusted budget balance can be calculated to
analyze the fiscal stance. We make use of the structural budget balance, i.e., the differ-
ence of tax revenue and government spending if output would be equal to its potential
level to decide whether fiscal policy is performed pro-cyclically or not. If the structural
budget balance is positive, the government receives more income than it spends and
vice versa. To judge if fiscal policy is performed pro- or countercyclically, changes in
the output gap are compared to changes in the structural budget balance of the econ-
omy. If the two changes have the same sign, fiscal policy is performed countercyclically,
whereas if the changes have different signs, the fiscal policy responds pro-cyclically. In
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this context, the fiscal stance is defined as changes in the structural budget balance.
For a closer description of the fiscal stance including other possible definitions see, e.g.,
Polito and Wickens [110], Clark and Dilnot [36], the OECD Economic Outlook No. 74
[103], or the IMF Pamphlet Series No. 49 [70]. Overall, the budget balance consists
of two components, the structural and the cyclical budget balance. The former is the
difference of government revenue and expenditure when output is equal to its potential
level. If actual output is smaller than potential output, for instance additional transfer
payments or unemployment benefits are caused by the fact that unemployment does
not equal full employment. In particular, to derive the structural balance in that case,
additional tax revenues that would occur if output was equal to potential output and
thus full employment have to be added to and the additional transfer payments due to
cyclical unemployment have to be subtracted from the actual budget balance. These
additional budget components are captured in the cyclical budget balance.
The OECD Economic Outlook No. 74 [103] analyzes the fiscal policy in the three major
countries Germany, France, and Italy for 1991-2002 using the structural balance. They
use aggregated data and find that in most periods, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical.
In the underlying study, we calculate the budget balance and the fiscal stance defined
above to decide if fiscal policy in Germany for 1991-2009 was pro- or countercyclical.
There are several methods to obtain the structural and cyclical budget balance. The
method used by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) tries to capture changes
in the structure of demand and income in more detail. It uses less aggregated data
compared to other methods in order to calculate the budgetary elasticities, see, e.g.,
Bouthevillain et al. [23]. Moreover, different components influencing the budget bal-
ance are chosen to take cyclical adjustment more into account. In particular, average
compensation of private employees, employment in the private sector, operating sur-
plus of companies, private consumption, and unemployment are taken as variables for
the macroeconomic environment instead of GDP. Budget items that are also part of
the expenditure side and that are not cyclically adjusted as indirect taxes paid by the
government to itself or direct taxes related to interest income are excluded from the
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analysis. A second method to calculate structural and cyclical budget balances is the
OECD approach. According to this approach, output elasticities of government spending
and revenues are calculated for different components of expenditure and tax categories.
Then, potential output is derived using the production function approach. Finally, by
combining the output elasticities and the potential output the structural and the cyclical
balance is calculated.
We follow the OECD method. Giorno et al. [56] and Van den Noord [125] use annual
data, Blanchard and Perotti [21] and Perotti [108] fit the methods to quarterly data to
obtain the necessary output elasticities of government expenditure and tax categories.
The results found in these studies are quite different because annual data smooth over
one whole year, leaving quarterly changes unconsidered. Moreover, not every estimate
is reasonable. If the estimated results are not statistically significant or unrealistic, the
elasticities are set exogenously, see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti [21] and Perotti [108].
We try to avoid exogenous choices and thus compare different methods to obtain mean-
ingful estimates. The most realistic results are filtered and used for further calculations.
Only a few exogenously given subelasticities are utilized. Combining the estimates of the
elasticities and the estimated potential output, the structural budget balance is obtained.
The derivation of the fiscal stance to examine fiscal policy concludes the analytical part
of the actual situation in Germany for 1991-2009.
The labor share in the underlying study is found to be decreasing over time. Potential
output increases for the examined time period and actual output lies below its potential
level, except for 2000-2002. Moreover, after estimating the output elasticities of the fiscal
instruments (government expenditure and revenue) and the budget balance, fiscal policy
is assessed. The German government follows a pro-cyclical policy for most parts of 1991-
2002. This behavior changes in 2003-2009. The largest part of this subperiod indicates
a countercyclical fiscal policy and coincides with Keynesian economics. In challenging
economic times as deep recessions fiscal policy responds clearly countercyclically to the
economic development for the whole time horizon 1991-2009.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we calculate
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the potential output and the output gaps using the methodology of the OECD. The
third section derives the elasticities needed to calculate the budget balance. Moreover,
the fiscal stance of Germany is characterized. The last section draws some conclusions.
4.2 Potential Output and the Output Gap for 1991-2009
In this section, we derive the potential output for Germany in the post-reunification
period (1991-2009). Potential output is used to calculate the output gap. A decrease
in the output gap suggests a cyclical downturn of the economy. We examine in later
sections if downturns are accompanied by countercyclical fiscal policy.
Quarterly data are used for all calculations of the study. The data series, their sources,
and their time horizons are described in detail in Appendix B.1.
As starting point, we assume that an economy is split into two sectors. The business sec-
tor includes all the self-employed, firms and service providers. Measurable value-added
is produced in this sector. The second sector is the government sector, which produces
public goods. The value-added of these goods is measured as the factor costs, i.e., the
compensation of employees in the government sector. Additionally, the consumption of
fixed capital is summed to obtain a measurable production value. We follow the defi-
nition of government production given in Nissen [102]. Moreover, we assume that the
government sector produces at its potential level—see, e.g., Giorno [56]. The govern-
ment sector uses the available capital stock and employs as many workers as possible.
Thus, the corresponding actual government output value is used as one component of
the overall potential output of an economy. For the business sector, the OECD Business
Sector Database [104] is augmented by the period 2000-2009. The data base exists for
1960-1999 but is not supported by the OECD any more due to missing data series of
many of the main countries. For Germany, most data series needed are available such
that we add the necessary single data. To derive the potential output of the business
sector, we apply the production function approach similar to the one used by the OECD.
This approach takes a Cobb-Douglas production function as the basis to derive a data
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series for the unobservable total factor productivity. In a first step, the labor share
(1 − α) defined as the fraction of real wages (WB) to gross value-added in the business
sector (YB) is calculated.
1− α =
WB
YB
.
The compensation of employees in the business sectorWB is derived as the residual of the
overall wages in Germany subtracting the wages in the government sector. All nominal
wage series are deflated with the GDP-deflator with base year 2005. To obtain the
actual gross value-added in the business sector (YB), we take the difference between the
overall gross value-added that is calculated as the difference between GDP (Y ) and the
net indirect tax revenue (NTIND) and the value-added in the government sector (YGov).
The government value-added is equal to the sum of the compensation of employees and
the consumption of the fixed capital formation.
YB = Y − NTIND − YGov,
where YGov = WGov + CFCGov. WGov is the compensation of employees and CFCGov
denotes the consumption of fixed capital in the government sector.
The nominal GDP series is deflated with the GDP-deflator. The OECD Business Sector
Database offers a deflator series for the investment and the wages in the government
sector. Also a special deflator series for the net indirect taxes is given. See the description
of the OECD Business Sector Database [104] for more details concerning the calculation
of the business sector aggregates and the available data series.3 Using the wages in the
business sector, the labor share 1−α is calculated and varies between 0.6125 in 1992Q3
and 0.5101 in 2008Q1.
Figure 4.1 shows the development of 1− α for 1988-2009. To avoid endpoint problems,
we augment all data series for 1988-1990. Before reunification, the data correspond only
to West Germany.
We detect a statistically significant jump in 1991 due to the reunification. Overall, 1−α
diminishes (red solid line) over time and the average labor share for 1991-2009 is 0.5595
3All deflator series are normalized to 100 for the year 2005.
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(black solid line). The blue solid line denotes the HP-filtered series to illustrate the
negative slope of the series.4
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Figure 4.1: The Development of the Labor Share 1− α in 1988-2009
The next step in the calculation process of potential output in the business sector is to
find an approximation for the unobservable total factor productivity (TFP) data-series
A. We derive the TFP as the residual of the following Cobb-Douglas production function
in logarithmized form.
YB = AL
1−α
B K
α, (4.1)
where YB denotes the gross value-added in the business sector, A is the total factor
productivity and LB is employment in the business sector. The employment in the
business sector is calculated as the overall employment of the economy net of the general
employment in the government sector. The self-employed of the economy are part of
LB. Finally, K denotes the capital stock of the business sector. Since the data series
of the capital stock K in the OECD Business Sector Database ends in 1999Q4, it is
approximated as follows. We assume that the capital stock tomorrow (Kt+1) is equal
4Following Hodrick and Prescott [63], the λHP -parameter of the filter is set to 1600 for all filtering
procedures in the underlying study.
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to the capital stock of today (Kt) net of depreciation (δtKt), where δt denotes the
depreciation rate. Moreover, investment (It) today as the additional accumulated capital
in period t is added. We obtain the standard capital accumulation equation, applied to
the business sector:
Kt+1 = (1− δt)Kt + It. (4.2)
The investment in the business sector is defined as the overall gross fixed capital forma-
tion (GFC ) less investment in the government sector (IG) and investment in housing
(IH ):
I = GFC − IG − IH .
Since there is a special deflator series for all investment components, each component is
deflated with the corresponding deflator series given by the OECD Database normalized
for base year 2005.
The depreciation of capital in the business sector is modeled as follows. We take the
scrapping rate data series of the OECD for the business sector as given. The data series
ends in 1999Q4. Therefore, the last 5 years of available data are used to calculate the
average growth rate of depreciation in the business sector. The missing 10 years of data
are approximated by assuming that the growth rate of depreciation equals the calculated
average growth.
To create a series for the business sector capital stock as consistent as possible, we take
the 1991Q1 existing value and not the last existing value in 1999Q4 as the starting value.
Thus, the 1991Q1 value K1991Q1 = 1964935.608 MNe is chosen as starting point for the
law of motion of the capital stock described in equation (4.2).
After log-linearization of the production function (equation (4.1)) and usage of the cal-
culated data, we obtain a data series for the total factor productivity in logs. Finally, if
the exponential function is applied to the log series, we arrive at the TFP data series.5
To avoid endpoint problems when applying the HP-filter, we augment all data series for
1988Q1-1990Q4. These data correspond only to West Germany.
5Since we apply the production function approach, it is not possible to assign a meaningful measure
to the ordinate.
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Figure 4.2 shows the total factor productivity for 1988-2009. The series comprises an
upward trend for 1988-1990, which corresponds to expectations. The trend is disrupted
by the reunification. The sharp decline in 1991Q1 is due to a disproportionately high
increase in employment compared to the increase in gross value-added in the business
sector due to the reunification of the two economic regions, the GDR and the FRG. The
development in employment and the gross value-added in detail are shown in Figure C.1
and Figure C.2 of Appendix C.1, respectively. It seems that the average productivity per
worker in the business sector for the former GDR is smaller than that of West Germany
such that the reunification leads to a decrease of the total factor productivity. Thus, the
reunification causes a jump of the TFP on a different development path. For 1991-2007,
the total factor productivity increases but at a declining rate. In 2008, the TFP de-
creases due to a statistically significant decrease in the gross value-added of the business
sector (Figure C.2 in Appendix C.1) because of the global crisis. The dashed line shows
the HP-filtered TFP-series. As with the original data, the filtered series increases for a
long time before declining in 2008.
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Figure 4.2: The Development of the Total Factor Productivity for 1988-2009
Finally, potential output in the business sector can be calculated using the log-linearized
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Cobb-Douglas production function of equation (4.1)
ypotB = (1− α) l
pot
B + αk + a
tr, (4.3)
where ypotB denotes log potential output in the business sector and l
pot
B is the log potential
employment in the business sector. k denotes the log business sector capital stock and
atr is the log trend factor productivity. A series for the capital stock K already exists
and the labor share 1 − α is known. The remaining series still have to be calculated.
Following Giorno et al. [56], we use the HP-filtered log TFP series as a measure for the
log trend factor productivity. Finally, potential employment in the business sector is
calculated as
LpotB = Lall · PART trend (1− NAWRU )− LGov, (4.4)
where LpotB is the potential employment in the business sector. Lall denotes the overall
working age population and PART trend is the trend participation rate in the labor mar-
ket. The product of Lall and the trend participation rate corresponds to the smoothed
labor force. The NAWRU denotes the smoothed non-accelerating wage rate of unem-
ployment. The smoothing is proceeded using the HP-filter. Since potential output for
the business sector is calculated, we subtract LGov, the employment in the government
sector in equation (4.4) from the overall potential employment level of the economy.
Consistent with the assumption that the government sector produces at its potential
level, it also employs people at the potential level.
The potential overall employment level depends on the NAWRU being the specific un-
employment rate that would be associated with a constant wage inflation. Since we
follow the concept of the OECD—see Giorno et al. [56]—to derive potential output, the
NAWRU is used. A different approach is to implement the NAIRU, the non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment. For a closer discussion of alternative calculation meth-
ods of potential employment and output in Germany, see Horn et al. [65].
We decide to use the NAWRU -concept because we split the economic activity of a coun-
try into a government and a business sector. The NAWRU is calculated for the whole
economy, but it is reasonable to assume that the unemployment rate and the wages in
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the government sector follow a constant law of motion. Therefore, one can argue that
the NAWRU reflects the main reactions of the wage rate as well as the unemployment
rate for the business sector. The inflation rate related NAIRU cannot be split into dif-
ferent sectors, such that the usage of the NAIRU in this two sector concept seems to be
inappropriate.
Based on Elmeskov [46], we assume that there is a linear relationship between a change
in wage inflation and the gap between the actual unemployment rate and the NAWRU .
Thus, the NAWRU is calculated as the filtered series of the original series NAWRU o
defined as
NAWRU o = u−
(
∆u/∆2gw
)
∆gw,
where ∆ is the first difference operator, u is the unemployment rate, and gw denotes the
nominal money wage growth rate. Within this context, the money wage growth rate is
defined as the difference between two successive log nominal wage rates.
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Figure 4.3 shows the actual unemployment rate (blue solid line), the original NAWRU
(red solid line), and the smoothed NAWRU series (red dashed line) for 1991-2009.
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Once again, to avoid endpoint problems, we calculate the original NAWRU for 1988-2009
and then filter the series. 1991-2009 is the relevant time period, therefore, we suppress
the first 3 years. Since the original NAWRU is very similar to the actual unemployment
rate except of three outliers in 1992, 1994, and 2002, we filter the original NAWRU
series.6
As a last step to obtain potential employment in the business sector, the overall trend
participation rate in the labor market has to be calculated that is defined as the smoothed
ratio of overall employment to the labor force. We filter the calculated series of the
participation rate with the HP-method. For more details, see Figure C.3 in Appendix
C.1.
So far, the data series for the potential employment in the business sector, the trend
total factor productivity, the labor share, and the capital formation have been derived.
Hence, we calculate the log potential value-added in the business sector applying equation
(4.3). The overall potential output Y pot for Germany is defined as the sum of potential
output in the business and the government sector, net indirect tax revenue NTIND, and
consumption of fixed capital in the business sector CFC. Since we assume that the
government produces at its potential level, we take the actual output in the government
sector YGov as a component of the overall potential output. It holds that
Y pot = exp
(
ypotB
)
+ YGov + NTIND + CFC . (4.5)
To obtain a comparable measure to GDP, the value-added is augmented with the net
indirect tax revenue and the depreciation of capital because both components are part
of the GDP. The definition of government output includes the factor income, i.e., the
wages and the depreciation of capital in the government sector.7 Thus, we only have to
add the depreciation of capital (CFC ) for the business sector explicitly to get overall
potential output.
The obtained estimate for potential output in Germany is larger than the one estimated
6In general, the NAWRU is very volatile in many countries for most periods of time.
7If the original Deutsche Bundesbank series is not seasonally adjusted, as in the case of wages, the
standard Census X12-ARIMA method is applied.
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by Giorno et al. [56] even with the same conceptional methods.
On one hand, Giorno et al. use annual data, whereas we use quarterly data. Thus, more
dynamics are caught in quarterly data because the period over which we average (three
months) is shorter. On the other hand, the paper of Giorno et al. examines the time
period 1986-1996. Since the potential output depends in most parts on unobservable
variables as the total factor productivity calculated as a residual, the NAWRU, and the
labor share—see Horn et al. [65]—it is reasonable that different estimates are obtained
for different periods in time.
The estimates for the TFP and the NAWRU are not too different, but the labor share
declines statistically significantly in the 1991-2009 period as shown in Figure 4.1. Cal-
culating the average labor share for 1986-1996, we obtain a value of 0.5882. This is
significantly higher than the value we obtained for 1991-2009 (1− α = 0.5595).
A closer analysis on the effect of different labor shares is found in Appendix C.1.3. The
higher the labor share, the smaller the estimated potential output leaving all other data
series unchanged. As a consequence, smaller values for the potential output are calcu-
lated in Giorno et al. [56].
The following figure shows the overall potential output (black solid line) and the actual
GDP (blue solid line) for Germany in 1991-2009.
In the first third of the observed period, potential output is significantly higher than
the actual output. This indicates a demand pull and a cost-push inflation. The first
large difference between potential and actual output is caused by the fact that the input
factor labor increases extraordinarily due to the reunification. Potential employment
is calculated with very high values leading to a high potential output. The decline in
factor productivity implies that the additional employees are not that productive such
that potential output decreases. In the second third, the actual output converges to the
potential output and for 2000-2002, actual output is even higher than potential output.
Due to the turbulence of the world economy in the third part of the observed period, the
actual output falls back below the potential output and especially for 2008 and 2009,
the difference between actual and potential output becomes larger and larger.
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Figure 4.4: Potential and Actual Output for 1991-2009
As a last step in this section, we analyze the output gap. According to the recent liter-
ature, the output gap is defined as the deviation of actual from potential output as a
ratio of the potential level.
Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between the output gap and the unemployment gap
that is defined as the difference of the filtered NAWRU series and the actual unemploy-
ment rate in percent (NAWRU − u).
A positive unemployment gap means that unemployment is below the non-accelerating
wage rate level. Contrary, a positive output gap means that actual output is above the
potential level. The output gap as a percentage of potential output is positive only for
the period 1999Q4-2002Q4. In all other time periods the estimated potential output
lies above the actual GDP. To check for consistency, we compare our results with the
ones calculated by the IMF in spring 2006 for 1999 and 2001.8 Since the estimates of
potential output and the output gap depend on the calculation point in time—see Horn
et al. [65]— the results cannot be the same. But the estimates we calculate, are compa-
rable and consistent to the IMF values: the IMF finds the output gap for Germany to
8See the World Economic Outlook Database, 2006.
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be +0.1% in 1999 and puts it at 1.5% in 2001. We find an annual output gap derived as
the mean of the corresponding four quarterly data estimates to be -0.195% in 1999 and
1.135% in 2001.9
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Figure 4.5: Output Gap and Unemployment Gap for 1991-2009
Thus, our estimates are always a bit lower than the IMF estimates. Since the smallest
values for the labor share are calculated for winter 2006 to autumn 2008, our average
value for 1 − α is lower than the one used by the IMF at the beginning of 2006. As a
consequence, the calculated output gap is lower. For a further discussion on the effect
of different labor shares see Figure C.4 and C.5 in Appendix C.1.3.
4.3 Elasticities and the Budget Balance
To describe fiscal policy in Germany, the structural budget balance for 1991-2009 is
used. Thus, the output elasticities for six different types of taxes and for the govern-
ment expenditure have to be calculated. We approximate the government expenditure
9If we compare our estimates to the results of the World Economic Outlook Database in spring 2010,
the IMF finds +0.175% for 1999 and 1.339% for 2001. Thus, also the application of the production
function approach only to the business sectors seems to play a significant role concerning the value of
the estimate.
131
4.3. ELASTICITIES AND THE BUDGET BALANCE
similar to Perotti [108] as the sum of government purchases (government consumption)
and capital purchases (government investment in the sense of the gross fixed capital for-
mation in the government sector). The tax revenue is split into personal income taxes,
contributions to social security, corporate taxes, indirect taxes, and a residual obtained
by subtracting overall tax revenue by the four tax categories listed above. Moreover,
government transfers in terms of subsidies, i.e., negative revenue, build the last category
to be analyzed.
In the following subsection, we derive the elasticities of net taxes and government ex-
penditure with respect to output and prices. Moreover, other elasticities as the elasticity
of net taxes and government spending with respect to the interest or the exchange rate
are calculated. These elasticities are needed for the SVAR estimation in Chapter 5.
We compare our results to other recent studies and check for consistency of the results.
Finally, the structural budget balance is derived to assess fiscal policy in Germany for
1991-2009.
4.3.1 Elasticities
Following Giorno et al. [56], we split the tax revenue of the government into five parts.
Direct taxes are divided into three categories, the personal income tax, the contributions
to social security, and the corporate tax. Furthermore, the government earns indirect
taxes, which are divided into value-added tax (VAT) revenue and taxes on import duties.
We consider an additional tax obtained as a residual of subtracting the available overall
tax revenue with the direct and indirect tax types listed above. Finally, government
transfers (subsidies) as a negative tax revenue are analyzed. For a closer description of
the data sources see Appendix B.1.
The elasticity of net taxes or government spending with respect to output or, in other
words, the output elasticity of net taxes or government spending describes the effect of
varying output on taxes or government spending.
The elasticity of one of the five tax categories with respect to output is derived as the
product of the elasticity describing the effect of a change in output on the tax base and
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the impact of varying the tax base on the tax revenue. Thus, it is equal to the product
of the output elasticity of the tax base and the tax base elasticity of the tax rate. In
some parts, we follow this concept (as in the case of indirect taxes), in other parts we use
elasticity definitions suggested by Van den Noord [125]. In the next paragraphs, each
output elasticity is explained in detail.
The output elasticity of personal income taxes (oepit) and the elasticity of social secu-
rity contributions with respect to output (oessc) can be summarized as follows. TBi
denotes the tax revenue of the respective tax category i ∈ {personal income taxes, social
security contributions}. Y , L, and wr are the GDP, the employment, and the wage rate,
respectively. Following Van den Noord [125], the output elasticity of personal income
taxes and social security contributions oe i is defined as
oe i =
∂TBi
∂Y
Y
TBi
=
∂ [(TBi/L)L]
∂Y
Y
TBi
=
Y
L
(
∂ (TBi/L)
∂Y
L+
∂L
∂Y
TBi
L
)
=
(
∂L
∂Y
Y
L
)(
1 +
(
∂ (TBi/L)
∂wr
wr
TBi/L
)(
∂wr
∂L
L
wr
))
.
The first term in the last row is the output elasticity of employment (oee), whereas(
∂(TBi/L)
∂wr
wr
TBi/L
)
denotes the real wage elasticity of personal income taxes per worker
(wepit) and the real wage elasticity of social security contributions per worker (wessc).(
∂wr
∂L
L
wr
)
is the employment elasticity of wages (eew). The effect of a change in output
on the personal income tax revenue is summarized as follows.
oepit = oee (1 + wepit · eew) , (4.6)
where oepit is the output elasticity of personal income taxes, oee denotes the output
elasticity of employment, wepit is the real wage elasticity of personal income taxes per
worker, and eew denotes the employment elasticity of wages. The output elasticity of
employment describes the effect of a change in output on the employment and indirectly
captures the impact of changes in employment on taxes if a tax yield per worker is given.
Since Okun’s Law states that a change in output is partly absorbed by labor productivity
changes, the output elasticity of employment has to be smaller than 1. The product in
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brackets of equation (4.6) shows the development of the tax yield per worker and is split
into two parts: the real wage elasticity of personal income taxes and the employment
elasticity of wages. The last term (the employment elasticity of wages, eew) can be seen
as the Phillips curve effect on wages. It describes the impact of employment on wages.
A sensitivity analysis due to the Phillips curve effect and the Okun’s law effect is carried
out below.
To obtain the output elasticity of employment (oee), we regress the log of total em-
ployment on the first lead, the actual value, and the first to fourth lag of the log gross
value-added—see Perotti [108]. The choice of four lags is due to the usage of quarterly
data. Additionally, we use a constant and a deterministic time trend as regressor. An
LM-test on serial correlation is performed. Since the hypothesis of serial correlation is
not rejected, we use Newey-West robust standard errors. Except of the first lag of the log
gross value-added, all regressors are statistically significant at a 10% statistical signifi-
cance level. The estimated output elasticity of employment defined as the coefficient of
the log output today in the regression is statistically significant even at a 2% statistical
significance level. oee = 0.691092 (2.459),10 which is consistent with theory. An increase
in output increases employment and the estimate is smaller than 1. Contrary to Perotti
[108], we obtain a statistically significant, positive estimate such that we do not set the
elasticity equal to zero. Van den Noord [125] uses annual data and obtains an output
elasticity of 0.6 for the 1990th. The results are very similar for annual and quarterly
data. Quarterly fluctuations do not seem to significantly influence the result. Giorno et
al. [56] find an estimate of 0.45 for Germany in 1991, which is smaller than the estimate
of Van den Noord [125]. Blanchard and Perotti [21] estimate the output elasticity of
wages for the US as 0.42 in 1947-1997.
Similar to Perotti [108] and Blanchard and Perotti [21] who use the estimates of Giorno
et al. [56] or Van den Noord [125] for their estimation with quarterly data, we adopt the
estimates from Van den Noord and assume that wepit = 1.5. Giorno et al. [56] estimate
that the wage elasticity of personal income taxes per worker (wepit) varies between 1.8
10The term in brackets denotes the t-statistic with Newey-West errors.
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in 1978 and 2.0 in 1991, whereas Van den Noord [125] estimates it as 1.5 for the whole
period 1991-1998. Thus, the elasticity seems to fall in the 1990th. As a consequence, we
decide to use the lowest estimate available.
As a last step to obtain a value for the output elasticity of personal income taxes, we
regress the log of real wages on one lead, the actual value, and four lags of the log em-
ployment to calculate the employment elasticity of wages (eew)—see Perotti [108]. Once
again, a constant and a deterministic time trend are included as regressors.
The LM-test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis of autocorrelation. Thus, we
use Newey-West standard errors. All regressors are statistically significant at a 10% sta-
tistical significance level. The coefficient of the actual log employment, which is chosen
as the measure for the quarterly employment elasticity of real wages, is equal to 0.675976
(1.96).11 This qualitatively coincides with theory: an increase in employment causes an
increase in real wages.
Contrary to Perotti [108] who calculates a negative estimate and sets the employment
elasticity of real wages equal to zero, we obtain a statistically significant, positive esti-
mate for the quarterly effect of a change in employment on real wages, eew. For annual
data, Van den Noord [125] estimates the employment elasticity of real wages as 0.8 in
1985-1998 and Giorno et al. [56] estimate it as 0.57 in 1978-1991.
Blanchard and Perotti [21] use quarterly data for the US and obtain a value of 0.62 for
the employment elasticity of real wages.
Finally, the output elasticity of personal income taxes is calculated as 1.3918 using equa-
tion (4.6). The calculated result is larger than that of Perotti [108] who sets the elasticity
equal to 0. Van den Noord [125] obtains 1.3 and Giorno et al. [56] get 1.0. Both papers
use annual data and a different time period. Additionally, Giorno et al. [56] use a dif-
ferent value for wepit. Thus, the estimates cannot be exactly the same.
Next, we derive the output elasticity of the second tax category in a similar manner.
The output elasticity of social security contributions (oessc) is defined as
oessc = oee (1 + wessc · eew) , (4.7)
11The term in brackets denotes the t-statistic with Newey-West standard errors.
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where wessc denotes the wage elasticity of social security contributions per worker. Since
social security contributions depend on personal income in a similar manner as the per-
sonal income tax, the definition of the oessc has the same structure as equation (4.6)
defining the output elasticity of personal income taxes. We use the output elasticity of
employment and the employment elasticity of wages calculated above. Giorno et al. [56]
estimate a value of 0.9 for the wage elasticity of social security contributions in period
1978-1991, whereas Van den Noord [125] estimates a value of 0.8 for 1985-1998. Since
the wessc seems to decline between 1978-1998 and the estimate of Van den Noord covers
a big part of the analyzed time horizon of this study, we choose the smallest available
estimate and assume that wessc = 0.8. Overall, the output elasticity of social security
contributions is calculated as 1.0648 in this study. Perotti [108] sets the elasticity equal
to 0 because his estimate is negative and statistically insignificant. Giorno et al. [56]
get 0.7 and Van den Noord [125] calculates the output elasticity of social security con-
tributions with 1.0. The estimates cannot be the same because the latter authors use
annual data and different time periods. Moreover, Giorno et al. [56] utilize a different
value for wessc.
The next step is to calculate the output elasticity of corporate income taxes (oecit). The
estimation method of Van den Noord [125] assumes that the amount of corporate income
tax revenue is strictly proportional to corporate income such that the output elasticity
of corporate income taxes is equal to the output elasticity of corporate income (profits)
and does not seem to be reasonable for quarterly data. Quarterly installments are paid
on the liability of a firm that is assessed on the performance of the firm in the previous
year. In more details, firms pay a specific tax. After publishing the tax balance sheet for
the whole year they pay or receive a compensation related to the tax advance payments
in the third quarter of the next year. This fact is not captured by the assumption of Van
den Noord [125] that we can simply use the output elasticity of corporate income as a
proxy. If the elasticity would be a good proxy, the elasticity of the tax base (the profits)
to the corporate income taxes would be equal to one. This cannot be reasonable if the
paid tax is geared not to the actual but to the previous year profit. The proxy does
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not seem to be a good one with quarterly data in reality due to the time lag described
above. Thus, we decide to set the output elasticity of corporate income taxes analogous
to Perotti [108] equal to 0.
We derive the output elasticity of the last important tax category, the indirect taxes, in
the following. Perotti [108] assumes that the output elasticity of indirect taxes is equal to
1. He takes strict proportionality of the tax to the tax base as well as strict proportion-
ality between the tax base and output as given. Van den Noord [125] presumes that the
relevant tax base for the indirect taxes fluctuates proportionally to private consumption.
He estimates the output elasticity of private consumption by 2SLS as an approximation
for the output elasticity of indirect taxes and obtains 0.95 for the output elasticity of
indirect taxes. We follow a different approach. As mentioned above, we split the indirect
taxes into two categories: a VAT and an import duty tax. The overall output elasticity
of indirect taxes (oeit) is derived as the weighted average of the estimated output elas-
ticity of the VAT and the output elasticity of import duties. The weights are derived as
the ratio of the VAT or the import duty taxes on the overall indirect taxes.
The VAT shows similar variations as private consumption. We assume that the amount
of VAT reacts strictly proportional to consumption. Thus, the output elasticity of VAT
is defined as the output elasticity of private consumption times the private consump-
tion elasticity of VAT. The second term is equal to 1 due to the assumption of strict
proportionality. We estimate the output elasticity of the VAT as a2 of the equation
log(C/Y pot)t = const + a1t+ a2 log(Y/Y
pot)t, where C denotes private consumption ex-
penditures, Y pot is the potential output, Y is GDP, and t is a deterministic time trend.
The subscript t denotes the time period. We use the 2SLS method to correct for si-
multaneity and choose a constant, a deterministic trend, the log of gross fixed capital
formation divided by potential output, and the log of government consumption divided
by potential output as instruments. Since the LM-test result suggests that there is se-
rial correlation, we use Newey-West robust standard errors. All regressors are highly
statistically significant with a statistical significance level of 1%. We obtain 1.1690 with
t-statistic 7.204 for the output elasticity of the VAT. The average ratio of the VAT to
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overall indirect taxes is 0.7657. The largest part of indirect tax revenue comes from the
taxation of consumption goods.
The output elasticity of import duties is estimated in a similar manner as the output
elasticity of VAT. We assume that the import duty taxes show the same variations as im-
ports. The import elasticity of import duty taxes is set to 1. Thus, the output elasticity
of the import duty tax is equal to the output elasticity of imports. The output elasticity
of the import duty tax is calculated as b2 of log(Im/Y
pot)t = const+b1t+b2 log(Y/Y
pot)t,
where Im denotes the overall imports of Germany. The 2SLS method with a constant,
a deterministic trend, the log of private consumption divided by potential output, the
log of the gross fixed capital formation divided by potential output, and the log of
government consumption divided by potential output as instruments is applied. Once
again, the LM-test shows that there is serial correlation in the data such that we use
Newey-West standard errors. All regressors are statistically significant at a 10% statis-
tical significance level and the output elasticity of import duties is estimated as 1.2611
(1.773). The average ratio of import duty taxes to indirect taxes is 0.2343. As a conse-
quence, we calculate the output elasticity of overall indirect taxes (oeit) as the weighted
average of the output elasticities of VAT and import duty taxes with a value of 1.1905.
Perotti [108] assumes an output elasticity of 1 for quarterly data in a different time
period, whereas Van den Noord [125] estimates it as 0.95 for annual data, once again for
a different time horizon.
The last component of the net tax revenues are the government transfers. Since only the
unemployment benefits seem to react to a cycle, we derive the output elasticity of unem-
ployment benefits as a proxy for the output elasticity of transfers (oet). The following
formula is taken from Van den Noord [125] who uses the method described below. It
implies that the labor force does not react to the cycle.
oet = −UBG · oee(((1 − eelf )/ULF )− 1). (4.8)
UBG is the average ratio of the unemployment benefit to total government expenditure.
oee denotes the output elasticity of employment estimated above, eelf is the employment
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elasticity of the labor force, and ULF is the unemployment rate. We assume similar to
Van den Noord [125] that the unemployment related expenditure is strictly proportional
to unemployment. Furthermore, the unemployment benefit rates are postulated to be
independent of the actual economic situation, i.e., the position in the business cycle.
−oee(((1 − eelf )/ULF ) − 1) is the output elasticity of the unemployment related ex-
penditure. Weighted with the ratio of unemployment benefit of total transfers (UBG),
we obtain the output elasticity of government expenditures. Van den Noord [125] gets
for UBG 8.6%, whereas we get 2.82%. This is reasonable because the 2000-2009 time
period is a period of enormous government transfers unequal to unemployment benefits
in Germany. Thus, the ratio of the unemployment benefits is smaller than in 1985-1998.
The unemployment rate (ULF ) is 9.55%. Finally, we estimate the employment elasticity
of the labor supply. The log of the labor force divided by potential labor is regressed
on a constant and the log of total employment divided by potential labor. Due to serial
correlation, we use Newey-West standard errors. All regressors are highly statistically
significant and the employment elasticity of the labor force (the labor supply) is 0.5205
with t-statistic 11.23. Van den Noord [125] estimates it as 0.8 with annual data. Us-
ing equation (4.8), the output elasticity of government transfers (oet) is calculated as
-0.0783. The negative sign of the estimate fits to theory: if the output declines, e.g., due
to a crisis, unemployment rises and so do the unemployment transfer payments. The
unemployment benefits act as automatic stabilizers in a countercyclical way.
For robustness reasons, we also look at an alternative method used by Van den Noord
[125]. The unemployment rate in equation (4.8) is substituted by the average trend
unemployment rate, the NAWRU. We obtain -0.0731 for the elasticity, which is very
similar to the first result (-0.0783). Van den Noord [125] estimates the output elasticity
of transfers as -0.0688 and rounds it to -0.1. To allow for additional effects of other
transfer programs, which could be related to unemployment, we do not set the elasticity
to the strict value of -0.0783 and round it, similar to Van den Noord, to -0.1.
As a last step, we assume that the residual calculated as the residual obtained as the
difference of all tax categories examined above and the overall tax revenue has an output
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elasticity of 0, i.e., a change in output does not affect the tax revenue bundled in the
residual.
Overall, the following output elasticities are obtained:
Result 4.1. Output Elasticities
Tax Category Value
Personal Income Tax (oepit) 1.3918
Social Security Contributions (oessc) 1.0648
Corporate Income Tax (oecit) 0 (set exogenously)
Indirect Tax (oeit) 1.1905
Government Transfers (oet) -0.1 (rounded)
Residual 0 (set exogenously)
For the sensitivity analysis mentioned above we first switch the Phillips curve effect off,
i.e., we set the employment elasticity of wages equal to 0 such that tax progressivity does
not play a role any longer. In this scenario, wages do not vary with employment over the
cycle. The output elasticity of personal income taxes and social security contributions
are affected: oepit s = oesscs = 0.6911. Before, oepit = 1.3918 and oessc = 1.0648. If the
Phillips curve effect is switched off, the two elasticities are equal to the output elasticity
of employment. The effect of a change in output on the tax revenue is smaller because
changes in the employment do not affect wages and thus they do not supplementary
change the tax revenue.
A second step of the sensitivity analysis is to additionally switch off Okun’s Law. Wages
are assumed to be constant, which implies that oee = 1. Output varies proportionately
with employment and wages do not vary with employment in this scenario. According to
equation (4.6) and (4.7), the output elasticities are equal to one in this case. I.e., a rise
in output leads to an equal rise of the tax revenue because all other channels of reaction
are switched off. If output changes affect employment strictly proportionally, the output
elasticity of transfers changes. We obtain oet s = −0.1133. For the alternative formula
including the NAWRU, we get -0.1058. Hence, the absence of a channel where labor
productivity absorbs changes in output causes the transfers to react more to a change in
output: if a disturbance variable is switched off, the effect has to be stronger in general.
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After the derivation of all tax category output elasticities, we obtain the overall elasticity
of net taxes with respect to output αty as the weighted sum of all elasticities described
above. The weights are chosen as the average share of the ith tax category to overall
taxes. Because transfers are paid and not received by the government, we assign a
negative weight to the output elasticity of transfers, see also Perotti [108] and Blanchard
and Perotti [21]. The transfer payments decline due to a rise in output implying a rise in
employment and a smaller amount of transfers has to be subtracted from overall taxes to
obtain net taxes. Thus, net taxes rise due to the rise in output without taking changes
in other tax categories into account. Overall, since transfer payments as unemployment
benefits decline and the transfer component has a negative weight, the effect of a rise in
output on the overall net tax due to a change in transfers is positive.
In particular, αty = 2.0857, the output elasticity of net taxes for Germany in 1991-2009.
Perotti [108] derives a value of 0.92 for West Germany in 1960-1989. An output elasticity
larger than 1 is not unreasonable—Perotti calculates output elasticities of net taxes for
the US and for Canada between 1.61 and 2.16. Thus, in the 1990th and 2000th, output
seems to have a significantly higher impact on the net tax revenue. A 1% rise in output
raises net tax revenue by 2.09%. Due to the dependency of the estimation method on
quarterly data, e.g., by implementing four quarters of data in the regressions, we cannot
simply include annual data and compare the results with those found by Van den Noord
[125] and Giorno [56].
Heppke-Falk et al. [61] obtain a value of 0.95 for the period 1974-2008. They split the
overall net taxes into different tax categories. As a consequence, the resulting elasticities
are estimated with different values. Bode et al. [22] examine the period 1991-2005 and
use aggregates of taxes that differ significantly from our choice. They obtain 0.46 as
the output elasticity of net taxes. The main explanation for the deviation from our
calculated value is indeed the usage of different tax categories.
The output elasticity of the government spending αgy is assumed to be 0 because the
government cannot react to changes in output within one quarter due to the rigidity of
the government’s decision making process. This assumption is only justified for quarterly
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data and is also made amongst others by Blanchard and Perotti [21], Heppke-Falk et al.
[61], and Bode et al. [22].
Result 4.2. Output Elasticities
• αty = 2.0857 • αgy = 0 (set exogenously)
The price elasticity of net taxes αtpi is derived in a similar manner as the output elasticity.
We decide for each tax category and the transfers if the corresponding taxes are affected
by price changes. We follow Perotti [108] and assume that the price elasticity of real
personal income taxes is equal to the wage elasticity of personal income taxes per worker
(wepit) less 1. Implicitly, employment, output, and the real wage are held constant.
Similarly, the price elasticity of social security contributions is set to be equal to the
wage elasticity of social security contributions per worker (wessc) less 1. A change in
the price level, i.e., inflation, affects corporate income taxes in both directions. Which
direction overweighs is not clear. Thus, we set the price elasticity of corporate income
taxes equal to 0. Following Perotti [108], the price elasticity of real indirect tax revenues
is set equal to 0; the price elasticity of transfers is set to -1.
The price elasticity of the residual calculated by subtracting the tax revenue of the four
tax categories from overall taxes is assumed to be 0.
As before the overall price elasticity of net taxes is derived as the sum of the weighted
price elasticities of all tax categories. The weight is the average ratio of the ith category
tax revenue to the overall tax revenue. We obtain αtpi = 1.0199. In particular, the price
elasticity of personal income taxes is positive as well as the impact of the negative price
elasticity of transfers because transfers are assigned to a negative weight. Perotti [108]
calculates a value of 0.87 for 1960-1989 where West Germany is examined. Heppke-Falk
et al. [61] assume that the price elasticity of net taxes is equal to the output elasticity
of net taxes minus one. They obtain a value of −0.05 as elasticity.12
Since some parts of government spending such as wages react on changes in the price
level and some do not, we set the price elasticity of real government expenditure αgpi
12The approach we follow is not comparable.
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equal to -0.5. The price elasticity of the responding parts is -1. The other part such as
spending for health does not react to changes in the price level at all. These parts have an
elasticity of 0. We follow Perotti [108] with this approach. The government consumption
of wages is about 40%-50% of the overall government expenditure such that we set the
price elasticity of government spending on average equal to -0.5. Heppke-Falk et al.
[61] set the price elasticity of government spending equal to the output elasticity of
government spending minus 1, i.e., equal to -1.
Result 4.3. Price Elasticities
• αtpi = 1.0199 • αgpi = −0.5 (set exogenously)
To create a reasonable VAR model in the fifth chapter of the thesis, we need some
more elasticities. The interest rate, the exchange rate, and imports are included in
the SVAR model to analyze the effect of fiscal shocks on the exchange rate and trade
variables. Thus, the interest rate elasticity, the exchange rate elasticity, and the import
elasticity of net taxes and government spending are calculated in the following. First,
we derive the amount of the interest rate elasticity of net taxes αti and government
spending αgi. We use as approximation for government spending the sum of government
consumption and government investment. Government consumption does not depend
on the interest rate. On one hand, government investment depends on the interest
rate. On the other hand, government investment is on average 8.2% of total government
expenditure. Thus, the negative influence of interest rate changes on the government
investment is negligible. Moreover, from intuition, we can rule out a de facto dependence
of government expenditure on the interest rate in reality and set αgi = 0. Since the major
part of the considered tax bases does not include property income, we assume that a
change in the interest rate does not affect net taxes; αti = 0. Also Heppke-Falk et al.
[61] set the interest rate elasticity of net taxes and government spending equal to 0.
The next step is to calculate the import elasticity of net taxes. Taxes on imports of goods
are part of the indirect taxes. We assumed above that the import duty tax revenue reacts
strictly proportionally to imports. The import elasticity of import duty taxes is weighted
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with the average share of import duty taxes to overall net taxes. We obtain the import
elasticity of net taxes αtim = 0.0731. The imports do not play any role in the decision
process for government expenditure such that we set the import elasticity of government
spending equal to 0: αgim = 0.
A rise in the exchange rate lowers imports. The import duty taxes and the net tax
revenue decrease. Thus, we define the exchange rate elasticity of net taxes αte as the
import elasticity of net taxes αtim multiplied by the exchange rate elasticity of imports
(eeim). The eeim is obtained by regressing the log real imports on a constant, the
log real effective exchange rate, and the log real GDP, where the estimated coefficient
of the log real effective exchange rate is the exchange rate elasticity of imports. We
use Newey-West standard errors due to serial correlation. All coefficients are highly
statistically significant on a 1% statistically significance level and eeim = −0.8002 (-
2.895). Multiplying the exchange rate elasticity of imports with αtim , we obtain for the
exchange rate elasticity of taxes αte = −0.0585. The small coefficient is due to the small
weight of the import duty tax revenue vis-a-vis the overall net tax revenue. Finally, the
exchange rate elasticity of government spending is assumed to be 0 because it is not
reasonable that the policy decision process on government expenditure depends on the
exchange rate. Thus, αge = 0.
Result 4.4. Price Elasticities
• αti = 0 (set exogenously) • αgi = 0 (set exogenously)
• αtim = 0.0731 • αgim = 0 (set exogenously)
• αte = −0.0585 • αge = 0 (set exogenously)
4.3.2 The Budget Balance
Before turning to the primary budget balance, the development of selected parameters
as the net tax to GDP ratio or the government spending to GDP ratio for Germany is
analyzed. The ratio of overall net taxes to GDP is on average 21.01%. Perotti [108]
calculates it as 22.4% in West Germany for 1960-1989.
In the remaining part of the study (except of the derivation of the structural budget bal-
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ance plotted in Figure 4.8), we follow the definition of Perotti [108] and Blanchard and
Perotti [21] of government expenditures. The overall government spending is approx-
imated by the sum of government consumption and the gross fixed capital formation
of the government sector. The qualitative developments using the approximation are
the same as for the original data used in the analysis of the cyclically-adjusted budget
balance below. The average ratio of government spending to GDP is 20.99% where gov-
ernment consumption is 19.76% of GDP and government investment is 1.74%. Perotti
[108] calculates these values as 21.4%, 17.9%, and 3.5% for West Germany in 1960-1989,
respectively.
Figure 4.6 shows the net tax revenue (blue solid line) and the government spending (red
solid line) as a ratio of GDP.
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Figure 4.6: Net Tax Revenue and Government Spending as a Ratio of GDP
The ratio of government expenditure to GDP first increases for 1991-1992, where gov-
ernment spending rises more than GDP due to the reunification. In 1993-2008, the ratio
decreases on average. The economic crisis in 2008/2009 causes output to decline and
government spending to rise, e.g., due to the German fiscal stimulus package in late
2008 and 2009. Thus, the ratio sharply increases in 2009. The tax per GDP ratio first
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grows larger with the reunification of West Germany and the GDR. The tax revenue
rises more than the GDP rises such that the ratio increases. For 1993-1998, the tax per
GDP ratio declines and rises sharply till 2000. Afterwards it declines sharply till 2002
and rises once again in the period of 2002-2008. Finally, in 2009, the GDP declines due
to the recession and as a consequence, the tax revenue decreases, too. The reduction in
the tax revenue is more severe than the decline in GDP such that the ratio sharply falls.
The fact that tax revenues are affected more coincides with the estimated elasticity of
net taxes with respect to output exceeding 1.
Overall, the tax per GDP ratio is far more volatile than the government spending per
GDP ratio. Both series clearly suggest a recession (an economic crisis) in 2009.
The differences of the log tax revenue to log government spending are plotted in Figure
4.7. The curve shows the overall effect of tax revenue and government spending in 1991-
2009 and fluctuates around the zero line.
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Figure 4.7: Difference of Log Net Tax Revenue and Log Government Spending
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There are periods where government spending exceeds tax revenue and vice versa. The
log tax revenue is larger than the log government spending in 1998-2001 and 2006-2008.
The last period of positive values signal a high level of tax revenues indicating a boom.
In 2009, the curve sharply declines, illustrating the economic crisis, which is accompa-
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nied by a high level of government spending.
The curve becomes more volatile over time. The fiscal actions are less balanced if we
compare the 2000th with the first 10 years after the German reunification. Since the
accession of Germany to the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999/2000, the differ-
ence of government expenditure and revenue becomes larger. Within 2000-2009, there
are large changes in the economic performance of the EMU causing higher fluctuations
in the fiscal aggregates of a single member country as Germany in the underlying case.
Finally, to decide whether fiscal policy responds pro- or countercyclically to the economic
situation, we calculate the structural balance for Germany in 1991-2009.
The structural balance measures what the balance of tax revenue less government spend-
ing would be if the actual output is equal to the potential output.
We follow the definition given in Giorno et al. [56] and Van den Noord [125] and extend
it by the residual tax category ctrr. The structural budget balance is the residual of the
actual budget balance and the cyclical balance.
The actual balance is defined as the difference of government tax revenue and govern-
ment spending. Moreover, the cyclical budget balance (Bcyc) is derived as a ratio of
potential output specified in the following equation—see, e.g., Van den Noord [125].
Bcyc =
1
Y
(
5∑
i=1
T di
(
1−
(
Y pot
Y
)oetci−1)
+XN
(
1−
(
Y pot
Y
)−1)
−Gd
(
1−
(
Y pot
Y
)oet−1))
, (4.9)
where Y pot is potential output, T di is the tax revenue of the 5 tax categories personal
income taxes, social security contributions, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes, and
the residual term ctrr. oetci denotes the output elasticity of tax category i derived in
Subsection 4.3.1. Gd is government spending excluding capital and interest spending and
oet is the output elasticity of transfers. XN denotes the non tax revenues less interest
on debt and net capital outlays—see Giorno et al. [56] and Van den Noord [125]. As
before, Y is the GDP.
Figure 4.8 shows the actual, the calculated structural, and the cyclical budget balance
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as ratio of the actual GDP and the potential output.13
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Figure 4.8: The Actual, Structural, and Cyclical Budget Balance
The cyclical balance fluctuates around the zero line. Starting with negative values for
1991-1999, it turns positive between 2000 and 2002 and becomes negative once again
for the remaining plotted periods. There is a sharp decline in the cyclical balance from
2008 onwards due to the financial crisis.
The structural balance fluctuates around the actual balance. It lies above the actual
balance for all periods with a negative cyclical balance. This holds per definition. After
a decline in 1991-1995, the structural balance rises till 2001, falls again till 2003, and
highly rises till 2008. The highest values are obtained between 2005-2008. In this period,
the tax revenue rises due to a positive development of the German economic activities.
In 2009, government expenditures sharply rise such that the structural balance sharply
decreases and stays negative onwards. The dramatic rise in government spending and
the sharp reduction of tax revenue at the end of 2008 has been already discussed with
Figure 4.6.
The results for 1991-2002 are qualitatively comparable to those stated in the OECD
13There is an outlier in the data for the overall revenue of the government in 2003 quarter 3. We
correct this value in the data series.
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Economic Outlook No. 74 [103]. The OECD study examines the period 1980-2002 and
offers only aggregated results for the large Euro-Area countries France, Germany, and
Italy. Thus, the results cannot be quantitatively the same, e.g., because of the special
role the reunification plays for Germany. But qualitatively, the cyclical balance in per-
cent of potential output shows a comparable structure. The cyclical balance becomes
negative in 1993 in the OECD study, whereas it is negative since 1991 in our study.
The reunification causes this difference. Moreover, the cyclical balance is positive for
1999-2001 in both studies and negative again for the remaining year 2002. For most
periods, the qualitative results are the same in both studies.
The highest value for the cyclical balance is 0.99% in our study, whereas it is about 1.2%
for the OECD study. Thus, the results are not very different. One reason for discrepan-
cies is the dependence of the results on the estimate for potential output, which has to
be different.14 The structural balance derived as the residual of the actual and the cycli-
cal balance reaches the highest value in 1999/2000 if we compare the overlapping time
horizon examined in both studies. We obtain a value of -2.905% of the potential output
for the structural balance when the cyclical balance reaches its maximum, whereas the
OECD estimates a value of about -1%.
Finally, we analyze the fiscal stance of Germany in 1991-2009. First, the development of
the output gap is studied to assess the position in the business cycle. Then, we exam-
ine if the German government conducts a pro- or countercyclical fiscal policy. Defining
cyclical downturns of the economy as the years in which changes in the output gap are
non-positive relative to the previous year value, we identify 1992, 1998, 2001-2005 and
2007-2009 as cyclical downturns. These points in time are similar to the ones found in
the OECD study [103]. To evaluate the fiscal stance of the German policy makers, we
compare changes in the structural budget balance to changes in the output gap.15 A fall
in the structural budget balance means that government expenditures are raised more
14See the discussion above about the effect of different labor shares in the calculation of potential
output.
15There is a variety of measures for the fiscal stance. For further information see the IMF Pamphlet
Series No. 49 [70].
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than tax revenues are lowered. Thus, a decrease or increase in the structural balance
is equal to an expansionary or restrictive policy, respecively. Fiscal policy can be pro-
or countercyclical. Countercyclicality is defined as a situation where fluctuations in the
structural budget balance move in the same direction as the output gap, i.e., towards
surplus in an upswing or towards deficit in a downturn. See also the OECD study [103].
In 1992, the output gap is smaller than in 1991. Furthermore, the structural budget
balance falls. Thus, Germany acts countercyclically by following an expansionary fiscal
policy. For 1993-1997, the output gap changes are positive; the structural budget balance
falls till 1995 and rises afterwards. The fiscal policy responds pro-cyclically in 1993-1995
and countercyclically in 1995-1997: the upswing in 1993-1995 is accompanied by an ex-
pansionary policy, whereas it is followed by a restrictive policy for 1995-1997. Moreover,
in 1998, the structural budget balance rises. As a consequence, the fiscal stance is pro-
cyclical. For 1999-2000, the structural budget balance falls such that Germany follows a
pro-cyclical policy by conducting an expansionary policy in an upswing. We identified
a downturn in 2001-2005. In the first one to two years of this period a countercyclical
policy takes place followed by a pro-cyclical policy for the last three to four years. In
2006-2008, fiscal policy responds more or less countercyclically to the business cycle:
2006 was found to be an economic upswing period, whereas 2007-2008 was identified as
a downturn. Since the change in the structural balance is positive in 2006 and weakly
negative for 2007-2008, an upswing is accompanied by a contractionary policy and the
downturn in 2007-2008 by a weak expansionary policy. When the economic crisis be-
comes more and more severe in 2009, the structural budget balance strongly falls. The
policy makers pursue an intense expansionary policy, see the huge economic stimulus
packages in the end of 2008 (package I) and the beginning of 2009 (package II).
Overall, we find the German fiscal stance to be pro-cyclical for most parts of 1991-2000.
This coincides with the results found for the three large Euro-Area countries in 1991-
2002, see the OECD Economic Outlook No. 74 [103]. Frankel et al. [51] come to the
same conclusion (for 1960-1999) using the correlation coefficient between the cyclical
components of real government expenditure and real GDP as valuation basis. For 2001-
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2009, fiscal policy is mainly countercyclical. Also in this case, Frankel et al. [51] find the
same result. They examine the time horizon 2000-2009. During challenging economic
situations (e.g., 2008-2009), the countercyclicality of fiscal policy in Germany is clearly
detectable, also after the entry to the European Monetary Union.
Figure 4.9 summarizes this result:
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Figure 4.9: The Fiscal Stance in Germany for 1991-2009
Overall, the following is observed:
Result 4.5. Fiscal Policy in 1991-2009
The fiscal stance in 1991-2000 is mostly pro-cyclical. For 2001-2009, fiscal policy
is conducted increasingly countercyclically. Moreover, during challenging economic
situations as severe economic downturns, fiscal policy reacts strongly countercyclically
for the whole analyzed period 1991-2009.
4.4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the fiscal policy situation in Germany between 1991-2009 in the under-
lying study. Potential output was calculated by applying the OECD production function
approach to the business sector. Actual output lies below its potential level except for
the periods 2000-2002. The study derived the elasticities of government expenditures
and net taxes with respect to output and prices using quarterly data. The calculated
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output elasticity of net taxes is significantly larger than those found by former studies
with a different time horizon. Thus, changes in output seem to have a stronger impact
on net taxes for the last 20 years.
The output elasticities of different tax categories as personal income taxes, social secu-
rity contributions, or indirect taxes do not differ strongly from elasticities derived with
annual data for a comparable time horizon. Hence, the fluctuations caught in quarterly
data do not seem to matter in the context of the reaction intensity. Finally, the fiscal
stance of Germany has been analyzed and we found that fiscal policy in Germany is
pro-cyclical for most parts of 1991-2000. This behavior changes in 2001-2009. The latter
subperiod indicates mostly a countercyclical fiscal policy. The fiscal behavior coincides
with Keynesian economics at least for severe economic downturns: during challenging
economic situations as the financial crisis, the policy decision is found to be counter-
cyclical for the whole analyzed time period 1991-2009.
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Chapter 5
Fiscal Shocks in Germany - An
SVAR Approach
5.1 Introduction
The question of how intensely fiscal policy affects an economy is more relevant than
ever. In times of the financial crisis and large economic stimulus packages to support the
business cycle, the first point of interest is the effectiveness of an increase in government
expenditure. At the same time the ever lasting discussion of the impact due to a change
in government expenditures or due to a change in government revenues gains more and
more importance. In other words, which fiscal policy instrument is preferable?
With the very high debt in some European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries,
an additional question emerges: are there spill-over effects of fiscal policy of one EMU
member country to another? The underlying study gives answers to these questions. As
a special issue for Germany, the impact of fiscal policy on exports as a main part of the
GDP is examined in particular.
We analyze the effect of fiscal shocks on real variables in an economy. In this context,
fiscal shocks are changes in government expenditure and revenues, i.e., fiscal policy ac-
tions. One main approach to study these effects is the analysis of special consolidation
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periods in an economy. The economic performance before, in, and after the special fiscal
situation is compared (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti [4] or Alesina and Ardagna [3]).
Another approach examines the response of economic variables to fiscal shocks during a
long period of time and not in the manner of a case study. The Vector Auto-Regression
(VAR) or the Structural VAR (SVAR) are used as methodology.1 The identification of
independent fiscal shocks is the strongest challenge within the analysis. In general, fiscal
shocks always depend on other variables. Thus, if fiscal variables and other real variables
are estimated in a VAR framework, the resulting residuals are not independent of each
other and have to be reestimated to identify independent fiscal shocks. There are differ-
ent methods to identify these shocks. Fata´s and Mihov [47] use a Choleski ordering of the
variables in this context. Mountford and Uhlig [100] identify fiscal shocks by setting sign
restrictions on the responses of economic variables to fiscal shocks. A different approach
is that of Blanchard and Perotti [21] who assume that a frequency of quarterly data is
too short for a response of the fiscal variables to changes in output. This assumption is
crucial in the identification process of shocks because cross-dependencies are excluded.
In detail, they calculate the cyclically adjusted residuals of a VAR estimation by using
institutional information, i.e., output and price elasticities of the fiscal variables. Then,
the authors regress the obtained cyclically adjusted residual of one fiscal variable on the
VAR residual of the second fiscal variable to obtain independent residuals for both fiscal
variables.
There are only few studies for Germany using an SVAR framework to evaluate the impact
of fiscal policy on other economic variables. De Arcangelis and Lamartina [39] analyze
West Germany. They compare the responses of economic variables to fiscal shocks under
the assumption of different policy regimes, i.e., policy makers who first decide what to
spend and then come to a tax decision and vice versa. An overidentified SVAR model is
estimated in the study and the interest rate, the price level, the output level, and three
fiscal variables, in particular, government expenditure for wages and transfers, other
1For a critical discussion of the VAR methodology, in particular, the inability of an SVAR model to
account for the actual economic situation, see Parker [106].
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government expenditure, and current revenue, are included as variables. They find that
mostly government expenditure decisions are taken first but that expenditures do not
seem to play a significant role for the dynamics of output because the estimates of the
corresponding output responses are statistically insignificant with very low estimated
coefficients. Overall, output and private consumption respond in a Keynesian way to
expenditure and tax shocks but with low multipliers and if statistically significant then
only weakly.
Ho¨ppner [64] examines fiscal shocks in a VAR framework. The endogenous variables
of the model are government expenditure, government revenue, and GDP or govern-
ment expenditures, revenues, private disposable income as well as private consumption.
Ho¨ppner detects that the economic variables respond in a Keynesian way to fiscal shocks
and finds that fiscal policy is not a useful tool for a stabilization policy due to the small
and weakly statistically significant estimation results.
Heppke-Falk et al. [61] use real GDP, the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate,
government expenditure, and government net revenue as variables for the SVAR model.
They take quarterly data for 1974-2008 in Germany. The economic variables respond
in a Keynesian way to fiscal shocks. Moreover, a government spending shock is found
to affect output in a statistically significant way, whereas the estimates of the output
response to a net tax shock are not statistically significant. Moreover, shocks in expen-
diture affect the economic variables only for a short time horizon after the occurrence
of the shock. The authors find that the point estimate of output to a fiscal shock is low
suggesting a weak effect of fiscal policy on output.
Breuer and Buettner [25] analyze fiscal shocks in an SVAR setting. They identify fiscal
shocks by changes in tax laws for 1967-2008 and find statistically significant short-term
effects of fiscal policy on economic variables. Finally, they forecast the response of out-
put to the latest stimulus programme, which, based on their results, had a statistically
significant short run effect on output.
The previous studies only examine economic variables within Germany. Trade or ex-
change rate variables are considered in the following field of research. Assuming some
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policy coordination between the government and the central bank, Palacios-Salguero
[105] examines the effect of monetary and fiscal shocks on the exchange rate for Ger-
many in 1974-1998, i.e., before the European Monetary Union (EMU). He finds that an
unexpected shock in government spending causes the German currency to appreciate.
Giuliodori and Beetsma [57] analyze the cross-border spill-over effects of fiscal policy
shocks in an SVAR model framework for 1970-1998. They implement government ex-
penditures and revenues, GDP, the inflation, the interest, and the exchange rate as well
as imports from EMU member countries as endogenous variables to decide whether fis-
cal shocks of one country have international spill-overs or not. The imports connect the
domestic country directly with foreign countries via the import-export channel: every
imported good is exported by another country. The shocks are not identified with in-
stitutional information; all fiscal rule parameters are left unrestricted. Identification is
based on a Choleski decomposition. In a second setting, the authors include the interest
rate and the exchange rate as exogenous variables to simulate a situation with perfect
EMU behavior. For the latter model framework, they find that a fiscal coordination in
the EMU is of some help due to the obtained tendencies that there indeed exist spill-over
effects of one country on the exports of another country.
We follow the SVAR approach. Since our aim is to analyze the effect of fiscal shocks
on the economy without predictions for the direction of response after a shock, we do
not use sign restrictions2 but choose the identification method introduced by Blanchard
and Perotti [21]. Quarterly data are used for all calculations of the study. All data are
real and seasonally adjusted.3 Methodologically, Structural VAR (SVAR) models are
used. We analyze different model settings and start with the baseline model similar to
that of Blanchard and Perotti [21] who only examine the US. Thus, taxes, government
spending, and the GDP in logs and per capita are introduced as model variables. We
augment the set of model variables in the course of the study. The first model variation
2The sign restriction approach solves the structural identification problem, but does not solve the
model identification problem (there are many models with the same identified parameters fitting in the
same way to the data). For more details, see Fry and Pagan [52].
3For more information on the data, their sources, and their time horizons see Appendix B.1.
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additionally includes the inflation and the interest rate—see for example Perotti [108] or
Heppke-Falk et al. [61]. In the second model variation, we add imports from European
Monetary Union member countries and the real effective exchange rate to evaluate pos-
sible spill-over effects of the German fiscal policy. Within this setup, we examine two
scenarios. First, all 7 variables are implemented as endogenous variables and second, we
treat the exchange rate and the interest rate as exogenous variables. The last variation
is based on the assumption that the EMU works perfectly. The interest rate and the
exchange rate channel are switched off in that case. Implicitly, it is assumed that the
European Central Bank sets one interest rate for the whole monetary union and that the
monetary policy decisions are independent of the fiscal policy of single member countries.
Moreover, there is only one common currency within the EMU such that the exchange
rate is not affected by shocks in one national fiscal policy.
Overall, the effect of fiscal shocks on different model variables and the robustness of these
effects are examined. Moreover, we want to decide, which economic theory matches best
the empirical findings. Since for example consumption responds qualitatively different
under New Classical or New Keynesian theory (positive to a positive government ex-
penditure shock under consideration of New Keynesian theory and negative with New
Classical theory), single components of the GDP as private consumption or investment
are included and the respective impulse responses are analyzed. Special attention is paid
to the response of exports due to fiscal shocks because exports play an important role
for Germany and fiscal spill-over effects of national fiscal policy on other countries can
be studied.
Our main findings are that the overall deficit rises due to a positive shock in government
expenditure and declines due to a positive net tax shock. This fits to economic theory.
Changing net taxes is a more effective instrument in affecting deficits in the short run,
whereas varying government expenditure influences deficits more strongly in the medium
run. A positive shock in government expenditure lowers output after a while. Moreover,
a positive shock in the net tax revenue affects output negatively. Overall, the estimated
multipliers are small such that fiscal policy does not seem to be a strong instrument
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in stabilizing output. Private consumption, investment, and exports diminish due to a
rise in government expenditure. Furthermore, exports decline if net taxes are raised.
Imports from EMU countries decrease due to the two fiscal shocks. Thus, we detect
spill-overs of German fiscal policy to foreign countries. A fiscal coordination within the
EMU may be helpful to stabilize the economic standing of the EMU.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we shortly
describe the VAR approach in general and the shock identification method used in the
study. In the third to fifth section, we describe model setups with different sets of en-
dogenous and exogenous variables. The estimation results are presented for each model
setting separately. In the sixth section, the results, which are robust across all model
variations are summarized and possible explanation approaches of the empirical findings
are discussed. The last section draws conclusions.
5.2 The SVAR and its Identification Method
The German economic situation in 1991-2009 as a basis for the underlying study is of
some interest to evaluate the quality of the VAR estimation. Thus, we look at the data.
First, we perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to detect possible unit roots
in the data. A selection of data plots can be found in Appendix C.2. All data plots
except of the respective ones for the inflation rate and the real effective exchange rate
clearly show an upward or downward trend in the data. Since the data plots indicate
that there is a trend, we follow Heij, de Boer et al [60] and include additional to a
constant a deterministic trend term in the test equation. If the trend term is omitted
in the case of a trend in the data, the null hypothesis of a unit root, i.e., a stochastic
trend, will not be rejected in nearly every scenario. In general, the null hypothesis of a
unit root cannot be rejected if the test statistic exceeds the critical value.
For the net tax revenue and the government spending, we cannot reject the Null of a
unit root in the data. Furthermore, a unit root is detected in the data series for the
GDP, which corresponds to recent expectations. The data series of all components of
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GDP, i.e., private and government consumption, investment, exports and imports, im-
ports from member countries of the European Monetary Union, and the real effective
exchange rate4 contain a unit root.5 Contrary to most other data series, the inflation
rates stayed at a low level for the last 20 years—see Figure C.6 of Appendix C.2. The
test statistic for the inflation rate leads to no rejection of the unit root hypothesis. More-
over, a unit root is found in the interest rate data series. To summarize, the unit root
hypothesis is not rejected for all data series but the Null of a unit root is rejected for all
first differences data series such that the data are I(1).
At least one cointegration relation is found by applying the Johansen trace and eigen-
value test for all model variations (combinations of model variables) examined in the
underlying study. Following Sims et al. [120] and Lu¨tkepohl and Reimers [92], the esti-
mates of the (log) level VAR are consistent since the data series are nonstationary and
cointegrated.
We now turn to the description of the general model setting. The reduced form Vector
Auto-Regression model (VAR) can be written as
~Xt = A(L) ~Xt−1 + ~Ut. (5.1)
~Xt denotes the vector including all endogenous variables as net tax revenue, government
spending, and GDP in the baseline model. A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L
and ~Ut is the vector of reduced form residuals. Additionally, we include several terms as
a constant or a trend.
We estimate all model specifications with a deterministic, a log quadratic, and a stochas-
tic trend. Due to the very similar results of a log quadratic trend to a linear trend, we
suppress the results for this model variation. We follow Bhaskara [18] concerning the
implementation of a stochastic trend. Seasonal dummies and, for the seven variables
model, an exogenous variables component are added to the set of regression variables.
4Because the real effective exchange rate does not show a unique trend—see Figure C.9 in Appendix
C.2—we cross-check our results by including a deterministic trend or not in the ADF-test. Both test
results lead to no rejection of the unit root hypothesis.
5For robustness of results, we add regressors up to 4 lags. The null hypothesis of a unit root is not
rejected for all scenarios.
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These terms are omitted for simplicity in equation (5.1).
To determine the optimal lag length of the VAR model, we apply a likelihood-ratio test
(LR), the Akaike (AIC), and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The maximum
lag order is set to 10. The optimal lag order for all model variations found by the three
methods lies between 1 and 6. For comparability, we choose the same lag order for all
model specifications. Since a lag order of 4 seems to be a natural choice when using
quarterly data, it is set to 4 for all model variations.
So far, we finish the pre-estimation tests and estimate the respective VAR model. After
conducting a VAR-estimation, the obtained residuals for the two fiscal policy parame-
ters are linear combinations of different influences: an automatic, a systematic, and a
random response to changes in the other variables of the model—see also Blanchard and
Perotti [21].
The random components of the fiscal variable residuals (government expenditure and
net taxes) are not correlated with other structural shocks. Thus, they can be used to
estimate the model variables’ impulse responses to innovations in the fiscal variables.
How the identification procedure of the random components continues is explained in
detail for each model specification in the three following sections. In the following, ev-
ery variable x that is given as log per capita variable is labeled with x¨.6 Besides the
identification, the theoretical foundations of the estimation technique and the estimated
results are described for each model. Furthermore, different model setups are compared.
The last section checks for robustness in a general manner, discusses, and tries to explain
the results, which are robust for all model specifications.
5.3 The Baseline Model
Following Blanchard and Perotti [21], the log government spending per capita, g¨, ap-
proximated by the sum of government consumption and the gross fixed capital formation
in the government sector, the log tax revenue per capita, t¨, and the log GDP per capita,
6Small letters denote a variable in logarithms.
160
CHAPTER 5. FISCAL SHOCKS IN GERMANY - AN SVAR APPROACH
y¨, are chosen as endogenous variables of the model. Thus, ~Xt, the vector of endogenous
variables is equal to ~Xt =
[
g¨t t¨t y¨t
]′
.
The corresponding vector of residuals after the VAR-estimation is ~Ut =
[
ugt u
t
t u
y
t
]′
.
We rank government spending first, net taxes second, and output last. The underlying
fiscal rules determining the cross-effects of one variable to the other variables are de-
scribed in the following.7
Each residual of the three variables can be described as the linear combination of the
other residuals and structural shocks for selected variables. Thus, w.l.o.g., the following
equations hold:
ug = αgyu
y + βgte
t + eg,
ut = αtyu
y + βtge
g + et, and
uy = αytu
t + αygu
g + ey,
where αgy = 0 denotes the output elasticity of government expenditures and αty = 2.0857
is the output elasticity of net taxes calculated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1. The output
elasticities are derived independently of the model specification and reflect institutional
information.
αyt and αyg clarify the influence of net taxes and government spending on output, re-
spectively. uj is the residual for a variable j ∈ {g, t, y} found in the VAR estimation
and ej is the corresponding structural shock. The structural shocks are uncorrelated:
cov(ei, ej) = 0 for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {g, t, y}.
To identify the structural shocks of the model, we calculate the cyclically adjusted resid-
ual of government spending and the net tax revenue residual, which are linear combina-
tions of the uncorrelated structural fiscal shocks:
ug,CA = ug − αgyu
y = βgte
t + eg,
ut,CA = ut − αtyu
y = βtge
g + et.
Following Perotti [108] and Blanchard and Perotti [21], we assume w.l.o.g. that βtg = 0
holds. For robustness of results, we cross-check our results by assuming that βgt = 0. The
7For a variation of the ordering of variables and its implications, see also Caldara and Kamps [31].
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results were not far from the ones obtained with βtg = 0. Thus, the chosen identification
method does not seem to significantly matter. In particular, with βtg = 0, it holds that
ut,CA = et and ug,CA = βgte
t + eg. The structural shock et for net taxes is equal to the
cyclically adjusted residual ut,CA = ut − αtyu
y calculated with the residuals obtained
from the VAR estimation and the output elasticity of net taxes αty. An OLS-regression
of et on ug,CA provides estimates for the coefficient βgt and the structural shock e
g of
government expenditure because ug,CA = βgte
t + eg. Hence, the two structural fiscal
shocks are identified with this procedure.
Finally, the coefficients αyg and αyt as well as the structural shock e
y in the original
equation uy = αytu
t + αygu
g + ey have to be identified. Since the two structural shocks
of government expenditure and net taxes, eg and et, are independent, they can be used
as instruments in an instrumental variable (IV) estimation for the correlated residuals ug
and ut obtained from the VAR. We find estimates for αyt, αyg, and e
y after performing
the IV estimation.
The overall relationship between the residuals uj and the structural shocks ej for j ∈
{g, t, y} can be written in matrix form as:
~C1 ~U = ~C2 ~E
1 0 −αgy
0 1 −αty
−αyg −αyt 1


ug
ut
uy
 =

1 βgt 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


eg
et
ey
 , (5.2)
where ~U = [ug, ut, uy]′ and ~E = [eg, et, ey]′. Thus, the underlying model is a so called
AB-model described in Amisano and Giannini [5]. For further information see also
Breitung, Bru¨ggemann, and Lu¨tkepohl [24].
After identifying the structural shocks of the model variables, we analyze the impulse
responses of log government expenditure per capita, log net taxes per capita, and log
output per capita to one unit positive shocks in the government expenditure and in
the net tax revenue, respectively. For robust impulse responses, we perform a Monte
Carlo simulation taking 500 draws from the distribution of the reduced form residuals.
Residuals equally distributed as the original ui residuals for i ∈ {g, t, y} are randomly
162
CHAPTER 5. FISCAL SHOCKS IN GERMANY - AN SVAR APPROACH
chosen to create new time series. Next step is to carry out an impulse response analysis
for the new data series. Finally, we save the impulse responses for all 500 replications
and choose the 10% error band.8
The following subsections present the results for the baseline model setting including
government expenditure, net taxes, and output as variables. Sensitivity is tested by
varying the model setup, e.g., by implementing a deterministic and a stochastic trend
(Section 5.3.1), or by splitting the period for 1991-2009 into two subsamples 1991-1998
and 1999-2009. The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) plays a role
in the 7 variables VAR model in Section 5.5. For better comparability of results, we split
the sample into the two time periods before and after the integration of Germany into
the EMU. The first sample only contains 32 data points such that we abstain from a
discussion of the first subsample due to the small overall sample size and the associated
problems.
We add components of the GDP (private and government consumption, investment,
exports, and imports) to our model setting (Subsection 5.3.2) to discuss, which economic
theory matches best the empirical results and what effects arise on the trade variables
imports and especially exports in the occurrence of fiscal shocks.
5.3.1 Different Model Specifications
A Structural VAR including three endogenous variables, g¨, t¨, and y¨ is estimated, dif-
fering between two settings. First, we include a deterministic trend (DT) and second a
stochastic trend (ST) in the set of model regressors. Moreover, a constant is added for
both scenarios. We implement seasonal dummies for all model variations—see Perotti
[108] and Blanchard and Perotti [21]. Since the implementation of a fourth seasonal
dummy would make no sense because of the linear dependence of the seasonal dummies
and the constant, we only add seasonal dummies for the first three quarters of a year—
see also LeSage [84].
As described above, we find the coefficients βgt, αyg, and αyt via OLS and IV estimation
8For more information on the difficulties concerning error bands, see Sims and Zao [121].
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after the VAR estimation. The results of a Portmanteau test on autocorrelation suggest
that there is no autocorrelation in the VAR estimation.9 Moreover, we do not find any
autocorrelation in the OLS and the IV estimation.
The point estimates are shown in Table 5.1. The number in brackets is the value of the
t-statistic.
Since βgt shows the relationship of the structural shock in net taxes to the cyclically
adjusted residual of government spending, a positive change in net taxes lowers the
cyclically adjusted government spending. The estimate is statistically insignificant and
very small in size. αyg and αyt reflect the impact of government spending and net taxes
on output, respectively. Note that αyg and αyt only show the effect of the correlated
residuals of government spending and net taxes on output and not the effect of the re-
spective structural shocks.
Variable DT ST
βgt -0.083 (-1.5829) -0.077 (-1.477)
αyg 0.171** (2.329) 0.17** (2.215)
αyt -0.201** (-4.221) -0.221** (-4.349)
* and ** denote statistical significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.
Table 5.1: Results for the Baseline Model
A government spending shock affects output positively, whereas a change in net taxes
affects output negatively. The results for the regressors10 do not vary strongly for the
model variations including a stochastic and a deterministic trend.11
We perform a Granger-causality test between government expenditure, net taxes, and
output. In general, a variable x is Granger-causal for a variable z if z can be predicted
more efficiently when adding the information on the x process to the information set
than without any information on x. For more information, see Lu¨tkepohl [91]. Output
does not Granger-cause government spending, but taxes have a Granger-causal impact
9For more information on the Portmanteau test see, e.g., Lu¨tkepohl [91].
10We round all results off to three decimal places.
11In the VAR estimation, the stochastic and the deterministic time trend is statistically insignificant.
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on government spending. Moreover, we cannot reject the Null of a Granger-causal rela-
tionship of government spending and output on net taxes for a 5% statistical significance
level. Finally, no Granger-causality is found between net taxes and government expen-
diture on output.
Next, we analyze the impulse responses to fiscal shocks. After a Monte Carlo simulation
with 500 draws, the following point estimates (the median values) for the responses to
fiscal shocks in time period 0 (the ad hoc response) and the overall effect in period 1 are
obtained. In general, the overall effect for period t can be found by summing up the ad
hoc response and the period response for all periods up to t.
Variable G - 0 G - 1 T - 0 T - 1 T1 - 0 T1 - 1
irg 1* 1.429* -0.084* -0.135 -0.122* -0.198
irt 0.253* 0.531 0.685* 0.926* 1* 1.351*
irdef 0.747* 0.898* -0.769* -1.062* -1.122* -1.55*
irt,CA 0* 0.24* 1* 1.604* 1.459* 2.343*
iry 0.122* 0.135 -0.151* -0.325* -0.22* -0.475*
m 0.122* 0.095 -0.229* -0.351* -0.22* -0.352*
mCA 0.122* 0.095 -0.151* -0.203* -0.151* -0.203*
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.2: Influence of a Spending and a Tax Shock - Baseline Model
The left third of Table 5.2 shows the estimated effects of the model variables due to a
positive one unit spending shock. The remaining part consists of the corresponding es-
timated effects due to a positive tax shock. The tax shock does not have 1 unit strength
on taxes if a one unit change in net taxes is implemented because output immediately
decreases and automatically lowers the influence of the positive tax shock on taxes. The
Granger-causality test already suggested that there is an impact of output on net taxes.
The columns marked with “T” are the results for a tax shock with the intensity that
arises endogenously from the model. The columns marked with “T1” denote the results
for a tax shock normalized to one unit intensity.
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The impulse response coefficients of government expenditure, net taxes, and output are
denoted as irg, irt, and iry, respectively. The deficit response irdef is defined as the
difference of the impulse response of government spending and of net taxes to the par-
ticular fiscal shock (irdef = irg − irt). The impulse response of the cyclically adjusted
government spending irg,CA is equal to the response of government spending, because
we assume in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, that the output elasticity of government ex-
penditure αgy is zero and thus, ir
g,CA = irg − αgyir
y = irg. As a consequence, it is
suppressed in Table 5.2. We define the response of cyclically adjusted taxes irt,CA as
irt,CA = irt−αtyir
y. αty is the output elasticity of net taxes—see Section 4.3.1 of Chap-
ter 4. The last two rows of the table show the quarterly multipliers and the quarterly
cyclically adjusted multipliers. In this context, the government spending and the tax
shock multiplier are defined as the ratio of the impulse response of output to the im-
pulse response of government spending iry/irg and taxes iry/irt, respectively. Similarly,
the cyclically adjusted multiplier is the ratio of the impulse response of output to the
cyclically adjusted impulse response of government spending iry/irg,CA = iry/irg and
net taxes iry/irt,CA.
The statistically significant estimates are labeled with an asterisk. Statistical significance
at a 10% statistical significance level is fulfilled if the zero line does not lie in the interval
of the 10% and 90% error band of the 500 Monte Carlo simulations in a graph including
the impulse response curves. Since the estimators in the two model variations with a
deterministic or a stochastic time trend are quantitatively and qualitatively closely the
same, we only list the results for the deterministic trend variation in detail.
Most of the estimates shown in Table 5.2 are statistically significant at a 10% statisti-
cal significance level. Per definition, the government spending shock affects government
spending with 1 unit strength. Due to cross-effects, government expenditure rises even
more after one period. Since a rise in government expenditure corresponds to expan-
sionary fiscal policy, output increases and thus, also taxes increase. Both effects are
strengthened after one period (the impulse responses are even larger one period after
the occurrence of the shock in government expenditure). The rise in revenue due to a
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rise in output cannot compensate for the increased expenditure of the fiscal authority.
As a consequence, the overall deficit reacts positively to a government spending shock.
Debt is raised by the expansionary fiscal policy. The effect becomes even stronger one
period after the change in expenditure. In the first period of simulation, the cyclically
adjusted tax response to a government spending shock is 0,12 whereas it becomes posi-
tive for the second period. A rise in government spending by one unit implies a rise in
output by 0.122 units when the shock occurs. After one period, the multiplier decreases
to 0.095.13 Since the cyclically adjusted government spending response is equal to the
original government spending impulse response, the cyclically adjusted expenditure mul-
tiplier is equal to the originally calculated multiplier: the last two rows of Table 5.2 are
the same for a government spending shock.
If we consider a positive shock in net taxes, output decreases due to the contractionary
fiscal policy. Since the effect on taxes strengthens one period after the shock, output
decreases even more. Moreover, government spending decreases (with increasing inten-
sity for the first two simulated periods). As a consequence, the overall deficit reacts
negatively to a net tax shock. The rise in net taxes lowers the deficit and the decrease
in government expenditure strengthens this effect additionally. Thus, debt is reduced
by the contractionary policy. In the first simulation period, the cyclically adjusted tax
response is 1 for a tax shock if we do not normalize the shock (columns marked with
“T”). The interdependency with output is switched off by the cyclical adjustment. After
one period, cyclically adjusted net taxes increase even more. The multipliers for the last
four corresponding columns are the same as we only consider two different intensities of
tax shocks. A rise in taxes by one unit lowers output by 0.229 units. The multiplier
becomes larger for the second simulated period because all responses are stronger at this
point in time. The cyclically adjusted multipliers show a smaller impact of the shock on
output as the regularly calculated multiplier. This is caused by the fact that the cyclical
12This follows from the model specification, i.e., the ordering of variables.
13The quarterly multipliers only have a small size compared to Perotti [108], but we examine a different
time horizon and use a different model setting by omitting the interest and the inflation rate in our
baseline model.
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adjustment already switches off cross-effects.
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse responses after a fiscal shock if a deterministic trend (DT)
is implemented as regressor in the VAR model. Contrary, Figure 5.2 shows the respec-
tive impulse responses if a stochastic trend (ST) is added as regressor. The upper row
of graphs consists of the responses of government expenditure, net taxes, and output
to a positive one unit shock in government spending, whereas the lower row shows the
estimated effect to a one unit net tax shock. The dash-dotted lines are the 10% and 90%
statistical significance error bands. The solid blue line is the median value of the 500
draws obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation (the point estimate). If the zero line
lies between the error bands, the point estimate of the impulse response is statistically
insignificant.
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Figure 5.1: Impulse Responses to Fiscal Shocks (DT) - Baseline Model
As already indicated in Table 5.2, all responses of the model variables to a fiscal shock
in period 0 except the point estimate of government spending to a net tax shock are
statistically significant. The impulse responses to a government spending shock are very
similar for both model variations. If a tax shock hits the system, taxes decline after
a while due to the sharp decrease in output for the stochastic trend model. Contrary,
output only responds smoothly to a positive tax shock in the deterministic trend model.
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For robustness, we also cross-check the model with linear deterministic trend (DT) by
implementing a log quadratic deterministic trend. The results are qualitatively, more or
less quantitatively, and concerning the statistical significance closely the same.
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Figure 5.2: Impulse Responses to Fiscal Shocks (ST) - Baseline Model
Similar to Blanchard and Perotti [21], the positive ad hoc response of output to a gov-
ernment expenditure shock is followed by a sharp decline and a repeated increase after
a while. Since the estimated ad hoc multiplier is larger in the Blanchard/Perotti study,
our impulse response curve is shifted downwards such that the minimum of the curve
lies in the negative quadrant. The negative estimates are not statistically significant.
If taxes are raised, output responds statistically significantly negatively. The estimated
multiplier is higher than for a comparable shock in government expenditure. For both
model variations, the impulse response of government spending to a spending shock,
the response of taxes to a tax shock and the response of output to a tax shock stay
statistically significant for at least 3 periods after the occurrence of the shock.
The main difference of the two model specifications is the estimated effect of taxes to a
positive net tax shock. For a stochastic trend scenario, taxes undershoot the zero line
after a one unit tax shock. The responses to the tax shock are estimated with higher
absolute values for all three variables including a stochastic trend. Moreover, output
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responds with a long lasting decline in the stochastic trend model. In contrast, output
reacts similarly to a government spending shock for both model variations.
We cannot state long run implications due to the existence of unit roots when performing
an SVAR in levels because the long run estimates tend to random variables and not to
the true impulse response. See, e.g., Phillips [109]. As a consequence, we focus on the
short- to medium-lived responses up to 12 periods after the occurrence of the shocks.
The cumulative impulse response of government expenditure, net taxes, and output are
calculated by adding up the period impulse responses for the model variables and then
choosing the median value. The sum of the impulse responses gives the entire impact of
a shock on the respective variable because the VAR model is estimated in levels.
From a mathematical point of view, an accumulated impulse response is equal to the
integral of the point estimate curve. Note that the accumulated median values of the
point estimates do not have to be equal to the median value of the accumulated point
estimates, i.e., the integral curve. To annualize, we divide the sum of the quarterly
responses by 4—see Perotti [108]. The annualized cumulative responses of the model
variables to fiscal shocks are listed in the following two tables.
Table 5.3 shows the results for a government spending shock if a deterministic (left half
of the table) or a stochastic shock (right half of the table) is implemented. Moreover,
Table 5.4 includes the respective results for a positive one unit net tax shock. The
estimates for the 4th and the 8th time period (quarter) after the shock are shown.14
The responses of government spending (cirg), taxes (cirt), output (ciry) and cyclically
adjusted taxes (cirt,CA) are listed. Furthermore, we examine the cumulative response of
the overall deficit (cirdef ) defined as the difference between the cumulative response of
spending and taxes to the corresponding fiscal shock.
The last row of Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 denotes the cyclically adjusted spending and
the cyclically adjusted net tax multiplier, respectively. Similar to above, the multipliers
are defined as the ratio of the cumulative response of GDP to the cyclically adjusted
response of spending ciry/cirg,CA or net taxes ciry/cirt,CA for the same period.
14The shock takes place in period 0.
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We compare the deterministic trend model (DT) with the stochastic trend model (ST)
in Table 5.3 if a government spending shock occurs.
Variable DT-4 DT-8 ST-4 ST-8
cirg 0.499* 0.504* 0.517* 0.495*
cirt -0.02 -0.979 -0.065 -0.904
cirdef 0.519* 1.483* 0.581* 1.398*
cirt,CA 0.001 -0.62 0.007 -0.574*
ciry -0.01 -0.172 -0.034 -0.158
smCA -0.02 -0.341 -0.066 -0.319
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.3: Cumulative Responses to a Spending Shock for the Baseline Model
Since the positive response of output to a positive shock in government expenditure is
weak and only short lasting before becoming negative, the accumulated response of out-
put to a government spending shock is negative four and eight periods after the shock.
The cumulative response is statistically insignificant at the 10% statistical significance
level. Due to the negative output responses, tax revenue declines and the spending mul-
tipliers are negative, too.
After some periods, the expansion of spending causes a reduction in tax revenue. Hence,
the overall deficit rises over time. The annualized multipliers suggest that a positive
one unit spending shock lowers output by 0.02 units (DT) or 0.066 units (ST) after one
year and by 0.341 (DT) or 0.319 (ST) units after 8 periods. The estimated decline in
output after 8 quarters is smaller for the stochastic trend model. The results are not
statistically significant.
Table 5.4 shows the estimates due to a one unit tax shock. All statistically significant
annualized cumulative impulse responses, marked by an asterisk, have the same sign in
the model with deterministic and with stochastic trend.
Deficits decline due to an increase in net taxes. The estimates are statistically significant
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at a 10% statistical significance level and have a greater absolute value for the determin-
istic trend model.
Output declines due to a net tax shock. The estimated negative response 4 and 8 pe-
riods after the positive tax shock is statistically significant for both model variations.
Moreover, the tax multipliers are estimated to be statistically significantly negative with
relatively small values, e.g., compared to the results found by Bode et al. [22], especially
for a stochastic trend.
Variable DT-4 DT-8 ST-4 ST-8
cirg 0.015 -0.034 0.029 -0.065
cirt 0.488* 0.703* 0.317 0.069
cirdef -0.473* -0.737* -0.289 -0.134
cirt,CA 1.026* 1.26* 1.077* 1.49*
ciry -0.258* -0.267 -0.361* -0.681*
tmCA -0.251* -0.212 -0.335* -0.457*
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.4: Cumulative Responses to a Tax Shock for the Baseline Model
Overall, the deficit is affected positively by a positive government spending shock and
negatively by a positive tax shock. Even after 8 periods (2 years), there is a statistically
significant effect in the deterministic trend model. A rise in deficits is more intense after
some years for a government expenditure shock.
In both model settings, output reacts as expected in the first periods after the occurrence
of the respective shocks: it increases due to a positive shock in government expenditure.
However, it becomes negative after a while. If a positive shock (an increase) in taxes
occurs, output decreases. The tax multiplier is statistically significant and larger in size
than the expenditure multiplier for both model variations.
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show the accumulated impulse responses to a government spending
and a net tax shock for the deterministic and the stochastic trend model. A positive
slope in the figures means a positive value in the single variable accumulated response.
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This does not mean that the variable responds still more and more positively in the
respective period. The intensity of the estimated effect can diminish, i.e., the respective
period impulse response can have a negative slope lying in the positive quadrant at that
time.
As before, the first and the second row of each figure show the responses to a positive
government expenditure shock and the responses to a positive net tax shock, respec-
tively. Moreover, the dash-dotted lines are the 10% and the 90% error bands of the
impulse responses found with a Monte Carlo simulation including 500 draws, whereas
the solid lines denote the accumulated point estimates defined as the median values of
the accumulated period impulse responses for 500 draws.
Most accumulated impulse responses are statistically significant at time 0. Only the
response of spending to a spending shock, the response of taxes to a tax shock, and the
response of GDP to a tax shock stay statistically significant in the deterministic trend
case up to 12, 3, and 5 quarters, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Accumulated Impulse Responses (DT) - Baseline Model
The overall effect of a government spending shock on output for the deterministic trend
model is first positive, then becomes negative, but the estimate is not statistically sig-
nificant. The estimated overall output response after a net tax shock is statistically
significantly negative and lasting.
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Figure 5.4 shows the impulse responses to fiscal shocks if a stochastic trend is included
as regressor in the VAR model estimation. The responses to a net tax shock differ
qualitatively for the two model variations. If a stochastic trend is implemented, the
accumulated response of taxes become negative after a while, whereas they are positive
for the whole simulated period with deterministic trend. Moreover, the estimated overall
impact of a tax shock on output is stronger for the stochastic trend model and becomes
more and more intense over time.
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Figure 5.4: Accumulated Impulse Responses (ST) - Baseline Model
We summarize our results in the following.
Result 5.1. Expenditure vs. Net Tax Shock (Baseline Model)
• Output weakly rises due to a positive shock in government spending but declines
some periods after the shock and becomes negative. The negative response is
not statistically significant.
• Output declines statistically significantly due to a positive tax shock.
• All multipliers are estimated with small values.
• A shock in net taxes has an estimated higher impact on output as a comparable
shock in government spending and seems to be a more effective instrument in
stabilizing output in the short run.
• The overall deficit rises with an expansionary spending shock and declines if
taxes are raised. A rise in taxes lowers deficits more in the first periods after the
shock, but a reduction in government spending is more effective in the medium
run.
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For comparison, we split the whole time period for 1991-2009 into two parts; one part
before (1991-1998) and one part after the foundation of the European Monetary Union
(1999-2009). Due to small sample size problems and thus a lack of statistically signif-
icant results, we only compare the results of the second subsample with the results of
the overall sample presented above. The institutional information needed (the output
elasticities) are derived only for the subsample. The elasticity of net taxes with respect
to output is 1.0094 and thus smaller than for the whole period. The impact of a change
in output on net taxes seems to weaken after the German accession to the EMU.
Table 5.5 shows the estimated impulse responses at time zero. The first 2 columns are
the estimation results for a government spending shock, whereas the remaining columns
include the estimates for a net tax shock (the last tow columns assume a one unit tax
shock).15
Variable G - DT G - ST T - DT T - ST T1 - DT T1 - ST
irg 1* 1* -0.082 -0.072 -0.089 -0.08
irt -0.01 -0.034 0.916* 0.9* 1* 1*
irdef 1.01* 1.034* -0.998* -0.972* -1.089* -1.08*
irt,CA 0* 0* 1* 1* 1.092* 1.111*
iry -0.01 -0.034 -0.083 -0.099* -0.091 -0.11*
m -0.01 -0.034 -0.091 -0.11* -0.091 -0.11*
mCA -0.01 -0.034 -0.083 -0.099* -0.083 -0.099*
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.5: Influence of a Spending and a Tax Shock for 1999-2009
The intensity of a government spending shock on government expenditure is per def-
inition still 1. The impact of a tax shock on taxes is larger in the overall period for
both model types. Since we cannot directly compare the effect of a tax shock on output
because the magnitude of the tax shocks (the results displayed in the 3rd and fourth
15We only discuss the statistically significant results marked with an asterisk.
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column of the table) are different for the two scenarios, we examine the last two columns
of the respective tables where comparability is given.
In the subsample, output immediately responds negatively with a very small intensity
to a government spending shock. The response is not statistically significant. Moreover,
taxes diminish. Expenditure rises and revenues decline such that the overall deficit in-
creases more by the government spending shock for 1999-2009. The impact factor of a
government spending shock on deficits exceeds 1. Debt rises.
All multipliers are negative due to the decline in output, very small in size, and statis-
tically insignificant.
If a shock in net taxes occurs, government spending declines weakly. Because the rise in
taxes raise government revenues, the deficit is reduced. Compared to the whole sample
1991-2009, the reduction in the deficit is weaker due to a net tax shock for the subsample
1999-2009. Output declines due to the contractionary shock. The estimated response is
statistically insignificant for the deterministic trend model and statistically significant
for the stochastic trend model. The multipliers for a tax shock are negative. A one unit
rise in taxes lowers output by 0.09-0.11 units, depending on the chosen model specifica-
tion. Because all multipliers are smaller in absolute value compared to the whole sample
results, a tax shock seems to have less impact on output after the accession to the EMU.
Qualitatively, a one unit negative government expenditure shock seems to have closely
the same impact on deficits as a one unit positive tax shock. For the overall period, a
tax shock is found to be more effective. Thus, in the 2000s, the ability of a net tax shock
to reduce overall deficits shrinks, whereas a government spending shock has a higher
estimated impact factor on deficits as before.
Result 5.2. The Baseline Model - 1999-2009
• The impact of a rise in taxes on output weakens after the accession to the EMU.
• A reduction in government spending or a rise in taxes are equally effective in
reducing the deficit for 1999-2009 in the short run.
The three variables model is facing statistical insignificance problems due to the small
sample size for the subsamples. As a consequence, most of the impulse response estimates
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and the multipliers are statistically insignificant 4 or 8 periods after the shock. We refrain
from discussing the results explicitly.
Overall, it can be noted that the response of output to a spending and to a tax shock is
smaller than expected. One possible explanation is that fiscal policy is not that effective
any longer in the 1990s and 2000s or the model is facing problems due to omitted
variables. Hence, we augment the baseline model with several variables such that we
can check for the robustness of results in the course of the study.
5.3.2 Components of GDP
Before augmenting the set of endogenous variables, several components of GDP as pri-
vate and government consumption, investment, imports, and exports are added to the
baseline model. On one hand, we try to answer the question, which economic theory
(New Classical vs. New Keynesian) matches best the empirical results in the underlying
model specification. On the other hand, the estimated impact of fiscal shocks on the
trade variables imports and exports is analyzed.
Each additional component is ranked last in the vector ~X of endogenous variables. In par-
ticular, we estimate a four variables SVAR model. The residual of the GDP component
is described in a similar manner as the residual of GDP: uyci = αycigu
g + αycitu
t + eyci ,
where yci denotes one of the five GDP components listed above with i ∈ {1, ..., 5}. yc1
is private consumption, yc2 government consumption, yc3 denotes investment, yc4 are
the exports, and yc5 are the imports. All data are in logs and per capita.
Table 5.6 displays the ad hoc response and the annualized cumulative impulse response
of the chosen component (C is consumption, GC government consumption, INV invest-
ment, IM imports, and EX exports) in the occurrence of a positive spending shock or
a positive tax shock for period 4 and 8 after the shock. Since we still assume that the
respective shock occurs in period 0, the columns labeled with “0” show the estimated ad
hoc coefficients of the variables. The upper half of the table corresponds to the spending
shock, the lower half to the tax shock, respectively. As before, the deterministic trend
model is displayed on the left (labeled with “DT”), whereas the stochastic trend model is
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shown on the right (labeled with “ST”). The first row of each block gives the estimated
impulse response of GDP from the baseline Structural VAR—see Subsection 5.3.1.
We describe the estimated annualized overall impact of the fiscal shocks on the GDP
components in the following. Since we want to analyze whether national fiscal policy
within the EMU also affects other EMU member countries via the trade channel and
Germany is highly export driven, the response of exports is analyzed in detail.
Variable DT - 0 DT - 4 DT - 8 ST - 0 ST - 4 ST - 8
ciry 0.122* -0.01 -0.172 0.117 -0.034 -0.158
cirC 0.038 -0.008 -0.1335 0.035 -0.018 -0.203
cirGC 0.798* 0.405* 0.396* 0.796* 0.42* 0.451*
cirINV 0.313 -0.387 -1.225 0.276 -0.337 -1.2
cirEX -0.304 -0.123 -0.414 -0.333 -0.261 -0.572
cirIM 0.268 0.343 0.107 0.275 0.308 0.312
ciry -0.22* -0.258* -0.267 -0.229* -0.361* -0.681*
cirC -0.109* 0.066 0.212 -0.111* 0.037 0.118
cirGC -0.028 0.009 0.0075 -0.053 -0.035 -0.052
cirINV -0.248 -0.285 0.057 -0.225 -0.294 -0.014
cirEX -0.39* -0.863* -0.959 -0.447* -1.363* -2.673*
cirIM -0.447* -0.775* -0.759 -0.486* -0.943* -1.32
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.6: Influence of Fiscal Shocks on GDP Components - Baseline Model
The government spending shock first raises private consumption. The positive estimated
ad hoc coefficient is very small. After a while, the impulse response of consumption be-
comes negative. Reasonable values concerning the size of response are all negative.
The estimated overall impact of a spending shock on government consumption is positive
and statistically significant for both model variations as government consumption is de-
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fined as a part of government spending. Investment responds to a government spending
shock first positively and after some periods negatively. The overall response is negative
for the main part of the forecasted periods.
The impact on imports is positive for the first years after the shock. Exports decline for
almost 10 quarters. The cumulative impulse responses show that an increase in govern-
ment spending lowers exports and raises imports at least for the analyzed 12 quarters
after the occurrence of the expenditure shock in the baseline model.
A tax shock lowers all components of GDP when the shock occurs. The direction of the
response changes for consumption, government consumption, and investment such that
the estimated responses are positive after some periods. Contrary, a positive tax shock
(an increase in taxes) persistently lowers imports and exports for at least two years.
The responses of the GDP components are qualitatively the same for the deterministic
trend and the stochastic trend model, but the intensity varies.
The sum of the estimated GDP component responses significantly differs from the GDP
response for an expenditure shock. In the occurrence of a tax shock, the sum of the
GDP component responses are close to the response of GDP. Most of the single GDP
components react intensely to a fiscal shock compared to the impact factor on output.
The longer the forecast horizon, the larger is the difference of the summed responses of
GDP components and the directly estimated impulse response of GDP.
The impulse responses concerning their fit to economic theory is analyzed in the follow-
ing. With neoclassical theory, consumption decreases if government spending is raised,
whereas it responds with a positive sign according to the Keynesian theory. The spend-
ing shock affects private consumption first positively then negatively. The positive ad
hoc point estimate is statistically insignificant. It cannot be shown which theory matches
best the estimated impulse response of private consumption.
The estimated coefficients of investment have in most parts converse signs for the two
analyzed fiscal shocks. An expansionary (government spending) shock and a contrac-
tionary (net tax) shock affect investment in opposite directions. This fits to standard
Keynesian theory.
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Finally, we examine the impulse response of exports to fiscal shocks in detail.
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Figure 5.5: Impulse Responses of Exports - Baseline Model
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Figure 5.6: Accumulated Impulse Responses of Exports - Baseline Model
The period responses are shown in Figure 5.5. Exports respond negatively to both pos-
itive fiscal shocks at the occurrence of the respective shock. In the course of time, they
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begin to increase, fluctuating around the zero line. Overall, the estimated response to
an expenditure shock is more volatile.
Figure 5.6 shows the annualized accumulated effect of a fiscal shock on exports. The
estimated overall impact of a positive shock in government spending is negative for all
3 analyzed years after the shock. The response is statistically insignificant. Moreover,
exports decline if taxes are raised. The impulse response of exports to a net tax shock
is statistically significant for most periods.
Both accumulated impulse responses are negative for the whole analyzed simulation pe-
riod of 12 quarters. A net tax shock has a lasting negative overall effect on exports
since it does not revert to the zero line, whereas the estimated impact on a positive
government spending shock weakens over time.
Within this subsection, we find the following.
Result 5.3.
• Keynesian theory matches the impulse responses of investment to fiscal shocks.
• Analyzing the impact of a government spending shock on consumption, we can-
not decide, which theory is supported by the empirical result.
• Exports decline if a fiscal shock hits the economy. The estimated cumulative
response is statistically significant if taxes are raised.
Due to the limited model framework, we cannot explain the responses of the trade
variables in this setting. Thus, the model is augmented by new endogenous model
variables to argue about interdependencies. As a first step, the interest rate and the
inflation rate are included in the following.
5.4 The SVAR Model Including the Interest and Inflation
Rate
We augment the baseline model with the nominal interest rate i and the GDP-deflator
inflation rate π. The two interest rates to be considered are the short-term interest rate
and the long-term interest rate.
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There are different arguments to include the one or the other.
On one hand, the interest rate play a role thinking of monetary policy, on the other
hand, it has some influence on the demand variables of an economy.
The nominal short-term interest rate plays the major role in the context of monetary
policy because it is the main tool to influence the economy. The importance of long-term
interest rates for monetary policy is discussed widely. Some studies analyze if the long-
term interest rate should be used as monetary policy instrument—see amongst others
McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams [96] or Woodford [131]. McCallum [95] assumes
a positive relation between short-term and long-term interest rates and thus includes
the long-term interest rate with a positive sign in the monetary policy decision rule.
Contrary, Casellina and Uberti [33] figure out that the optimal response of the short-
term interest rate to a positive shock in the long-term interest rate is negative. In this
case, the model setting is an IS-LM-Phillips curve model including rational expectations
and the long-term interest rate with an extended Taylor rule to analyze optimal monetary
policy. Woodford [130] states that real output depends more on the long-term interest
rate than on the short-term interest rate. Thus, the efficacy of monetary policy crucially
relies on the ability to influence the term structure of an economy and thus the long-term
interest rate.
Standard macro models as the IS-LM model state a relationship between macro variables
as the GDP, consumption, saving, or investment and the interest rate. In this case, the
long-term interest rate plays the major role because the actors in an economy decide
what amount to save, consume, or invest depending on the value of the real long-term
interest rate although it is not observable. As a consequence, the expected real long-term
interest rates are relevant in the decision making process. The Fisher-Hypothesis claims
that the real interest rate is equal to the difference of the nominal interest rate and the
expected rate of inflation—see Fisher [50]. Hence, consumption, saving, and investment
decisions depend implicitly on the nominal long-term interest rate.
Since the demand response on changes in fiscal policy is one of the basic points of
interest in this study and the analyzed structural VAR model includes the inflation rate,
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we implement the nominal long-term interest rate rather than the short-term interest
rate as regressor following Perotti [108].16 Contrary, most other studies as, e.g., Heppke-
Falk et al. [61] or Giuliodori and Beetsma [57] include the short-term interest rate.
The new endogenous variables vector is defined as ~Xt =
[
g¨t, t¨t, y¨t, πt, it
]′
, whereas the
corresponding vector of residuals after the VAR-estimation is ~Ut =
[
ugt , u
t
t, u
y
t , u
pi
t , u
i
t
]′
.
We rank the inflation rate past to the endogenous variables of the baseline model to
allow for effects of output, government spending, and taxes on the price level. Finally,
we include the long-term interest rate as the variable ordered last. After estimation of
the VAR model, we obtain the estimation residuals ujt ∀j ∈ {g, t, y, π, i}. The cyclically
adjusted residuals for the two fiscal variables are defined as
ug,CA = ug −
(
αgyu
y + αgpiu
pi + αgiu
i
)
= βgte
t + eg
ut,CA = ut −
(
αtyu
y + αtpiu
pi + αtiu
i
)
= βtge
g + et.
The output elasticity of government spending αgy is set to zero and the output elasticity
of net taxes is calculated as αty = 2.0857. The price elasticity of government spending
αgpi is set to -0.5 and the price elasticity of net taxes is estimated as αtpi = 1.0199. As
before, we assume that neither government spending nor net taxes react to changes in
the interest rate such that αgi = αti = 0 holds. For more information on the derivation
of the respective elasticities see Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4.
We follow the same identification method as for the baseline model. The overall relation-
ship of the estimation residuals ~U to the structural shock variables ~E is characterized
by an equation similar to equation (5.2):
~C1 ~U = ~C2 ~E
1 0 −αgy −αgpi −αgi
0 1 −αty −αtpi −αti
−αyg −αyt 1 0 0
−αpig −αpit −αpiy 1 0
−αig −αit −αiy −αipi 1


ug
ut
uy
upi
ui

=

1 βgt 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


eg
et
ey
epi
ei

,
16We cross-checked our results by implementing the short-term interest rate rather than the long-term
interest rate. All impulse responses stay qualitatively the same in that case.
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where ~U = [ug, ut, uy, upi, ui]′ and ~E = [eg, et, ey , epi, ei]′. The missing values for αjk are
found, as before, by stepwise IV estimation using the former identified structural shock
variables as instruments for the correlated residuals. The following subsection describes
the results for the first augmented model variation.
5.4.1 Results for the Five Variables Model
The SVAR model including the inflation and the nominal long-term interest rate is esti-
mated. After obtaining the residuals, we perform an instrumental variable estimation of
the correlated residuals found with the VAR model estimation and the identified struc-
tural parameters. Selected point estimates are shown in Table 5.7. For comparability,
we list the same estimates as in Subsection 5.3.1. As before, the number in brackets
denotes the t-statistic.
Variable DT ST
βgt -0.095* (-1.79) -0.093* (-1.727)
αyg 0.118* (1.734) 0.114* (1.68)
αyt -0.177** (-4.007) -0.18** (-4.03)
* and ** denote statistical significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.
Table 5.7: Results for the 5 Variables Model
No autocorrelation is detected in the estimation residuals of the VAR if we perform a
Portmanteau test. The estimates are statistically significant (at 5% or 10% statistical
significance level) and are estimated with similar values as these found for the baseline
model—see Table 5.1.
The Granger-causality test performed after the VAR suggests that we cannot reject
a Granger-causal impact of output on net taxes on a 1% statistical significance level.
Furthermore, the long-term interest rate Granger-causes output. The Null of a Granger-
causal relation of taxes and the inflation rate to the interest rate is not rejected. The
results are robust to the choice of a stochastic or deterministic trend as regressor. Since
the results including one of the two trend types are similar, we only discuss the model
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setups with deterministic trend in detail in the remainder of the study.
The qualitative change in one fiscal variable due to a change in the other fiscal variable
in the underlying model specification is comparable to the respective change found for
the baseline model: if government spending is affected by a positive one unit shock, net
taxes immediately rise. Expenditure decreases due to a positive one unit tax shock.
Table 5.8 shows the point estimates for the deficits and output. Moreover, the cyclically
adjusted responses of government spending and net taxes as well as the multipliers are
given.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
cirdef 0.785* 0.547* 1.391* -1.113* -0.527* -0.825*
ciry 0.093 -0.052 -0.265 -0.179* -0.168* -0.162
cirg,CA 1.01* 0.494* 0.446* -0.145* 0.011 -0.036
cirt,CA 0.001 0.033 -0.421* 1.438* 0.938* 1.18*
m 0.093 -0.104 -0.615 -0.179* -0.307* -0.201
mCA 0.092 -0.105 -0.594 -0.124* -0.179* -0.137
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.8: Influence of a Spending and a Tax Shock - 5 Variables Model
The deficit is more affected in almost all cases in the underlying augmented model spec-
ification. Qualitatively, the result found for the baseline model is still true: deficits
decline most in the first periods after a net tax shock, but the reduction in deficits due
to a negative shock in government expenditure is lasting longer and is estimated stronger
in intensity for the overall analyzed horizon of 12 quarters.
Output responds positively to a government spending shock, but the intensity is smaller
compared to that of the three variables baseline model. In particular, the ad hoc re-
sponse of output to a government spending shock is 0.093 (before 0.122), 1 period after
the shock, the output response decreases to 0.04 (before 0.135), whereas the annualized
cumulative responses for the 4th and 8th period are −0.052 (before -0.01) and −0.265
(before -0.172), respectively. Output is affected less at the time the shock occurs, but
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the estimated negative response following after some periods is stronger. Overall, the
impulse response of output due to a rise in government spending is shifted downwards
if we include the inflation and the interest rate. For comparison, see also Table 5.2 and
5.3. All estimates are not statistically significant at the 10% statistical significance level.
The impulse response of output after a positive government spending shock is qualita-
tively not too different compared to the results found by Heppke-Falk et al. [61]. The
ad hoc increase in output due to a spending shock is followed by a decrease in output
after some periods. Only the time periods are different. Furthermore, the intensity of
the estimated effect is very similar as a one unit expenditure shock causes an ad hoc rise
in output of around 0.12 in Figure 6 of Heppke-Falk et al. [61], whereas our response is
0.093. If taxes rise due to a shock, the ad hoc response of output as well as the impact 4
and 8 quarters after the occurrence of the tax shock on output are weaker. The response
is negative also for this model specification and thus, the qualitative response is similar
in both setups. Heppke-Falk et al. [61] estimate a smaller response of output to a net
tax shock. The ad hoc response is calculated as -0.019, whereas our response is -0.179.
As before, the estimated ad hoc response of output is larger in size for a net tax shock
such that taxes are the more effective instrument in stimulating the economy for a short
period of time.
Due to the smaller absolute value of the estimated cyclically adjusted ad hoc multipliers,
the immediate influence of the fiscal shocks to output seems to be smaller in the five
variables model setting compared to the baseline model.
The negative multipliers for a shock in government spending, which are all statistically
insignificant, are larger for the underlying model specification after a while such that a
rise in expenditure affects output more negatively in the course of time. The multipliers
for a net tax shock are all calculated with smaller absolute values independent of the
time elapsed after the shock. The impact of a rise in net taxes on output is detected
to be smaller if the model additionally includes the interest and the inflation rate as
regressors.
Figure 5.7 shows the period responses of output to fiscal shocks, whereas the accumulated
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responses, i.e., the overall effect of a shock in one of the two fiscal variables government
expenditure or net taxes on output are given in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.7: Impulse Responses of Output - 5 Variables Model
Output first rises due to a positive shock in government spending. But the estimated
period response is negative from the second period onwards. If net taxes rise, output
declines almost for all simulated periods.
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Figure 5.8: Accumulated Impulse Responses of Output - 5 Variables Model
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As suggested in Table 5.8, the accumulated response of output to a positive government
expenditure shock shown in Figure 5.8 becomes negative 3 periods after the occurrence
of the shock. The estimated negative response is statistically significant 10 periods after
the shock. To summarize, the expansionary government expenditure shock first raises
output, but the multiplier is only very small. Output declines after a while and the
response is estimated with statistically significant negative values 2.5 years after the
shock.
The estimated cumulative impulse response of output to a net tax shock is negative for
all simulated periods and statistically significant for the first 1.5 years after the occur-
rence of the shock. Hence, a rise in taxes lowers output which corresponds to standard
macroeconomic theory.
The period responses of the inflation rate and the long-term interest rate are shown
in Figure 5.9. As before, the upper row shows the responses to an expenditure shock,
whereas the lower row consists of the estimated effects on a tax shock. The results for
the stochastic trend implementation are omitted because the results are similar to those
found for the deterministic trend model.
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Figure 5.9: Impulse Responses of the Inflation and the Interest Rate - 5 Var.
The inflation rate increases due to a positive government spending shock with a very low
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intensity and fluctuated after some periods around the zero line. The ad hoc response
of the inflation rate (0.019) is very small; the annualized cumulative response for the
4th period after the shock is 0.017 and 0.023 for the 8th period and not statistically
significant. After 12-14 periods, the inflation rate approximates to the zero line.
Due to a positive net tax shock, the inflation rate decreases statistically significantly.
The ad hoc response is -0.063. The annualized cumulative response after 4 and 8 periods
are -0.028 and -0.034, respectively. Moreover, the inflation rate approximates to the zero
line after some periods.
The interest rate is affected negatively but with a very small value (the ad hoc response
is −0.007) due to the expenditure shock. It then increases, overshoots the zero line, and
afterwards decreases again fluctuating around the zero line. The annualized cumulative
responses after 4 and 8 periods amount to 0.046 and 0.059, respectively. Overall, the re-
sponse is small in intensity. The increase after some periods and the subsequent decline
in the period responses of the interest rate are statistically significant.
In the occurrence of a one unit tax shock, the interest rate is first negative, increases
and then overshoots the zero line. The ad hoc response is -0.015, whereas the annualized
cumulative response after 4 (8) periods is -0.033 (0.011). The decline in the interest rate
and the following increase are statistically significant.
Figure 5.10 shows the estimated overall effect of fiscal shocks on the inflation and the
interest rate. The inflation rate and the long-term interest rate are affected positively by
a positive government spending shock, where both cumulative impulse responses are not
statistically significant. One may argue that the rise in the interest rate after a positive
government expenditure shock is reasonable because overall deficits rise–see Table 5.8.
As a consequence, the government issues additional bonds. If the money supply is not
adjusted by the same amount, the interest rate rises.
If net taxes rise temporarily, the estimated overall impact on the inflation rate is neg-
ative and long lasting. The interest rate is affected first negatively and overshoots the
zero line 1.5 years after the occurrence of the shock. Both responses to a net tax shock
are statistically significant at least for 4 quarters.
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Overall, the estimated intensity of the fiscal shock impact factors is significantly higher
for the response of output than the ones of the inflation or the interest rate.
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Figure 5.10: Acc. Impulse Responses of the Inflation and the Interest Rate - 5 Vars.
Result 5.4. Expenditure vs. Net Tax Shock (5 Variables Model)
• Output weakly rises due to a positive shock in government spending but declines
some periods after the shock and becomes negative. The negative response is
statistically significant 10 quarters after the shock.
• Output statistically significantly declines due to a positive tax shock.
• All multipliers are estimated with small values.
• If the model includes the inflation and the interest rate, changes in taxes affect
output less strongly.
• As for the baseline model, a shock in net taxes has a higher estimated impact
on output and is a more effective instrument in stabilizing output in the short
run.
• The overall deficit rises with an expansionary spending shock and declines if
taxes are raised. A rise in taxes lowers deficits more in the short run, but a
reduction in government spending is more effective in the medium run.
• If the inflation and the interest rate is included, deficits can be influenced more
with one unit shocks in government expenditure and net taxes.
For a closer examination of the near past, the model is applied to 1999-2009, i.e., the
period after Germany’s entry to the European Monetary Union. We calculate the elas-
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ticities needed to identify the fiscal shocks for the subsample period. The elasticity of
net taxes with respect to output is 1.0094 (for the whole sample 2.0857), whereas the
price elasticity of net taxes is 1.0279 (for the whole sample 1.0199). For the subsam-
ple, the impact of a change in output on net taxes seems to weaken and the effect of a
change in prices on the net taxes seems to strengthen in comparison to the whole sample
(1991-2009). As before, all other institutional information is set exogenously and inde-
pendently of the time horizon.
The qualitative tendency of the estimated output response to a government spending
shock is similar to the one found for the whole period, but the intensity of the estimated
effects is different. The ad hoc response of output to a government spending shock is
0.166 > 0.093 where the value on the right hand side is the respective estimate for the
whole sample and 0.701 > 0.04 for the first period after the shock. Moreover, the over-
all output response stays positive for a longer simulation period. Even the 4th quarter
estimate is positive (0.005) in that case.
In the occurrence of a net tax shock, output declines first for the subsample but be-
comes positive afterwards. The ad hoc response is −0.019 > −0.179 and we estimate
the response of the first period as 0.026 > −0.349. The positive response is statistically
insignificant.
Raising government expenditures becomes more effective. Moreover, the estimated im-
pact of a net tax shock on output declines in the short run. Thus, the results are
comparable to those found for the subsample in the baseline model setting. The infla-
tion rate and the interest rate are found to respond more volatile in the subperiod than
in the whole period to fiscal shocks.17
Result 5.5. The 5 Variables Model - 1999-2009
• Net tax shocks seem to affect output less strongly after the accession of Ger-
many to the EMU. Furthermore, output seems to respond more strongly to a
government expenditure shock in that case.
• The response of the inflation and the interest rate are more volatile.
17The corresponding figures are available on request.
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5.4.2 Results for the Five Variables Model - Components of GDP
We implement one of the five components of GDP as a sixth variable in the SVAR
model setting in this subsection. Since we try to decide, which theory matches best
the empirical results, private consumption and investment are analyzed in detail. If
New Keynesian theory is presumed, consumption increases due to a positive government
spending shock, whereas the opposite is true for New Classical theory. If investment
responds conversely to an expansionary government spending and a positive net tax
shock, this behavior matches with New Keynesian theory. Apart from that, the effect of
German fiscal shocks on the trade variables is examined and the responses of German
exports are explicitly shown.
The GDP components are included in ~X , the vector of endogenous variables, and are
ordered past output and prior to the inflation rate. The responses of all five variables
after the implementation of the additional variables are qualitatively the same as for the
standard five variables model.
The following table shows the responses of the components in the deterministic trend
model for three different points in time, similar to Table 5.6. The first row reports the
response of output found in the standard five variables model.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
ciry 0.093 -0.052 -0.265 -0.179* -0.168* -0.162
cirC 0.086 0.025 -0.134 -0.082 0.066 0.113
cirGC 0.773* 0.378* 0.293 -0.047 0.005 -0.017
cirINV 0.138 -0.739 -1.788* -0.031 0.206 0.595
cirEX -0.601* -0.472 -0.777 -0.296* -0.492 -0.346
cirIM 0.076 -0.048 -0.575 -0.332* -0.273 -0.031
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.9: Influence of Fiscal Shocks on GDP Components - 5 Variables Model
Consumption first responds positively and then becomes negative for a positive govern-
ment spending shock. Most parts of the response are statistically insignificant. Due
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to a rise in net taxes, consumption first declines because also output and thus income
declines. After a while, consumption rises. This positive response is statistically insignif-
icant, whereas some parts of the negative response are statistically significant at a 10%
statistical significance level.
Overall, the response cannot be used to find a match with a specific economic theory.
The estimated impact of an expenditure shock on government consumption is (as ex-
pected) high because government consumption is one aggregation component of govern-
ment expenditure, whereas a net tax shock affects government consumption only weakly.
Investment responds qualitatively similar to a fiscal shock as in the baseline model. The
response due to an expansionary government expenditure shock is first positive and then
becomes negative. Since the interest rate rises if government expenditure is increased, it
is observed that investment is crowded out by the rising government spending. If a net
tax shock occurs, investment is first negative and becomes positive after some periods.
Overall, the impulse responses of investment show a converse behavior in the occurrence
of a shock in government expenditure and a shock in net taxes. Standard Keynesian
theory matches these results.
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Figure 5.11: Impulse Responses of Exports - 5 Variables Model
Figure 5.11 shows the period impulse responses of exports to fiscal shocks. Exports are
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estimated to decline due to both fiscal shocks. Some period responses are statistically
significant at a 10% statistical significance level. The two shocks seem to have a long
lasting overall impact on exports. After a negatively estimated response, exports rise due
to the expenditure shock. The response in the first periods after the occurrence of the
shock is statistically significant. If a positive net tax shock takes place, exports fluctuate
around the zero line. Only parts of the negative response are statistically significant.
The accumulated impulse responses are shown in Figure 5.12. Since both curves run
below the zero line for all forecasted periods, the graphs indicate a decline in exports
due to the fiscal shocks: the estimated impact is negative and long lasting.
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Figure 5.12: Accumulated Impulse Responses of Exports - 5 Variables Model
The response of exports to a rise in government expenditure or net taxes can be explained
by the response of the inflation rate. If the deficit is extended by raising government
spending, the inflation rate increases. Prices rise and thus exports decline.
If taxes are raised, the inflation rate is smaller than before, but all private customers
from abroad have to pay higher taxes on German products. Hence, exports decline.18
18Firms are unaffected by higher taxes because they do not have to pay German taxes on German
products when buying from abroad. Only private customers from abroad have to pay VAT, just like the
domestic consumers.
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Imports first rise due to a positive shock in expenditure but decline after some periods.
All values are statistically insignificant at a 10% statistical significance level. Similar to
exports also imports decline in the occurrence of a positive net tax shock: import taxes
probably increase or are even expected to be higher if overall net taxes increase. The
estimated intensity of the accumulated impulse response for imports is smaller than that
for exports except for the ad hoc response to a net tax shock.
As a consequence, the ad hoc response of net exports to a tax shock is very small and
positive (0.036) but becomes immediately negative after one period. The impact of a
positive shock in government expenditures on net exports is negative for all analyzed
simulation periods. Net exports are indeed affected negatively by fiscal shocks.
The sum of the annualized cumulative responses for the GDP components differs from
the response of GDP for the ad hoc response. The longer the forecast, the higher the
deviation of the sum of single responses to the overall response of the aggregated GDP.
Overall, we find the following.
Result 5.6.
• Keynesian theory matches the impulse responses of investment to fiscal shocks.
• The impulse response of private consumption to a government spending shock
cannot be used to decide about economic theory.
• Exports are statistically significantly reduced if taxes are raised. Moreover, ex-
ports decline due to an increase in government expenditure.
• Net exports are reduced due to the fiscal shocks.
5.5 The Model Including EMU-Imports and the REER
In the following, the five variables model is augmented by imports from member countries
of the European Monetary Union and the real effective exchange rate. In the first part of
the section, all variables are implemented as endogenous variables, whereas the second
part shows the results when assuming that the exchange rate channel and the interest
rate channel are switched off in a monetary union with one currency and one central
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bank conducting monetary policy. In the latter case, the interest rate and the exchange
rate are implemented as exogenous variables.
The augmented seven variables model is estimated as before. The imports from EMU
member countries are ordered past to the output and prior to the inflation rate, whereas
the real effective exchange rate is ordered last in the vector of endogenous variables, i.e.,
~X = [g¨ t¨ y¨ ¨im π i e]′, where ¨im denotes imports from EMU member countries
and e is the real effective exchange rate (REER). The corresponding vector of residuals
is ~U = [ug ut uy uim upi ui ue]′. After performing a VAR, the cyclically adjusted
residuals for the two fiscal variables are calculated as
ug,CA = ug −
(
αgyu
y + αgimu
im + αgpiu
pi + αgiu
i + αgeu
e
)
= βgte
t + eg,
ut,CA = ut −
(
αtyu
y + αtimu
im + αtpiu
pi + αtiu
i + αteu
e
)
= βtge
g + et.
As before, we use as value for the elasticity of net taxes with respect to output αty =
2.0857 and for the price elasticity of net taxes αtpi = 1.0199—see Section 4.3.1 of Chapter
4. The price elasticity of government spending αgpi is set to -0.5. We assume that neither
government spending nor net taxes respond to changes in the interest rate such that
αgi = αti = 0 holds (Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4).
The elasticities additionally needed are stated in the last part of Section 4.3.1. The
decision process of government expenditure is not influenced by the amount of imports
or the exchange rate such that we set αgim = αge = 0. The elasticity of imports and the
real effective exchange rate to taxes was estimated as αtim = 0.0731 and αte = −0.0585,
respectively. The relatively small value for the import elasticity of net taxes is due to
the small import tax revenue vis-a-vis the overall tax revenue.
The shock identification method is the same as before. An OLS estimation is performed
to identify the uncorrelated two fiscal shocks. Furthermore, the identified residuals are
used as instruments in a stepwise instrumental variable estimation to obtain the ~C1
and ~C2 matrices. In this case, we get 7x7 matrices with a similar structure as the 5x5
matrices described in detail in Section 5.4.
For the second part of the section, the interest rate and the exchange rate are included
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as exogenous variables and are thus no longer part of the endogenous variables vector
~X. The VAR is performed with a vector of five endogenous variables and a vector of
exogenous variables, including the constant and the trend as before and additionally the
interest and the exchange rate. With this procedure, it is assumed that the monetary
union is perfectly working: monetary policy is conducted by one independent, single
institution and there is one currency for the whole union.
5.5.1 Results for the Seven Variables Model
First, the VAR model is estimated. A Portmanteau test is performed and no autocorre-
lation is detected in all estimations. The point estimates of the three main coefficients
obtained from the IV estimations are shown in the following table. Compared to the
former results, the estimated coefficients are small and in most parts statistically in-
significant, but the signs are the same.
Variable DT ST
βgt -0.064 (-1.171) -0.067 (-1.272)
αyg 0.051 (0.875) 0.057 (0.957)
αyt -0.09** (-2.782) -0.102** (-2.964)
* and ** denote statistical significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.
Table 5.10: Results for the 7 Variables Model
The Granger-causality test shows that output is influenced by the inflation and the in-
terest rate. Also net taxes Granger-cause output. Furthermore, the interest rate and
imports from EMU member countries are Granger-caused by the inflation rate.
The cumulated impact of the fiscal shocks on output, the deficit, the cyclically adjusted
government expenditures and net taxes, and the multipliers are listed in Table 5.11.
The deficit response to a positive government expenditure shock is estimated with higher
values in comparison to the five variables model. The ad hoc response of deficits to a
net tax shock is estimated with smaller values, whereas the 4th and 8th period response
has a higher estimate compared to the 5 variables model. The estimates indicate that
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a positive net tax shock first lowers deficits less if we also take the union-variables into
account, whereas the effect is estimated to be stronger after a while in that case. As
before, a net tax shock is the more effective instrument in reducing the deficit for a short
time and a government expenditure has a stronger medium run effect on deficits.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
cirdef 0.919* 0.825* 1.609* -1.06* -0.549* -0.884*
ciry 0.041 -0.152 -0.292 -0.096* -0.074 -0.031
cirg,CA 0.998* 0.447* 0.303* -0.072 0.064 0.07
cirt,CA -0.0002 -0.036 -0.732* 1.262* 0.81* 1.035*
m 0.041 -0.335 -0.994 -0.096* -0.12 -0.033
mCA 0.041 -0.34 -0.734 -0.076* -0.091 -0.03
cirimEMU -0.13 -0.546 -0.784 -0.441* -0.286 -0.304
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.11: Influence of a Spending and a Tax Shock - 7 Variables Model
The cyclically adjusted ad hoc multiplier for a government spending shock is very small
such that a rise of one unit in government expenditure raises output only by 0.041 units.
The decline of output after a short increase due to the government spending shock,
which was also found for the other model specifications, takes place one period after the
occurrence of the shock. Thus, the multiplier for the first period after the shock has a
negative sign. Moreover, the cyclically adjusted multipliers for the 4th and 8th period
after the occurrence of the shock are estimated with higher absolute values: the negative
impact of a rise in government spending on output seems to strengthen over time. All
spending multipliers shown in Table 5.11 are statistically insignificant.
The results of the underlying model specification lead to the conclusion that an increase
in government expenditure has a negative impact on output, which is stronger in inten-
sity than the effect found for the two former models setups. The estimated tax multipliers
are all smaller in absolute value compared to the ones found in the five variables model.
Thus, if the trade variables imports from EMU member countries and the exchange rate
198
CHAPTER 5. FISCAL SHOCKS IN GERMANY - AN SVAR APPROACH
are implemented in the model, the estimated impact of a net tax shock is smaller. If we
compare the spending and the tax multiplier, output is affected stronger by a net tax
shock, but both ad hoc multipliers are very small such that fiscal policy does not seem
to be an effective instrument in stabilizing variations in output. The imports from EMU
member countries are affected negatively for both fiscal shocks and the ad hoc response
to a net tax shock is statistically significant.
In the following, we analyze the period impulse responses on fiscal shocks in the aug-
mented 7 variables model. Special attention is paid to the response of output.
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Figure 5.13: Impulse Responses of Output - 7 Variables Model
First, a government spending shock has a positive impact on output as in the other
model specifications. But output declines faster compared to the 5 variables model.
After reaching a minimum in the negative quadrant,19 output increases again, similar
to the three and five variables model after the occurrence of the shock. The impulse
response is statistically insignificant at a 10% statistical significance level for almost all
simulated periods. The impact of a net tax shock on output is qualitatively the same
compared to the five variables model but shows a higher volatility in the underlying
19The negative values are also found by Giuliodori and Beetsma [57] who use a similar model setting.
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model specification—see also Figure 5.7 in Section 5.4. Only the negative responses for
the first periods after the shock are statistically significant.
To analyze the overall effect of a fiscal shock on output, the following figure shows the
accumulated responses of output to a positive government spending or net tax shock.
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Figure 5.14: Accumulated Impulse Response of Output - 7 Variables Model
The estimated output responses indicate that a government spending shock affects out-
put negatively. The estimated response is statistically significant 9 periods after the
occurrence of the shock. In the five variables model, the qualitative response is closely
the same. The first statistically significant negative response is obtained in the 5 vari-
ables setting after 2.5 years, i.e., 10 periods after the shock.
A net tax shock has a long lasting negative impact on output. The response is statisti-
cally significant at a 10% statistical significance level only for 3 periods after the shock,
whereas it is estimated to be statistically significant for 5 periods in the 5 variables
model setting.
The inflation and the interest rate responses to a fiscal shock are shown in Figure 5.15
(period impulse responses) and 5.16 (cumulative impulse responses).
Inflation declines due to a shock in government expenditure in the underlying model
setting. After a while, the overall impact becomes positive. The estimated cumulative
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response is statistically significant after 6 quarters with positive values.
The overall response of the interest rate to a government expenditure shock is positive
and statistically significant for the first 5 quarters after the occurrence of the shock.
The government issued bonds to finance the additional spending. Since Germany does
not print money to adjust the money supply, the interest rate rises.
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Figure 5.15: Impulse Responses of the Inflation and the Interest Rate - 7 Vars.
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Figure 5.16: Acc. Impulse Responses of the Inflation and the Interest Rate - 7 Vars.
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The accumulated response of the inflation rate to a net tax shock first fluctuates around
the zero line and is positive from 8 periods onwards after the shock. All estimates are
statistically insignificant at a 10% statistical significance level.
As in the 5 variables model, the interest rate first responds statistically significantly neg-
ative to a rise in net taxes. The estimated overall impact of the net tax shock becomes
positive after 6 periods.
The effect of the fiscal shocks on the imports from EMU member countries and the
exchange rate, i.e., the newly implemented variables, are shown in Figure 5.17 and 5.18.
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Figure 5.17: Responses of EMU-Imports and the Exchange Rate - 7 Vars.
Imports from EMU member countries respond negatively to a positive government
spending shock. Within one year, imports sharply decrease before increasing again.
A positive net tax shock affects imports negatively. The ad hoc response is statistically
significant. In the remaining simulated period, imports fluctuate around the zero line
staying in most parts in the negative quadrant. The exchange rate reacts to a positive
spending shock with an immediate statistically significant decrease and a statistically
significant increase 9-12 periods after the shock. The exchange rate response to a rise
in net taxes lies above the zero line for almost all periods, indicating a lasting positive
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influence. The response is statistically significant only in period 0.
The overall impacts of the fiscal shocks are shown in Figure 5.18. Imports from EMU
member countries diminish due to fiscal shocks, whereas the effect on the exchange rate
is overall positive for a net tax shock. The currency depreciates in that case.
The exchange rate is affected negatively for the first 10 periods after a government ex-
penditure shock, which corresponds to an appreciation of currency and becomes positive
afterwards. Since the increased interest rate due to the shock attracts foreign investors,
the demand for home currency rises such that it appreciates.
Especially, a net tax shock seems to have long lasting effects on both variables.
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Figure 5.18: Acc. Impulse Responses of EMU-Imports and the Exchange Rate - 7 Vars.
The negative response of imports after an expenditure shock is due to the rise in the
inflation rate (the rise in the price level). The statistically significant decline in imports
due to a net tax shock is caused by higher taxes on imports or the expectation that
import taxes are raised if overall net taxes are higher than before. The response of the
inflation rate in that case is statistically insignificant, very small in size and seems to
have closely no effect.
We cross-check the results by implementing the short-term interest rate instead of the
long-term interest rate. The accumulated impulse responses of the inflation rate to a
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positive government spending shock is at least weakly positive for all analyzed periods.
The response to a net tax shock is negative. Furthermore, the accumulated impulse
response of the exchange rate to a net tax shock is close to the zero line. All remaining
responses are qualitatively more or less the same in comparison to the results found
for the long-term interest rate and the explanations for the impulse responses are still
reasonable.
Result 5.7. Expenditure vs. Net Tax Shock (7 Variables Model)
• Output rises very weakly due to a positive shock in government spending but
declines one period after the shock and becomes negative. The negative response
is statistically significant 9 quarters after the shock.
• Output statistically significantly declines due to a positive tax shock.
• All multipliers are estimated with very small values such that an important role
of fiscal policy in the stabilization process of output is not detected.
• If the model includes the exchange rate and imports from EMU member coun-
tries, the estimated responses of output to changes in net taxes is smaller.
• As for the two other model variations, a shock in net taxes has a higher ad hoc
impact on output and is a more effective instrument in stabilizing output in the
short run.
• The overall deficit rises with an expansionary spending shock and declines if
taxes are raised. A rise in taxes lowers deficits more in the short run, but a
reduction in government spending is more effective in the medium run.
• German fiscal policy indirectly lowers the exports of EMU member countries and
thus the corresponding GDP.
• The home currency is directly affected: the currency appreciates with a positive
government expenditure shock and depreciates with a positive net tax shock.
The period after the foundation of the EMU is not examined separately. Due to the high
number of endogenous variables and the low number of observations, a meaningful dis-
cussion is not possible. The ad hoc responses are qualitatively the same for all variables
but the 10% error bands become very large within a short period after the occurrence
of a fiscal shock such that the uncertainty of response increases extraordinarily.
Finally, the model is augmented by the GDP components. The respective component is
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ordered prior to the imports from EMU member countries and past to output in the vec-
tor of endogenous variables. Similar to Table 5.9, the annualized cumulative responses
are shown in Table 5.12.
As for all other model variations, the ad hoc response of consumption to a government
expenditure shock is positive and very small. The response becomes negative after a
while and is in most parts statistically insignificant. The estimated overall impact of
government expenditure on consumption is negative and long lasting. If a positive shock
in net taxes occur, we estimate first a negative response of consumption, which becomes
positive and finally negative again. The overall impact is negative only for the first pe-
riods after the occurrence of the shock and statistically insignificant at a 10% statistical
significance level.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
ciry 0.041 -0.152 -0.292 -0.096* -0.074 -0.031
cirC 0.01 -0.026 -0.173 -0.023 0.069 0.099
cirGC 0.743* 0.37* 0.194 -0.014 0.039 0.021
cirINV 0.201 -0.749 -1.805 0.264 0.383 0.673
cirEX -0.769* -0.702 -0.496 -0.265 -0.441 -0.31
cirIM 0.098 -0.153 -0.66 -0.468* -0.414 -0.511
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.12: Influence of Fiscal Shocks on GDP Components - 7 Variables Model
Government consumption reacts as expected positively to an increase in government
expenditures and shows a similar pattern as the response of government expenditure
to a net tax shock. Overall, the responses do not differ in a qualitative way from the
responses found in the other model variations.
Investment immediately increases due to a positive government spending shock. After
some periods, it declines. The estimate is negative and statistically significant in that
case. This is caused by the increase in the interest rate due to a positive government ex-
penditure shock. Investment is crowded out by the increase in government expenditure.
The impact of a net tax shock on investment is first positive and becomes negative af-
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ter 10 periods. The intensity of response is high compared to the components of GDP
discussed so far. The estimated overall effect of a shock in government expenditure on in-
vestment is negative and statistically significant from 5 periods after the shock onwards.
Moreover, the estimated overall impact of a net tax shock on investment is positive for
all 12 periods but statistically insignificant. Except of the ad hoc response, investment
always responds to a spending shock in the opposite direction as if a shock in net taxes
occurs. Thus, we can, as in the other model setups, conclude that Keynesian theory
matches the empirical results.
Exports also respond with a high intensity: the period response is negative first and then
fluctuates around the zero line for both fiscal shocks. The estimated overall responses
are negative for both fiscal shocks. The same was true for the three and five variables
model for the 12 analyzed periods. Imports are affected positively by a government
spending shock only at the occurrence of the shock. The remaining period responses are
estimated with negative values. The response to a net tax shock runs below the zero
line for all 12 analyzed periods. When examining the overall impact, the government
spending shock affects imports negatively except for the period of the shock occurrence.
Moreover, the accumulated impulse response of imports to a net tax shock is negative
for all periods and statistically significant for the first 3 quarters after the shock. The
impact factors are high. The impacts of fiscal policy on overall imports and on imports
from EMU member countries do not qualitatively differ from each other.
Next, we analyze the impact of the fiscal shocks on exports. Figure 5.19 shows the pe-
riod impulse responses of exports. As described above, both period responses fluctuate
around the zero line. The cumulative impulse responses of exports to fiscal shocks are
given in Figure 5.20.
All curves indicate that fiscal policy has a long lasting negative effect on exports: the
government spending shock causes the inflation rate to rise such that the price level
rises. As a consequence, exports decline. In general, the home currency would depreci-
ate with a higher inflation rate leading to a rise in exports. But the positive response
of the interest rate caused by the fiscal expansion finally leads to an appreciation of the
206
CHAPTER 5. FISCAL SHOCKS IN GERMANY - AN SVAR APPROACH
home currency such that home goods are more expensive for foreigners. Hence, exports
lower. A net tax shock has a negative impact on exports because the private consumers
from abroad expect higher prices due to an increase in taxes. As in the other model
variations, the estimated cumulative impact of a fiscal shock on exports is negative.
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Figure 5.19: Impulse Responses of Exports - 7 Variables Model
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Figure 5.20: Accumulated Impulse Responses of Exports - 7 Variables Model
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Overall, summing up the effect on all components of GDP delivers a significantly larger
value than the overall response of output to the fiscal shock, but the estimated GDP
component multipliers are smaller than in the other two model settings.
Result 5.8.
• Keynesian theory matches the impulse responses of investment to fiscal shocks.
• The response of consumption to an expenditure shock is not supported by clas-
sical or Keynesian theory.
• Consistently with the former models examined in Section 5.3 and 5.4, exports
are affected negatively by increasing government spending or net taxes.
In the next subsection, we compare the seven variables model with a version of the
model where the interest rate and the exchange rate channel is switched off such that
fiscal shocks of one country do not influence the long-term interest rate or the currency
(in terms of a perfect monetary union with one monetary authority). The model is
simulated for 1991-2009. We assume that the two channels do not work since 1991, i.e.,
9 years before the foundation of the EMU as approximation.
5.5.2 Results for the Reduced Form SVAR Model
After performing a VAR model estimation,20 we get the point estimates obtained from
the IV estimations of the VAR residuals shown in Table 5.13. Contrary to the 7 variables
model, the found values are statistically significant.
Variable DT ST
βgt -0.091* (-1.738) -0.095* (-1.857)
αyg 0.136* (1.957) 0.147** (2.074)
αyt -0.173** (-3.783) -0.203** (-4.254)
* and ** denote statistical significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively.
Table 5.13: Results for the Reduced Form Model
20The hypothesis of no autocorrelation is not rejected after a Portmanteau test.
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The statistically insignificant small estimated coefficients of the seven variables model
seem to be caused by the high number of endogenous variables relative to the low num-
ber of observations.
The Granger-causality test indicates that the inflation rate Granger-causes imports from
EMU member countries. The same was found for the 7 variables model.
Table 5.14 shows the response of the overall deficit, output, the imports from EMU
member countries, and the multipliers for 0, 4, and 8 periods after the occurrence of a
positive government expenditure or a net tax shock.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
cirdef 0.789* 0.634* 1.154* -1.116* -0.528* -0.565
ciry 0.092 -0.17 -0.298* -0.189* -0.109 -0.085
cirg,CA 1.013* 0.431* 0.316* -0.15 0.043 0.01
cirt,CA -0.003 0.174* -0.157 1.513* 0.865* 1.039*
m 0.092 -0.399 -0.975 -0.189* -0.191 -0.1
mCA 0.091 -0.394 -0.943* -0.125* -0.126 -0.082
cirimEMU -0.064 -0.751* -1.437* -0.692* -0.327 -0.34
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.14: Influence of a Spending and a Tax Shock - Reduced Form
As for the other model variation, overall deficits rise due to an increase in government
expenditure and lower with an increase in net taxes. The ad hoc response of overall
deficits and the impact for the 4th and the 8th period after the respective shock are
statistically significant in almost all cases. As in the other model variations, a net tax
shock affects overall deficits more for a short period of time compared to a government
spending shock. Thus, increasing taxes by one unit is more effective in reducing deficits
than lowering government expenditures by one unit in the short run. On the other hand,
the reduction in the deficit is stronger in the medium run if government expenditure is
reduced.
The response of output to a government expenditure shock is first estimated to be weakly
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positive but becomes negative after one period. The cumulative negative response 8 pe-
riods after the shock is even statistically significant. Overall, the cyclically adjusted
government spending multiplier is small and becomes negative after one period.21 Out-
put declines, as in all other model setups, for a positive shock in net taxes. The net
tax multiplier is negative and estimated with comparable values as for the 5 variables
model. As for all other setups except of the seven variables model the estimated impact
of a net tax shock on output is stronger than the impact found for a shock in spending.
The imports from EMU member countries are affected negatively by both fiscal shocks.
The estimates are almost all larger in absolute values compared to the ones found for the
seven variables model. If we allow for a response of the interest rate and the exchange
rate on a fiscal shock, the interdependencies between these variables and the imports
from EMU member countries seem to weaken the effect of the fiscal shock.
The impulse responses of output and imports from EMU member countries are discussed
in the following—see Figure 5.21 and 5.22 for the period and the cumulative impulse
responses, respectively.
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Figure 5.21: Impulse Responses of Output and EMU-Imports - Reduced Form
21This is due to the sharp decline in output after a first increase. See also Figure 5.21.
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The impact of the examined fiscal shocks on output and imports from EMU member
countries are closely the same. Similar to the other model variations, output increases
immediately after the occurrence of the shock, then declines before increasing again. The
estimated negative response is statistically significant after one year. Almost the same
is true for imports from EMU member countries. The ad hoc response to a government
spending shock is positive and the impact becomes negative after a while.
Also in the occurrence of a net tax shock, the response pattern of the two examined
real variables is comparable. Output and imports from EMU member countries respond
statistically significantly negative to a positive one unit net tax shock. Afterwards, both
variables rise, staying close to the zero line for the remaining periods.
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Figure 5.22: Accumulated Responses of Output and EMU-Imports - Reduced Form
The overall impact of fiscal shocks on the two variables is negative—see Figure 5.22. The
pattern of the curves for output and imports from EMU member countries is closely the
same. Raising government spending affects both variables first positively, but is after-
wards followed by a long lasting decline. The negative response is statistically significant
at a 10% statistical significance level 4-12 and 5-12 periods after the occurrence of the
shock for EMU imports and output, respectively. A positive net tax shock affects both
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variables negatively for the simulated periods but the results are only statistically sig-
nificant for a short simulation period.
Figure 5.23 and 5.24 show the period and the cumulative impulse responses of the infla-
tion rate to fiscal shocks.
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Figure 5.23: Impulse Responses of the Inflation Rate - Reduced Form
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Figure 5.24: Accumulated Responses of the Inflation Rate - Reduced Form
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The inflation rate rises after a government spending shock and declines after a net tax
shock. Both curves fluctuate around the zero line and the estimated impact of the fiscal
shocks weakens over time.
The accumulated responses of the inflation rate shown in Figure 5.24 are positive for a
government expenditure shock and negative for a net tax shock. Both effects are weak
and long lasting. The response to a government expenditure shock is statistically in-
significant whereas the response to a net tax shock is statistically significant for the first
4 simulation periods. Overall, they are qualitatively the same as the estimated responses
for the 5 variables model.
We can summarize the following.
Result 5.9. Expenditure vs. Net Tax Shock (Reduced Form Model)
• Output rises very weakly due to a positive shock in government spending but
declines one period after the shock and becomes negative. The negative response
is statistically significant 5 quarters after the shock.
• Output declines after a positive shock in net taxes.
• All multipliers are estimated with small values.
• As for all other model variations, a shock in net taxes has a higher ad hoc impact
on output and seems to be a more effective instrument in stabilizing output in
the short run.
• The overall deficit rises due to an expansionary spending shock and declines if
taxes are raised. This result is robust to all model variations. A rise in taxes
lowers deficits more in the short run, but a reduction in government spending is
more effective in the medium run.
• German fiscal policy indirectly lowers the exports of EMU member countries and
thus the corresponding GDP. The impact of the fiscal shocks on imports from
EMU member countries is high.
We closer analyze the period after Germany’s entry to the EMU (1999-2009) in the
following. The elasticities needed to identify the fiscal shocks are estimated for the
subsample period. The elasticity of net taxes with respect to output is 1.0094 (for the
whole sample 2.0857). Hence, the output elasticity of net taxes differs significantly for
the whole and the subsample period. In 1991-1998, there seems to be a strong influence
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of output on net taxes. In 1999-2009, the German tax law changes such that the tax
revenue in percent of GDP declines. Hence, a one unit change in output changes net tax
revenue by a lower number of units for 1999-2009. For more information on changes in
tax laws see, e.g., Hayo and Uhl [59].
The price elasticity of net taxes is 1.0279 (for the whole sample 1.0199). Moreover, the
import elasticity of net taxes is 0.0747 (for the whole sample 0.0731). As before, all
other institutional information is set exogenously and is therefore independent of the
time horizon.
The qualitative output response to a government spending shock is similar to the one
found for the whole period, but the intensity of the estimated effect is different. The ad
hoc response of output to a government spending shock is 0.075 < 0.092 where the value
on the right hand side denotes the respective estimate for the whole sample. It holds
that 0.174 > −0.04 for the first period after the shock.22 Thus, the estimated response
is positive for a longer time period, but the decline in output after a while is more severe
for the subsample. I.e., a shock in government expenditure affects output stronger if the
estimated response is negative.
In the occurrence of a net tax shock, the ad hoc response of output is estimated as
−0.248 < −0.189 and the response of the first period is −0.644 < −0.337.23 Raising net
taxes lowers output more in the subsample than for the whole period.
Contrary to the impulse response of the inflation rate to a government expenditure shock
for the whole sample, the estimated response for the subsample is negative for most parts
of the simulation.
The inflation rate response to a net tax shock is qualitatively the same for both analyzed
periods.
The imports from EMU member countries respond qualitatively similar to both fiscal
shocks for the two analyzed periods. The estimated impact of fiscal policy on the EMU-
imports is higher after the German accession to the EMU.
22The responses of the 4th and the 8th quarter are −0.172 < −0.17 and −0.692 < −0.298, respectively.
23The responses for the 4th and the 8th period are −0.167 < −0.109 and −0.338 < −0.085, respec-
tively.
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Result 5.10. The Reduced Form Model - 1999-2009
• Net tax shocks affect output more intensely after the entry of Germany to the
EMU. Furthermore, output responds more strongly to a government expenditure
shock in this period.
• The response of the inflation rate is mostly negative for a government spending
shock.
• The imports from EMU member countries decline more due to fiscal shocks in
the subsample period.
We finally discuss the impulse responses of the respective GDP components private
consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, and imports to the fiscal
shocks. As before, the additional variables are ranked past to the log output per capita.
Almost all annualized ad hoc responses of the GDP components and output shown in
Table 5.15 are more intense after the occurrence of a fiscal shock if we cancel out the
interdependencies of the interest rate and the exchange rate to the other variables, i.e.,
if we implement the two variables as exogenous regressors. Also most other cumulative
responses are estimated with higher values in the reduced form model. The additional
variables in the seven variables model cause that the estimated impact of fiscal shocks
to the GDP components is smaller.
Variable G - 0 G - 4 G - 8 T1 - 0 T1 - 4 T1 - 8
ciry 0.092 -0.17 -0.298* -0.189* -0.109 -0.085
cirC 0.094 0.048 -0.051 -0.121* 0.061 0.174
cirGC 0.743* 0.36* 0.213 -0.074 0.016 0
cirINV 0.351 -0.767 -1.696* 0.051 0.437 0.846
cirEX -0.734* -1.041* -1.097* -0.388* -0.371 -0.486
cirIM 0.066 -0.625 -1.012 -0.511* -0.363 -0.48
* denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 5.15: Influence of Fiscal Shocks on GDP Components - Reduced Form
The responses of consumption correspond qualitatively to the ones found in the former
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model settings: the overall impact of a government expenditure shock is in most parts
negative and statistically insignificant. Consumption responds positively from the 2nd
period onwards after a transitory rise in net taxes. The cumulative response is statisti-
cally significant from 2 years after the shock onwards.
As in all other setups, government consumption responds positively and strongly to a
government expenditure shock and only weakly to a net tax shock.
Investment responds similar as in the former model variations. The single responses and
the overall responses of the two respective fiscal shocks are almost reflections of each
other such that empirical results fit to Keynesian theory.
Exports and imports mainly respond negatively to fiscal shocks. The results are qualita-
tively equal to the ones found for the 5 and 7 variables model. Imports respond similarly
for the seven and the reduced form model. The estimated overall effects of the two fiscal
shocks are negative, long lasting, and more intense for a government spending shock if
the interest rate and the exchange rate channel are working.24
We finally closer examine the response on exports in Figure 5.25 and 5.26.
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Figure 5.25: Impulse Responses of Exports - Reduced Form
24We found a comparable result for the EMU imports.
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Similar to the other model variations, exports decline due to a rise in government spend-
ing for the first periods after the shock and then overshoot the zero line—see for com-
parison the seven variables model. The intensity of the estimated effect is stronger for
a government spending shock. If a positive net tax shock occurs, exports respond nega-
tively for all simulated periods.
The estimated accumulated responses shown in Figure 5.26 indicate that exports decline
due to the two fiscal shocks. The negative cumulative responses for both shocks are sta-
tistically significant for at least 2.5 years. Switching off the exchange rate and interest
rate channel intensifies the medium run impact of a government expenditure shock on
exports.25 Moreover, exports are affected more by a net tax shock in the first periods
after the shock. Since the inflation rate responds statistically significantly negative, the
Euro appreciates with respect to other currencies. Exports are more expensive and thus
decline. This effect accompanies the reduction of exports due to the expectation of
foreigners that prices will rise in the future if net taxes rise.
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Figure 5.26: Accumulated Responses of Exports - Reduced Form
25Since the inflation rate response is statistically insignificant, it cannot be used as explanation.
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The estimated overall impacts of a net tax shock for the seven variables and the reduced
form variables model are not too different. Thus, the interest and the exchange rate do
not seem to play a significant role, if net tax shocks change exports. This is compatible
with the explanation that exports mainly decrease due to a change in taxes and thus
the expectation on the future price development, see also the discussion in Subsection
5.5.1.
Result 5.11.
• Keynesian theory matches the impulse responses of investment to fiscal shocks.
• The response of consumption cannot be used to decide, which theory is supported
by the empirical results.
• Consistently with all former setups, exports are affected negatively when increas-
ing government spending or net taxes. The responses are statistically significant
for at least 2.5 years.
5.6 Summary of Results
In this section, we summarize the results that are robust for all model settings in the
given time period 1991-2009.26 Possible explanation approaches are discussed.
The first two results describe the response of the overall deficits to fiscal policy in terms
of an expansion in government spending or net taxes, respectively. We try to give an
answer on the everlasting question which instrument is preferable to influence debt in
the short and the medium run:
1. Deficits rise if government expenditures are raised and decline if the net tax rev-
enues are reduced.
If the government expenditures increase, the short run rise in net tax revenue caused
by the expansive effect of the shock on output cannot compensate for the expansion in
spending. The response is too weak compared to the intensity of the rise in government
expenditures. Thus, overall deficits rise in the short run. After some periods, the net
26We abstain from augmenting the time horizon and leave this for future research.
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tax response becomes negative due to the estimated decline in output as a consequence
of the expenditure shock and even strengthens the increase in deficits. Moreover, if the
net tax revenue is raised, the estimated government expenditure response is negative.
Thus, overall deficits decline.
2. Changes in net tax revenue are more effective in changing deficits in the short run.
Moreover, deficits are affected more by a change in government expenditure in the
medium run.
The negative ad hoc response of government expenditure to a positive net tax shock
intensifies the reduction of the overall deficit in the short run.
The positive response of net taxes weakens the positive response of overall deficits to
a rise in government spending. Output declines due to a positive shock in government
expenditure after a while such that the net tax revenue is strongly reduced.
Overall, the expansion in expenditure is accompanied by a contraction in net tax revenues
and leads to a strong rise of deficits in the medium run. As a consequence, if Germany
conducts a policy that aims to reduce debt in a short period of time, taxes should
be increased. Contrary, if Germany aims to effectively reduce debt in the medium
run, accepting a weaker effect of policy in the short run, it should reduce government
spending.
3. Output rises only weakly due to a positive shock in government expenditure. After
some periods, the impulse response becomes negative.
In the very first periods after the occurrence of the expansionary fiscal policy action
of raising government expenditure, output increases. But despite recent theory, output
declines after some periods. This result is robust to all model specifications.
If we analyze the impulse responses of the GDP components, the estimated effect of
investment and output are qualitatively the same. One hypothesis is that the response
of output is driven by the investment response. Since the interest rate rises due to a
219
5.6. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
government expenditure shock, private investment might be strongly crowded out.27
A different explanation approach for the decline in output due to a positive government
expenditure shock, which does not depend on the endogenous model variables is the
following: if a government is already indebted at a high level as it is true for Germany,
an additional increase in expenditure and thus an extension of overall deficits being a
contribution to the existing debt, raises the scepticism of the economic entities to fis-
cal policy. Thus, the credibility channel of fiscal policy is disturbed and the economic
agents expect an economic crisis such that they reduce their economic activities. As a
consequence, output declines.
Moreover, the structure of the German government expenditure aggregate could give
some hints on the output response pattern: on one hand, spending is used to stabilize
output, on the other hand, it is used to stabilize the labor market. The reduction of
unemployment as well as the stabilization of the labor market in the economic crisis
has been successful in the last years. But in particular in Germany, a rise in labor does
not necessarily lead to a rise in output.28 To decide whether this hypothesis fits to the
data, the government expenditure aggregate and its effect on the labor market has to
be analyzed in greater detail. A closer analysis is left for future research.
A last explanation approach discussed in detail would be the methodological weakness
of the SVAR model. The identification process of shocks and thus the impulse responses
depend crucially on the institutional information, in detail, on the estimated elasticities.
Thus, we cross-check our results by implementing elasticities that are estimated in com-
parable studies as in Heppke-Falk et al. [61] or Bode et al. [22]. The elasticities of net
taxes with respect to output were calculated with smaller values. This was due to the
chosen aggregation methods and time horizons. For a closer discussion, see also Section
4.3.1 of Chapter 4. If we use the smaller elasticities of net taxes with respect to output,
27The reduction in investment could also be caused by the actual situation in 2007-2009. Thus, we
analyze the correlation of investment to the IFO climate, the IFO situation, or the IFO expectation
index to decide whether the changes in investment could be explained by the actual economic situation.
No statistically significant correlation is found.
28Amongst others, Christensen et al. [34] estimate a negative contribution of labor to growth for
Germany in the context of growth accounting.
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the cumulative impulse response of output to a government expenditure shock stays pos-
itive for a longer simulation period. This result is robust to all model variations. If we
especially compare the results of the five variables model including the output elasticity
of net taxes used by Heppke-Falk et al. [61] to our empirical results the output responses
are qualitatively almost the same and output increases due to the shock. Moreover, the
decline of output due to a rise in government expenditure takes place at the same time
period as in the original study. As a consequence, if we implement different institutional
information, the estimated decline in output is statistically significant in an advanced
simulation period.
But the elasticities we derive in Chapter 4 are reasonable and consistent with the used
data set and methodology.
Robustness of the shock identification could be tested by identifying the fiscal shocks
using different methods as, e.g., a Choleski decomposition.
4. Output declines due to a positive shock in net taxes. The estimated response is
statistically significant at least for some quarters after the shock.
Since net taxes are raised, fiscal policy is contractionary and affects output negatively.
This fits to economic theory. Contrary to the results found in this study, Heppke-Falk et
al. [61] estimate very small and statistically insignificant tax multipliers such that they
conclude that varying taxes does not change output statistically significantly.
5. In general, the spending and tax multipliers are estimated with weak values. But
the ad hoc response of output to a tax shock is stronger vis-a-vis the spending
multiplier.
We estimate that output is more affected by a change in net taxes in the short run for
all model variations examined in the study. This is mainly due to the fact that the
estimated spending multiplier in the occurrence of a spending shock is very small.
All multipliers indicate that fiscal policy does not seem to be a very effective instrument
in stabilizing output in Germany. The impact factors are estimated only with weak val-
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ues. The same was found in other comparable studies with German data—see, amongst
others, Heppke-Falk et al. [61].
6. Except of the reduced form model, the impact of a rise in net taxes on output
weakens for 1999-2009.
We find for almost all model specifications that net taxes affect output with a lower
intensity since Germany’s accession to the European Monetary Union. The results for
the reduced form model suggest that fiscal tax decisions are even more effective after
the entry to the EMU. Thus, overall, we cannot draw a definite conclusion.
7. The inflation rate rises for most analyzed simulation periods due to a positive
government expenditure shock and declines if net taxes are raised.
Thus, an expansionary fiscal shock (a rise in government spending) raises the inflation
rate and the price level increases. The opposite is true for a restrictive fiscal policy
action in terms of a rise in net taxes: it lowers the inflation rate. The responses are not
very strong and often of weak statistical significance.
8. The impulse response of consumption to a government expenditure shock cannot
be used to decide which theory fits the empirical results best. However, Keynesian
theory matches the investment responses to fiscal shocks.
For the first simulation period, the consumption response to a government expenditure
shock is positive. But contrary to Heppke-Falk et al. [61], the estimated cumulative
impulse response of consumption after 4 quarters is negative and statistically insignifi-
cant. Since consumption depends on income and output declines due to a positive gov-
ernment expenditure shock, consumption decreases. Thus, we cannot decide with the
consumption response which theory matches the empirical results. Moreover, contrary
to Heppke-Falk et al. [61], investment responds statistically significantly to fiscal shocks.
The responses suggest that Keynesian theory matches the empirical results since they
respond conversely to a positive government expenditure and a positive net tax shock.
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9. Exports decline statistically significantly due to fiscal shocks with high impact
factors.
There are spill-over effects of German fiscal policy to other countries. An explanation
was partly given in the sections including the interest, the inflation, and the exchange
rate as endogenous variables: exports decrease due to a rise in government expenditure
(to an expansionary fiscal stimulus) because the expansion causes the inflation rate to
rise such that the price level rises. Goods are more expensive if we assume that the
exchange rate does not adjust such that the foreign demand lowers. The interest rate
increases due to the additional deficit, which is partly financed by issuing bonds. The
higher interest rate attracts foreign investors such that they acquire domestic assets. As
a consequence, the home currency appreciates such that domestically produced goods
are more expensive for foreigners. This lowers exports additionally. If the interest rate
does not rise leading to a currency appreciation, the higher inflation rate would cause
the currency to depreciate and exports would be cheaper for foreigners such that they
augment. Thus, the interest rate response prevents a rise in exports due to expansionary
fiscal policy in terms of an increase in government expenditure.
A net tax shock has a negative impact on exports because the private consumers from
abroad expect higher prices due to an increase in taxes.
10. Imports from EMU member countries are affected negatively and strongly in in-
tensity due to fiscal shocks.
The result is robust to the reduced form model, where the interest rate and the exchange
rate channel are switched off. In an economic environment being a monetary union or
not, national fiscal policy lowers the imports from EMU member countries. The inflation
rate rises if government spending is raised and causes the imports to decline, whereas
the expectation of higher prices due to a rise in net taxes leads to a decline in imports,
too. As a consequence, exports and the GDP of EMU member countries are affected
negatively by a rise in German government expenditures or a rise in German net taxes.
Overall, since the responses of exports and EMU-imports to fiscal shocks are statistically
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significant at least for some periods, we detect spill-overs of German fiscal policy to
foreign countries.
5.7 Conclusions
We have studied the effect of fiscal shocks in an SVAR framework in the underlying
chapter and have tried to answer the question whether fiscal policy is effective in stabi-
lizing output and how economic variables are affected by fiscal shocks. Different model
settings have been used to analyze the robustness of results. We have found the follow-
ing: a positive shock in government expenditure leads to an increase in overall deficits,
whereas a rise in the net tax revenue lowers the deficit. Changing government spending
is more effective in the medium run, whereas tax changes seem to be more effective in
the short run.
When comparing a positive government spending shock with a positive shock in net
taxes, output first responds as expected, it rises due to an expansion in government ex-
penditure and declines due to the restrictive tax shock. But after some periods, output
sharply declines due to the expansionary spending shock for all model variations. There
were several approaches to explain this response. We observed a strong decline in invest-
ment, which could cause the decline in output: if the crowding out effect of investment
is strong enough, output could even decline due to the expansionary shock. Moreover,
the negative response of output to a positive government spending shock could be due
to a loss in credibility of the fiscal policy institution. By raising government spending,
debt rises and individuals lower their economic activity. A different approach was that
the additional spending in the case of a positive expenditure shock is mainly used to
stabilize the labor market such that output is not extended. Moreover, one can argue
that the methodology of an SVAR model depends on institutional information and is
thus sensitive to the estimated output and price elasticities lowering the robustness of
results. A shock in net taxes has a long lasting negative overall impact on output. The
restrictive fiscal policy action affects output as expected.
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Overall, the estimated impact of fiscal shocks is very low. Thus, fiscal policy does not
seem to be a strong instrument in stabilizing output.
Contrary to the weak influence of fiscal shocks on output, the estimated impact on other
components of GDP is stronger. Investment, exports, and imports respond with a high
intensity to fiscal shocks. The inflation rate responds in most parts positively to a gov-
ernment spending shock and negatively to a net tax shock. The impact on inflation is
not very strong and in some cases statistically insignificant.
Exports are affected negatively by both fiscal shocks. The estimated impact factor is
high. Thus, German fiscal policy affects the import behavior of foreign countries. More-
over, the last two model variations (the 7 variables and the reduced form model) have
analyzed if there are spill-over effects of German fiscal policy specifically on other EMU
member countries. EMU-imports decline due to a fiscal shock with high estimated im-
pact factors. As a consequence, the exports and thus the GDP of the respective EMU
member countries are affected.
Fiscal shocks lower exports and the imports from EMU member countries statistically
significantly if we assume that the exchange rate channel and the interest rate channel
does not work, which would be true in a perfectly functioning European Monetary Union
with one currency and one monetary policy authority.
We have found that fiscal policy seems to be not very effective in stabilizing the GDP
but that the negative effect on exports and imports is significant. Overall, the empirical
results indicate that the EMU is sensitive to German fiscal shocks. We detect severe
spill-over effects.
As a consequence, single EMU member countries should pursue fiscal policy very care-
fully such that they do not jeopardize the stability of the whole monetary union as
economic entity.
A fiscal coordination might be a valuable tool to strengthen the economic standing of
the EMU.
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Conclusions and Outlook
In times of the late 2000s economic crisis, lasting debt problems in member countries of
the European Monetary Union as Greece and Italy, and necessary fiscal policy decisions
as the stepwise enhancement of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the
analysis of fiscal policy is more important than ever.
The underlying thesis highlights different aspects of this complex topic as, e.g., the influ-
ence of the public debt structure on the economic performance of a country. The role of
external debt or, in particular, external debt defaults are studied in the literature—see
amongst others Eichengreen [43], Eichengreen and Lindert [44], or Lindert and Morton
[86].
However, domestic public debt is analyzed only rarely so far. In most theoretical models,
it is assumed that government debt is always honored such that there is no need of policy
decisions or such that a debt reduction policy is irrelevant because Ricardian equivalence
holds as in Barro [7]. Furthermore, domestic public debt is mostly included in the former
type of models as the driving force for the level of prices operating through the budget
constraint of the government—see Woodford [128] or with overlapping generations—see
Diamond [41].1
There are only few available data for domestic public debt2 and almost no empirical
1See also Reinhart and Rogoff [112].
2This is true particularly for data prior to 1980.
226
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
studies. The analysis of domestic debt defaults, which took place in the past, for exam-
ple in Argentina in 1989, is neglected in most parts. Reinhart and Rogoff [112] suggest
that the public domestic debt should be studied in more detail to fully understand the
public sector. They give a starting point by describing domestic debt crises. Moreover,
they develop a historical database for internal public debt (Reinhart and Rogoff [113]).
As shown in Chapter 2 of the underlying thesis, where an economy with different types
of debt has been compared, the relation between internal and external public debt, that
means its composition, is crucial for the performance of the economy if debt rises. Par-
ticularly, the analysis of domestic public debt in fiscal policy decisions might be one
important topic for future academic and policy research.
Overall, it may be worthwhile that fiscal policy institutions take the debt structure into
account to ensure a precise efficacy of fiscal stimuli.
The European Monetary Union (EMU) as a special economic entity of national coun-
tries with independent fiscal authorities and one union-wide central bank (the European
Central Bank, ECB) is subject of many studies. The compatibility of fiscal and mon-
etary policy as well as the consequences of this special economic structure are widely
discussed—see, e.g., the chapters published in Butti [29]. Moreover, the fiscal and mon-
etary behavior before and after the establishment of the EMU are compared. With
the new economic structure, the ECB conducts monetary policy with the main aim to
preserve price stability within the union. The national fiscal policy behavior is con-
strained by the Stability and Growth Pact requiring that national deficits never exceed
3% of GDP. It seems reasonable to suppose that the policy behavior is different for the
pre-EMU and past-EMU period. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay [6] show that policy
changed less drastic than anticipated before the establishment of the EMU.
Since some member countries of the European Monetary Union are indebted with very
high rates, the analysis of debt shocks becomes more important than ever. For example
the debt to GDP ratio in Greece grew rapidly from 110.7% in 2008 (being 127.1% in
2009 and 142.8% in 2010) to about 165% in 2011. This increase was not gradual over
many years but rather resembled a shock.
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We examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis the national effect of a rise in debt and com-
pared different debt levels as a starting point for a debt shock analysis. Direct and
indirect taxes were used as national fiscal instruments to reduce debt without causing
high welfare losses. In this context, the impact of fiscal spill-overs and the role of fiscal
coordination across member countries of the EMU can be seen as one important topic
for future academic research. With the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a
first move of fiscal coordination has been made such that time series data will be avail-
able soon to cross-check theoretical findings in this field of research.
Chapter 4 and 5 of the underlying thesis have provided an empirical analysis of German
fiscal policy. In particular, we have stated in Chapter 4 that there are periods of con-
tractionary as well as expansionary fiscal policy as shown in the following figure:
time
exp.fiscal policy
contr. fiscal policy
Figure 6.1: Periods of Restrictive and Expansionary Fiscal Policy in Germany
According to economic theory, the respective chosen manner of fiscal policy influences
the GDP. If the government pursues an expansionary fiscal policy, the GDP should in-
crease whereas it should decrease if restrictive fiscal policy is conducted. Figure 6.2
shows the development of real GDP in times of expansionary or contractionary fiscal
policy in Germany for 1991-2009. Two factors of influence are reflected in the run of
the curve: the real GDP data show fluctuations, which are partly due to business cycles
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and partly due to fiscal decision responses.
In the first period of expansionary fiscal policy (1991-1995), GDP first decreases but rises
in the course of time. For the first purple area, i.e., restrictive fiscal policy in 1995-1999,
it cannot be observed that GDP decreases or that the increase in GDP weakens. The
GDP data series is interfered with an opposing business cycle fluctuation or fiscal policy
does not work as expected. 1999-2000 is a period with high growth rates as well as
expansionary fiscal policy. This fits to our expectation. Also for 2000-2002, expansion-
ary policy is conducted, but the observed high increase of GDP weakens in this period.
For 2002-2005, restrictive fiscal policy is conducted and the increase in GDP seems to
be effectively damped. In the second half of this last period of restrictive fiscal policy
(2005-2007), GDP strongly increases although restrictive policy is pursued. Finally, in
2009, the sharp decline in GDP indicates that the economic crisis takes place in a period
of expansionary fiscal policy.
realGDP
time
exp. fiscal policy
contr. fiscal policy
Figure 6.2: The GDP in Periods of Contractionary and Expansionary Fiscal Policy
Thus, the effectiveness of fiscal policy has to be discussed. For some periods, the fiscal
stimulus seems to be strong enough to affect GDP in the expected way. But there are
also periods, where the fiscal actions are too weak to influence GDP sufficiently. In other
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periods, fiscal policy does not seem to affect GDP at all in the expected way as, e.g.,
for restrictive fiscal policy in 2006 when cyclical fluctuations entirely overlay the fiscal
effect.
Not only the GDP but also the actual budget balance responds to fiscal policy according
to theory. The actual budget balance in the underlying context is defined as the differ-
ence of government tax revenue and government spending. Since contractionary fiscal
policy is characterized as a reduction in government spending or a raise in net taxes,
the budget balance increases in that case. Conversely, if expansionary fiscal policy is
conducted (i.e., government spending is raised or net taxes lowered), the budget balance
decreases. Figure 6.3 shows the actual budget balance in percent of GDP.
budgetbalance
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Figure 6.3: The Budget Balance with Restrictive and Expansionary Fiscal Policy
If restrictive and expansionary fiscal policy would be effective in a way perfectly com-
patible with theory, the budget balance in percent of GDP would show a clear pattern:
with restrictive fiscal policy, the budget balance should increase and GDP should de-
crease such that the ratio of these two components overall would increase. The converse
is true for expansionary fiscal policy: in that case, the budget balance should decrease
and GDP should increase such that the ratio decreases. But GDP does not respond in
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the expected way, probably occasionally influenced by the business cycle. Nonetheless,
the actual budget balance in percent of GDP is affected in the theoretically expected
way. In periods of contractionary fiscal policy (purple area), the actual budget balance
in percent of the actual GDP increases whereas it decreases within a period of expansion-
ary fiscal policy (green area). Especially the strong fall in 2000-2003 and in 2007-2009
as well as the strong increase in 2006-2007 illustrates the direct influence of the type of
fiscal policy on the budget balance, which seems to be so strong that it outweighs the
unexpected response of output on the respective type of fiscal policy.
Additional to the results discussed so far, we have found in Chapter 4 that, taking
the business cycle into account, there are periods, where fiscal policy is conducted pro-
cyclically as well as periods, where fiscal policy is countercyclical. From a theoretical
point of view, countercyclical fiscal policy is expected to support the economic perfor-
mance of an economy. The following figure summarizes this result:
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Figure 6.4: Pro- and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy in Germany
Since there are also long lasting periods of pro-cyclical fiscal policy as in 1998-2000 or in
2003-2005, the German government does not seem to make fiscal policy decisions solely
due to the economic situation and thus does not pursue countercyclical fiscal policy
as suggested by Keynesian theory. The periods of pro-cyclical fiscal policy are mostly
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periods of expansionary fiscal decisions–compare also Figure 6.1. Hence, the German
government seems to raise expenditures often independent of the economic situation,
which is rather strange and needs further investigations.
In Chapter 5, the effect of fiscal policy on economic variables as output has been analyzed
using SVAR techniques. In this context, the response of output to a positive government
spending shock differs from the standard reaction of output to an expansionary fiscal
shock based on economic, in particular, on Keynesian theory. Output declines some
periods after the shock. One important topic for future research would be to verify the
suggested explanations in Chapter 5. In particular, German government expenditures
have a special structure since they are used not only to stabilize output, but also in
major parts to stabilize the labor market. This labor market stabilization seems to be
successful so far and could perhaps be used to explain the decline in output. More work
is needed to test the formulated hypotheses.
The empirical findings in Chapter 5 have indicated that there are spill-over effects of
German fiscal policy on other EMU member countries or even on the rest of the world.
As a consequence, fiscal coordination may be a valuable tool in stabilizing the European
Monetary Union as one of the largest existing economic entities.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A
A.1 Optimal Choices for the Baseline Model
The following section shows the optimal choices of consumption and saving for the initial
parents- and the children-generation without the restrictive assumption that σ = 1. The
optimal consumption choice of the initial old generation only depends on the initial en-
dowment and the interest rate in period 2. Hence, it is independent of σ, the coefficient
of relative risk aversion.
The optimal decisions concerning the consumption and saving in period 2 and the con-
sumption in period 3 for the initial parents-generation is given by
Cˇ2,2 =
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)(
1−
1
1 + β−1/σ (1 + r3 − δ)
1−1/σ
)
,
Sˇ2,2 =
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)
1 + β−1/σ (1 + r3 − δ)
1−1/σ
, and
Cˇ3,3 = (1 + r3 − δ) Sˇ2,2 =
(1 + r3 − δ)
(
w˜2 − d˜2
)
1 + β−1/σ (1 + r3 − δ)
1−1/σ
.
Finally, using the first order conditions of the maximization problem of the children-
generation, we obtain as optimal choices for consumption and saving
Cˇ1,t =
(
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
/ (1 + rt+1 − δ) + d˜t/ (1 + gn)[
1 +
(
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+2 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
] ,
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Sˇ1,t = −
(
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
/ (1 + rt+1 − δ) + d˜t/ (1 + gn)[
1 +
(
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+2 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
]
+
d˜t
1 + gn
,
Cˇ2,t+1 =
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
[(
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
+ d˜t1+gn (1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
[
1 +
(
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+2 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
] ,
Sˇ2,t+1 = −
[
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
] (
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
[
1 +
(
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+2 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
]
+w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
, and
Cˇ3,t+2 =
[
−
[
w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
] (
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
[
1 +
(
1 + β1/σ (1 + rt+2 − δ)
1/σ−1
)
β1/σ (1 + rt+1 − δ)
1/σ−1
]
+w˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
]
(1 + rt+2 − δ) .
A.2 Derivation of the Asset Market Clearing Condition
Equating the two equations (2.8) and (2.9), we get
K˜t+1 =
1
1 + gn
(
K˜αt + (1− δ)K˜t − Cˇ1,t(1 + gn)− Cˇ2,t −
Cˇ3,t
1 + gn
)
. (A.1)
From the constraints of the optimization problem for the arbitrary children-generation,
we can describe Cˇ1,t, Cˇ2,t, and Cˇ3,t with equation (2.3.1), (2.3.3), and (2.3.5).
Inserting this into equation (A.1), we get:
K˜t+1 =
1
1 + gn
(
K˜αt + (1− δ)K˜t + (1 + gn)sˇ1,t − w˜t − (1 + rt − δ)Sˇ1,t−1 + Sˇ2,t
−
1 + rt − δ
1 + gn
Sˇ2,t−1
)
.
With equation (2.12), K˜t+1 can be described as:
K˜t+1 =
1
1 + gn
(
(1 + rt − δ)K˜t + (1 + gn)Sˇ1,t − (1 + rt − δ)Sˇ1,t−1 + Sˇ2,t
−
1 + rt − δ
1 + gn
Sˇ2,t−1
)
. (A.2)
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If we rearrange equation (A.2) in absolute terms and not in per capita or per labor
terms, the following difference equation results:
Kt+1 − Sˇ1,tN1,t − Sˇ2,tN2,t = (1 + rt − δ)
[
Kt − Sˇ1,t−1N1,t−1 − Sˇ2,t−1N2,t−1
]
. (A.3)
The only chance to solve equation (A.3) is to set Kt+1 = Sˇ1,tN1,t + Sˇ2,tN2,t ∀t, which
corresponds to the asset market clearing condition (2.5).
A.3 Optimal Choices for the Modified Model
The optimal choices for the arbitrary children-generation assuming that debt is held
exclusively by foreigners are:
Cˇ1,t =
w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
(1 + rt+1 − δ) [1 + β + β2]
, (A.DF-3.1)
Sˇ1,t =
d˜t
1 + gn
−
(w˜t+1−τ˜t+1−d˜t+1)
1+rt+1−δ
+ d˜t1+gn
[1 + β + β2]
, (A.DF-3.2)
Cˇ2,t+1 =
β
[(
w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1
)
+ d˜t1+gn (1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
[1 + β + β2]
, (A.DF-3.3)
Sˇ2,t+1 = w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
−
[
w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1+gn
]
(1 + β)
[1 + β + β2]
, (A.DF-3.4)
Cˇ3,t+2 = (1 + rt+2 − δ)
[
w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
d˜t
1 + gn
−
[
w˜t+1 − τ˜t+1 − d˜t+1 + (1 + rt+1 − δ)
dt
1+gn
]
(1 + β)
[1 + β + β2]
]
. (A.DF-3.5)
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A.4 Figures
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Figure A.1: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio with α = 1/3 and q = 0.25
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Figure A.2: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio with α = 1/3 and q = 0.25 in a
Two Dimensional View
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Figure A.3: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio with α = 1/3 and q = 0.25 (red
area), q1 = 0.3 (blue area)
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Figure A.4: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio with α = 1/3 and q = 0.25 (red
area), α = 1/2 (blue area)
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Figure A.5: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio for the Baseline Model (red
area) and the Model Specification Including Debt Held by Foreigners (blue area)
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Figure A.6: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio for the Baseline Model (red area)
and the Model Specification Including Debt (green area) Held by Domestic Citizens
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Figure A.7: Law of Motion for the Capital-Labor Ratio for the Model Specification
Including External (blue area) and Internal (green area) Debt
A.5 Derivation of the Polynomial for K˜∗bc
Starting with equation (2.DC-14), we get for the steady state value of the capital-labor
ratio (K˜t = K˜t+1 = K˜t+2 = K˜
∗) the following equation:
K˜∗
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
(
K˜∗
)1−α
=
(1− q) B˜
(1 + β + β2)
+
1
1 + gn
[(
(1− α)
(
K˜∗
)α
− α
(
K˜∗
)α−1
B˜ + (1 + gn) B˜
)(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
+
(
(1− α)
(
K˜∗
)α
−α
(
K˜∗
)α−1
B˜ + (1 + gn) B˜
)
α
(1 + gn)
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)(
K˜∗
)α−1]
−B˜.
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For an arbitrary 0 < α = 1/u < 1, we get
K˜∗
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
(
K˜∗
)u−1
u
=(
(1− q)
(1 + β + β2)
− 1 +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
))
B˜ +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(1− α)
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
) 1
u
−
((
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
−
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
))
αB˜
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
) 1−u
u
+
(1− α)α
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)(
K˜∗
) 2−u
u
−
α2B˜
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)(
K˜∗
) 2−2u
u
and therefore with u = 3:
K˜∗
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
(
K˜∗
) 2
3
=(
(1− q)
(1 + β + β2)
− 1 +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
))
B˜ +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(1− α)
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
) 1
3
−
((
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
−
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
))
αB˜
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
)− 2
3
+
(1− α)α
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)(
K˜∗
)− 1
3
−
α2B˜
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)(
K˜∗
)− 4
3
.
We see that we have a polynomial with positive as well as negative exponents. To obtain
an equation representation containing only positive exponents, w.l.o.g., we multiply the
equation with K˜
4
3 . Using this procedure, we add additional zero roots. Since we are
only interested in the largest positive real root, the procedure is valid. The following is
obtained
(
K˜∗
) 7
3
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
(
K˜∗
) 6
3
=(
(1− q)
(1 + β + β2)
− 1 +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
))
B˜
(
K˜∗
) 4
3
+
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(1− α)
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
) 5
3
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−
((
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
−
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
))
αB˜
1 + gn
(
K˜∗
) 2
3
+
(1− α)α
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)
K˜∗ −
α2B˜
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)
.
Finally, we substitute K˜
1
3 = z and get a polynomial of order 7:
z7
(
1 +
(1− q) (1− α)
α (1 + β + β2)
)
+
(1− q) (1 + gn) B˜
α (1 + β + β2)
z6 =(
(1− q)
(1 + β + β2)
− 1 +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
))
B˜z4 +
(
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
(1− α)
1 + gn
z5
−
((
β (β + q)
(1 + β + β2)
)
−
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
))
αB˜
1 + gn
z2
+
(1− α)α
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)
z3 −
α2B˜
(1 + gn)
2
(
q −
(1 + β) q
(1 + β + β2)
)
.
It is not possible to state a closed form solution for an arbitrary polynomial of order
7. Using the Newton-procedure to receive a numerical approximation for the roots of
the given equation, MATLAB [94] finds the 7 solutions. The solution set consists of 4
complex, one negative, and two positive real roots.
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Appendix B
B.1 The Data
The data used in this study are taken from three main sources: the IMF Database, the
OECD Database, and the database supplied by the Deutsche Bundesbank (BBK)/Gen-
esis. Only the number of employees in the government sector are taken from the Eurostat
Database. All data are seasonally adjusted with the standard Census X12-ARIMA
procedure for seasonal adjustment and quarterly.1 We convert all series such that they
are given in MN euro. If the original series is given in DM, we use the euro reference
quotation in 1999: 1e = 1.95583DM. Moreover, the data are transformed in a number
e.g. for population, employment, etc. Most series taken from BBK/Genesis start in
1991Q1, therefore if we additionally need data for 1988-1990, we use for this pre-period
OECD data. If not labeled otherwise, all series are in current prices. The following
tables show, which series of the corresponding sources are used:
Description Data Source
GDP OECD
Table B.1: Data Sources: GDP
1In the OECD Database all quarterly data are annualized so that we divide with four to get the
quarterly flows.
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Description Data Source
Income on Investments (Earnings) BBK/Genesis
Income on Investment (Expenditure) BBK/Genesis
Gross Operating Surplus Genesis
Profits BBK/Genesis
Private Consumption Genesis
Imports Genesis
Exports Genesis
Imports from EMU Countries BBK/Genesis
Table B.2: Data Sources: GDP Components
Description Data Source
Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation Genesis
Scrapping Rate of Capital in the Business Sector OECD
Investment in Housing OECD
Real Investment in Housing OECD
Gross Fixed Investment (Capital Formation) in Govern-
ment Sector
OECD
Total Consumption of Fixed Capital IMF
Consumption of Fixed Capital in Government Sector OECD(1988-1998)&
IMF(1999-2009)
Table B.3: Data Sources: Capital
Description Data Source
Real Effective Exchange Rate OECD
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate IMF
Long-Term Interest Rate OECD
Short-Term Interest Rate OECD
Table B.4: Data Sources: Interest and Exchange Rates
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Description Data Source
GDP Deflator with Base Year 2005 IMF
Government Final Wage Consumption Expenditure Defla-
tor
OECD
Government Fixed Capital Formation Deflator OECD
Gross Total Fixed Capital Formation Deflator OECD
CPI Index with Base Year 2005 OECD
Table B.5: Data Sources: Deflators and CPI
Description Data Source
Net Indirect Tax Income (Indirect Taxes - Subsidies) OECD
Real Net Indirect Taxes OECD
Personal Income Tax BBK/Genesis
Social Security Contributions BBK/Genesis
Corporate Tax BBK/Genesis
VAT BBK/Genesis
Import Duty Tax BBK/Genesis
Total Tax Income BBK/Genesis
Government Tax Income Excluding Social Security Contri-
butions
BBK/Genesis
Interest on Public Debt BBK/Genesis
Capital Outlay of the Government Sector BBK/Genesis
Government Transfers to Households Genesis
Subsidies DIW/IMF
Government Final Consumption Expenditure Genesis
Total Expenditure of the Government Sector BBK/Genesis
Unemployment Benefits for East and West Germany BBK/Genesis
Table B.6: Data Sources: Government Sector Variables
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Description Data Source
Population Genesis
Total Labor Force OECD
Total Employment OECD
Total Number of Unemployed OECD
Total Self-Employed OECD
Employment in the Government Sector Eurostat
Wages for All Sectors OECD
Compensation Per Employee in Private Sector OECD
Wages in the Government Sector OECD(1988-1990)&
BBK/Genesis(1991-2009)
Table B.7: Data Sources: Population, Labor, and Wages
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Appendix C
C.1 Figures for Germany
The first subsection of Appendix C.1 examines the calculated employment and gross
value-added in the business sector to give an overview of the actual development in
Germany. The second subsection analyzes the participation ratio for the whole labor
market pointing out the problems of data collection in the reunification period of Ger-
many. The importance of different labor shares is shown by comparing potential output
and the output gap derived under different labor shares 1− α in the third subsection.
C.1.1 The Business Sector
Figure C.1 shows the time dependent behavior of the employment in the business sector,
which consists of employees and self-employed. The graph is plotted for 1988-2009 where
the data for 1988-1990 correspond only to West Germany. We see a sharp increase in
the number of employment due to the reunification of two different economic entities.
The gross value-added in the business sector does not increase that sharply—see Figure
C.2.1 Despite the sharp increase in employment, the additional workers can not produce
a proportionately high additional outcome. They seem to be less productive on average—
see also Figure 4.2 on the total factor productivity in Section 4.2.
1The data for 1988-1990 correspond to West Germany.
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Figure C.1: The Development of Employment in the Business Sector for 1988-2009
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Figure C.2: Gross Value-Added in the Business Sector for 1988-2009
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C.1.2 The Participation Ratio of The Labor Market
The graph of the participation ratio in the labor market between 1991-2009 is shown
in Figure C.3. Due to the reunification one faces some problems when capturing the
data such that the first two plotted observations in 1991Q1 and 1991Q2 can be seen as
outliers because the two data points are unexpectedly high. To avoid endpoint problems,
the series is augmented with data for 1988-1990 and then smoothed using a HP-filter
with λHP = 1600.
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Figure C.3: The Labor Market Participation Ratio for 1991-2009
The filtered series (dashed line) lies far below the two outliers2, whereas in the remaining
run of the curve it is closer to the very volatile participation ratio (solid line). Partici-
pation in labor declines within 1991-2004 and increases afterwards.
C.1.3 The Effects of Varying the Labor Share 1− α
Figure C.4 shows the potential output for two different choices of the labor share. The
black line takes the originally calculated average labor share (1 − α = 0.5595) into ac-
count, whereas the blue line assumes that 1 − αnew = 0.65. We see that all calculated
2Our presumption of an outlier in the data series is confirmed.
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values for the potential output are significantly lower, the higher 1− α.
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Figure C.4: Potential Output for Two Different Labor Shares
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Figure C.5: The Output Gap for Two Different Labor Shares
Since potential output is estimated with lower values for a higher average labor share,
the corresponding output gap being the deviation of actual from potential output as
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a ratio of the potential level is more often positive when 1 − α is higher. The black
line for the output gap with 1 − α = 0.5595 in Figure C.5 lies below the blue line with
1 − αnew = 0.65 for all periods. Since the average labor share is higher without taking
2006-2009 into account, it is reasonable that the IMF calculates a higher output gap for
1999 and 2001.
C.2 Selected Data Plots for Germany
The following section offers a closer description of the inflation rate, the long term inter-
est rate, overall imports and imports from EMU member countries, and the real effective
exchange rate for Germany in 1991-2009.
The discussed period 1991-2009 is influenced by a low inflation rate. The quarterly
GDP-deflator inflation rate was high at the beginning of the examined period but fluc-
tuated for most parts (for 1995-2009) around 0.2% on average.
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Figure C.7 shows the German long-term interest rate. In 1991-2009, the long-term in-
terest rate in percent was volatile and is characterized by a negative slope. Thus, it was
highest in 1991 and lowest in 2009.
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Figure C.7: The Interest Rate in Germany
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Figure C.8 shows the German imports for 1991-2009. The blue line displays the overall
imports of Germany, whereas the red line are the imports exclusively from EMU member
countries. Imports from EMU countries play a special role because within the EMU,
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there is one unique central bank interest rate and the exchange rate reaction channel is
not working any longer after the entry of Germany to the EMU in 1999.
Germany imported a high amount of goods and services from member countries of the
European Monetary Union. The overall imports showed a positive trend, which was
stronger than the trend found for imports solely purchased from the EMU member
countries. Thus, imports from the rest of the world increased more for 1999-2009.
The real effective exchange rate does not show a clear trend—see Figure C.9. It fluctu-
ated for the first two third of the plotted period (1991-2003) more than for 2003-2009.
In the latter subperiod, the real effective exchange rate varied only within a small range.
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